



# Key determinants of a successful CBDRR programme

Community Based Disaster  
Risk Reduction Study

ARUP International Development – September 2011

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***Key determinants of a successful CBDRR programme***  
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## Acknowledgments

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## Executive Summary

The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), as the ‘world’s largest humanitarian and development network’ is committed to building safety and resilience through its Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) programmes<sup>1</sup>. As a movement the Red Cross-Red Crescent (RCRC) has significant knowledge and experience of implementing CBDRR programmes. However, defining the aims and objectives of such programmes and the critical factors that influence their impact remains a challenge. This is particularly acute when comparing outcomes and approaches between communities, countries and regions.

CBDRR programmes were carried out in over 700 communities as part of the Tsunami Recovery Programme (TRP) alone. The IFRC has identified this as an opportunity to ‘identify and document lessons learned in implementing at scale CBDRR<sup>2</sup> projects to strengthen community safety and resilience...also [to] use its large evidence base to research new ideas and contribute to the wider efforts in improving CBDRR work within the IFRC’ (IFRC, 2010: 2).

This research report on the **Key determinants of a successful CBDRR Programme** has been prepared by Arup’s International Development team (Arup ID)<sup>3</sup> on behalf of the IFRC as part of a wider CBDRR Study of the TRP. Specifically, this report draws on the experience of the TRP CBDRR programmes and current literature in order to identify ‘the *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR project; including identification of the most effective interventions and services (also in terms of sustainability) in the context of these *key determinants*’ (IFRC, 2010: 3).

It is intended that the *key determinants* developed through this research will be used in the design, monitoring and evaluation of future programmes. A first step towards this is the lessons learned report which provides a further output from this study. Other outputs of the study include a “who, what, where” database of RCRC CBDRR projects; a research report identifying the *characteristics* of a safe and resilient community.

### Box 1: Additional research questions identified in the concept note (IFRC, 2010).

‘What minimum capacities are needed by NS’s at different levels (HQ and branch) to successfully manage and implement CBDRR?’

‘To what degree does community ownership play a role in impact and sustainability and how can ownership be fostered and measured/monitored?’

‘What are the necessary processes and components for effective RCRC movement coordination to ensure demand-driven CBDRR approaches and sustainability?’

‘What contributory role does VCA play in successful and sustainable CBDRR interventions?’

‘Under what circumstances does VCA contribute to a successful and sustainable CBDRR [intervention] and under what circumstances is it less effective?’

<sup>1</sup> IFRC, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/>

<sup>2</sup> The acronym CBDRR is used to include CBDP, CBHFA, CCA, ICBRR, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Arup International Development (Arup ID) operates as a not for profit group within the Arup Group Ltd (Arup). [www.arup.com/internationaldevelopment](http://www.arup.com/internationaldevelopment)




Figure 1 Diagrammatic representation of interrelationship between outputs

## Methodology

This research on the *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR programme is based on both primary and secondary data. A broad-ranging literature review provided a foundation for the study and an understanding of the wider context and debate. This was complimented by the meta-analysis of lessons learned drawn from existing RCRC CBDRR evaluations and reports. This identified 255 lessons learned that substantiated many of the issues identified in the literature review as well as highlighting additional topics; mostly relating specifically to the RCRC Movement or to the practicalities of implementing CBDRR programmes at scale. These two data sources provided a broad understanding of critical factors influencing the success of CBDRR programmes, as understood by a wide range of academics and practitioners.

In addition, key informant interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in 30 communities across Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand and the Maldives as part of the fieldwork. These communities were purposively selected to be representative of the diversity across the TRP, in terms of type of community and CBDRR programme. The data from the fieldwork provided a further reference point in defining the *key determinants* from the perspective of the community, local branches, HNSs and other stakeholders.

The four data sets were initially synthesised and analysed individually. An inductive approach to data analysis was taken whereby themes were allowed to emerge independently for each of the individual data sources. These were later synthesised and compared resulting in nine *key determinants* drawn from across all four data sets.

Further detailed analysis of this rich data set has provided additional justification and explanation of the rationale for each *key determinant*. This includes identification of the contextual parameters that might determine the success of a CBDRR programme, and should therefore be assessed before deciding to undertake a CBDRR programme; also, the key activities which can be undertaken

during the programme to increase the likelihood of success. Finally, the performance of the CBDRR TRP programmes was reviewed retrospectively in the context of the *key determinants* in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of particular interventions and approaches. Baseline assessments were typically not completed or not available in the programmes studied; or were not directly comparable across programmes or countries. Consequently, any comparison of CBDRR programmes is subjective, nevertheless provides some useful insights.

### **Key determinants of a successful CBDRR Programme**

The nine *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR programme identified as a result of this research are summarised in Box 2. They fall into three categories: stakeholders, programme design, programme management.

#### **Box 2: Key determinants of a successful CBDRR programme**

##### Stakeholders

1. The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders
2. The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them
3. The capacity of external actors (government, NGOs, private sector) and the strength of partnerships with them

##### Programme design

4. The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme
5. The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors
6. Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in programme design

##### Programme management

7. Having sufficient time to implement CBDRR programmes
8. Having sufficient funding to implement CBDRR programmes
9. Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures

These *key determinants* are based on detailed analysis of a wide range of data much of which is specific to the TRP communities where CBDRR programmes had been carried out. This provides a basis for further research in other regions, and also in communities where there has not been previous DRR interventions, in order to understand the extent to which these are globally representative.

### **TRP CBDRR programmes**

All TRP CBDRR programmes showed a strong awareness of the importance of stakeholder engagement and the range of stakeholders needed to be involved. A fundamental step in stakeholder engagement is the community selection process and this was most successful when undertaken in partnership with local government, when communities selected faced significant or regular hazards and understood the relevance of CBDRR programmes to their needs.

Lack of CBDRR capacity within the RCRC movement (particularly the HNS) was a key challenge faced in many of the TRP CBDRR programmes, as were relationships between the large number of RCRC stakeholders involved. Capacity had many facets and included a range of issues from a shortage or high turnover of staff and volunteers, through lack of skills and experience, to a need for pre-



existing manuals, guidelines or training materials, and many of these could be improved in future CBDRR programmes.

The wider enabling environment created by national government, and the capacity of local government to engage in CBDRR, had a critical impact on all programmes and led to significant variation between countries. In the most successful programmes local government was involved throughout the CBDRR process and provided continuing support to communities after completion of the RCRC programme within a supportive national government context.

Most TRP CBDRR programmes stated their intent to create community ownership over the programme, however this was difficult to achieve in practice. A critical activity in building ownership is the VCA process; both the way in which it is conducted and the response of the RCRC to the priorities and actions identified as a result. Increased RCRC capacity in the facilitation of the VCA process and in their ability to respond to the priorities identified in the VCA (in any sector) would significantly improve the impact of CBDRR programmes. However, the flexibility to respond to the needs of specific communities must be balanced against the requirements for standardisation, in order for the RCRC to implement CBDRR at scale.

The *key determinants* under stakeholders and programme design are specific to CBDRR programmes, while those under programme management are more generally applicable. Many TRP CBDRR programmes faced challenges with programme management and this led to scaling back or revision of objectives in many programmes. Allocating sufficient time for the completion of CBDRR programmes and improved mechanisms for assessment, monitoring, evaluation and financial management, combined with strong programme managers would significantly improve the success of future CBDRR programmes.

## Recommendations

- Develop a standardised CBDRR methodology, including community selection criteria, which can be applied at scale yet allows sufficient flexibility to respond to the needs of specific communities.
- Clearly communicate programme objectives and methodologies to all stakeholders through guidelines, tools and training.
- Increase RCRC capacity in the facilitation of the VCA process and in the ability to respond to the priorities identified in the VCA (in any sector).
- Improve staff/volunteer retention on CBDRR programmes and relationships between RCRC stakeholders.
- Involve local government throughout CBDRR programmes and advocate for the incorporation of DRR and CBDRR into national government policies
- Allocate sufficient time for the completion of CBDRR programmes and develop improved mechanisms for assessment, monitoring, evaluation and financial management of programmes
- Incorporate *key determinants* into standardised reporting procedures for programme implementation and into the terms of reference for external consultants undertaking evaluations of CBDRR programmes.

## Abbreviations

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ADB	Asian Development Bank
CBAT	Community Based Action Team
CBDRR	Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction
CBFA	Community Based First Aid
CBHFA	Community Based Health and First Aid
CDRT	Community Disaster Risk Team
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EWS	Early Warning System
HNS	Host RCRC National Society
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PNS	Partner RCRC National Society
RCRC	Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
TRP	Tsunami Recovery Programme
(H)VCA	(Hazard) Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
VDMC	Village Disaster Management Committee

# 1 Introduction

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The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), as the ‘world’s largest humanitarian and development network’ is committed to building safety and resilience through its Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) programmes<sup>4</sup>. As a movement the Red Cross-Red Crescent (RCRC) has significant knowledge and experience of implementing CBDRR programmes. However, defining the aims and objectives of such programmes and the critical factors that influence their impact remains a challenge. This is particularly acute when comparing outcomes and approaches between communities, countries and regions.

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This research report on the **Key determinants of a successful CBDRR Programme** has been prepared by Arup’s International Development team (Arup ID)<sup>6</sup> on behalf of the IFRC as part of a wider CBDRR Study of the TRP. Specifically, this report draws on the experience of the TRP CBDRR programmes and current literature in order to identify ‘the *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR project; including identification of the most effective interventions and services (also in terms of sustainability) in the context of these *key determinants*’ (IFRC, 2010: 3).

It is intended that the *key determinants* developed through this research will be used in the design, monitoring and evaluation of future programmes. A first step towards this is the lessons learned report which provides a further output from this study. Other outputs of the study include a “who, what, where” database of RCRC CBDRR projects; and a research report identifying the *characteristics* of safe and resilient communities.

This research report is structured as follows:

- Section two: provides an overview of the **scope and methodology** of the literature review and the fieldwork.
- Section three: presents a summary of the **findings** from both desktop and field-based research.
- Section four: summarises the **analysis** of the data obtained from the literature review and fieldwork from which we identified nine *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR programme, and considers the performance of CBDRR TRP programmes in this context.
- Section five: concludes with **recommendations** for future research and suggestions as to how the *key determinants* might inform future design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes.

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<sup>4</sup> IFRC, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/>

<sup>5</sup> The acronym CBDRR is used to include CBDRP, CBDRM, ICBRR, etc.

<sup>6</sup> Arup International Development (Arup ID) operates as a not for profit group within the Arup Group Ltd (Arup). [www.arup.com/internationaldevelopment](http://www.arup.com/internationaldevelopment)

## 2 Research Methodology

The research on the *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR programme is based on both primary and secondary data. There are four main inputs (Figure 2):

- Literature Review
- Meta-analysis of lessons learned identified in existing RCRC CBDRR evaluations/final reports
- Key Informant Interviews conducted during the fieldwork
- Focus Group Discussions conducted during the fieldwork

The literature review provided a foundation for the study and an understanding of the wider context and debate. This was complimented by the meta-analysis of lessons learned which both reinforced issues identified in the initial literature review and identified additional themes - often related specifically to the RCRC Movement or to the practicalities of implementing CBDRR programmes at scale.

Primary data was collected through qualitative fieldwork undertaken by Arup ID, in partnership with HNS's from January-March 2011. 30 communities across Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand and the Maldives were purposively selected to be representative of the diversity across the TRP, in terms of type of community and CBDRR programme. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions conducted during the fieldwork provided a further reference point for this research. The former included the specific insights of individuals involved in the implementation of CBDRR programmes, while the later collated the opinions of focus group participants in each community.

An inductive approach to data analysis was taken whereby themes were allowed to emerge from each of the individual data sources. These were later synthesised and analysed to identify a common set of *key determinants* across all sources. This resulting list of *key determinants* combines the perspectives of a wide range of academics and practitioners with perspectives from the community and local stakeholders.




Figure 2 Diagrammatic representation of research methodology

## 2.1 Literature Review

The literature review made reference to both peer reviewed publications as well as ‘grey literature’ as secondary data sources. An initial scoping study identified that there was a limited range of literature available specific to the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes and that members of the IFRC had authored or contributed to many of the documents in existence.

Literature included in the review fell into two main categories:

- guidance for those conducting CBDRR interventions (e.g. ADPC, 2006; Twigg, 2009; UN ISDR, 2008; USIOTWS, 2007)
- lessons learnt from implementing CBDRR interventions and suggested best practices for ensuring successful and sustainable interventions (e.g. BRCS, 2008; IFRC, 2006; Sida, 2010b).

The purpose of the literature review was to compile a ‘long list’ of *key determinants* which could be grouped and refined in order to generate a hypothesis for comparison with the findings from the fieldwork. The *key determinants* identified were subsequently mapped against the project lifecycle (ADPC, 2006) to provide a framework for analysis. This allowed comparison between programmes, highlighting critical activities and their timings in the project lifecycle.

Table 1 Documents included in the literature review

Author	Document/text
ADPC (2006)	Critical Guidelines: Community-based disaster risk management
BRCS (2008)	Process documentation on BRCS’s participatory and integrated approach to build community resilience
IFRC (2006)	Vulnerability and capacity assessment: Lessons learned and recommendations
IFRC (2009)	Integrated Community Based Risk Reductions (ICBRR) in Aceh
Kafle, S. (2010)	Measuring Community Resilience: A tool for baseline survey, program monitoring and progress reporting of a Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction Program
Sida, L. (2009)	Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami Operation: Evaluations and Lessons Learned Review
Sida, L. (2010b)	Meta-evaluation of the American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Programme
Twigg, J. (2009)	Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community: A Guidance Note
UN ISDR (2004)	A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives – Subchapter 3.4 “Community Action”
UN ISDR (2008)	Indicators of Progress: Guidance on measuring the reduction of disaster risks and the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action
USIOTWS (2007)	How Resilient is Your Community?: A guide for evaluating coastal community resilience to tsunamis and other hazards

## 2.2 Meta-Analysis of Lessons Learned

Consultation with PNS, HNS and the IFRC identified 15 programme evaluations or final reports which could be included in the meta-analysis of lessons learned (Table 2). Nine of these documents were external evaluations, while the remainder were internal end of programme or yearly progress reports.

A review of these programme documents identified 255 lessons learned or recommendations and these were analysed and grouped into themes. As these documents were all concerned with RCRC programmes, there was a specific focus on the *key determinants* that are of particular relevance to the implementation of CBDRR programmes within the RCRC movement.

Table 2 Programme evaluations analysed

Country	PNS	Report title
Indonesia	American Red Cross	Sida, L. & Pranawisanty, T.G. (2010) <i>Final Evaluation of the Indonesia Integrated Community based Risk reduction Program. June 2010</i>
	American Red Cross	AmCross (201) <i>Final Project Report: Integrated Community-Based Risk Reduction, July 2006-June 2010.</i>
	Belgium Red Cross	Belgium RC (2009) <i>DGDC Report – Action Plan – Year 2009</i>
	British Red Cross	Burton, C. & Brett, J. (2009) <i>British Red Cross Society Tsunami Recovery Programme, Aceh, Indonesia. Impact Evaluation</i>
	Canadian Red Cross	Bhatt, M.R. (2009) <i>Integrated Community-Based Risk Reduction and Early Warning System in Post-Tsunami Indonesia: An External Mid-term Evaluation for the Canadian Red Cross</i>
	Danish Red Cross	Danish Red Cross (2009) <i>Integrated Community Based Risk Reduction Programme: Aceh Jaya District, Indonesia. Final Report, December 2009</i>
Maldives	British Red Cross	? (2008) <i>BRCS MRP Final Evaluation Report</i>
Sri Lanka	IFRC	SLRCS (2010) <i>Final Evaluation Report of Community Based Disaster Management (CBDM) Project</i>
	American Red Cross	Sida, L. & Jayawardhana, L.C. (2010) <i>Final evaluation of the Sri Lanka disaster preparedness program, August 2010.</i>
	British Red Cross	Wilderspin, I. et al (2007) <i>Mid-term review of the community based disaster risk management project in Batticaloa</i>
	Danish Red Cross	DRC (2010) <i>Final Report: Community Based Disaster Management Program, SLRCS Monaragala Branch</i>
	Danish Red Cross	DRC (2010) <i>Final Report: Community Based Disaster Management Program, SLRCS Ampara Branch</i>
Thailand	IFRC (and AmCross)	Kunaphinun, A. (2008) <i>Disaster Management Programme Final Report</i>
	American Red Cross	Sida, L. (2010a) <i>Evaluation of the American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Programme in Thailand</i>
TRP	American Red Cross	Sida, L. (2010b) <i>Meta-evaluation of the American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Programme</i>

## 2.3 Key Informant Interviews

During the field work, 72 semi-structured key informant interviews were completed across the four countries – 24 in Indonesia, 20 in Sri Lanka, 15 in the Maldives and 12 in Thailand. Key informants included:

- HNS volunteers, field officers, branch staff, national staff and board members
- PNS Country Representatives, DRR specialists and programme coordinators
- Local and national government representatives
- Heads of Village and village elders
- Members of Village Action Teams/Village Committees
- UN Agencies

Prior to the fieldwork a set of standardised questions were developed to guide the interview process (Appendix A2). Of these questions several directly related to the identification of *key determinants* (Box 3). Comments on *key determinants* also emerged in answer to other questions and more general discussion.

Interviews in all four countries were completed in either the local language with real-time translation or in English and detailed hand-written notes were taken. Several interviews in the Maldives were completed entirely in Maldivian and later transcribed.

The notes from the interviews were analysed to identify themes, informed by the findings of the literature review and meta-analysis of lessons learned.

### Box 3 Sample Questions from the Key Informant Interviews

Of the CBDRR programmes you have experience of, which programme or community do you think was most successful?

Why do you think the project was successful? What contributed to its success?

What factors within the RC do you think make CBDRR programmes more or less successful?

What external factors do you think make CBDRR programmes more or less successful?

Are CBDRR projects sustainable? What makes CBDRR projects sustainable?

## 2.4 Focus Group Discussions

As part of the fieldwork, participants in focus group discussions in eleven Indonesian, six Sri Lankan, four Thai and four Maldivian communities were asked to complete 'SWOT analysis' of CBDRR programmes (Figure 3). Focus groups were typically formed using a purposive sampling strategy that sought to include village leadership and people within the village with responsibilities relating to disaster risk reduction. Firstly, participants were asked to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the programmes themselves, and secondly the external factors contributing to their strengths and weaknesses (opportunities and threats).

Each comment made in the SWOT exercises was contributed by an individual. In other words, each participant independently identified strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Consequently, responses are individual perceptions and not necessarily reflective of the opinion of all in the focus group or even the community. Furthermore, the SWOT findings are indicative of what communities appreciated or felt was lacking in CBDRR programmes, independent of whether the community felt that the programme was a success.

For each country, the findings from the SWOT activities were entered into a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet records each comment made, the community in which the comment was made and the number of times the comment was made. The findings for each country were then grouped into strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. These grouped findings were then manually analysed and categorised into themes. Categories were generated for each country on the basis of the material in the SWOT rather than sorting the comments into predefined categories.



Figure 3 Focus Group Discussions in Communities



## 3 Findings

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This section summarises the findings from the four data sources: the literature review, meta-analysis of lessons learned, key informant interviews and focus group discussions with community leaders. The full text of each data source can be found in Appendices B1-B4. An inductive approach was taken to the research, so different themes and structures were allowed to develop from each source. These were then synthesised and compared to derive the final list of *key determinants*. See Section 4.1.

### 3.1 Literature Review

*Key determinants* identified throughout the literature review were mapped against the project lifecycle. A wide range of factors were identified ranging from the importance of gathering local knowledge on hazardous conditions (ADPC, 2006; UN ISDR, 2004) to training and mobilising community volunteers to implement disaster risk reduction activities (IFRC, 2009). These were summarised and grouped into the following themes.

**Context:** external factors and conditions

Critical factors and conditions describe the context in which a programme is implemented and form what Twigg (2009) describes as an “enabling environment”. They may positively or negatively influence a programme. The literature identified a number of contextual *key determinants* that should be considered such as political will and governance, cultural factors, branch capacity and planning policy.

Whilst many of the critical factors stem from national level policy and social structures, it may be possible to take action as part of the programme that will influence the enabling environment in the longer term. The scale of the programme will inform the degree to which it is possible to address this.

**Approach:** the factors relating to the manner in which the programme is implemented

A range of *key determinants* related to the programme approach were identified. They can be considered as underlying themes and are important to consider throughout the project cycle. Examples include ensuring sufficient time, transparency and wide dissemination.

**Process:** the factors which are critical during the programme lifecycle

This group of *key determinants* are important factors that represent processes or activities undertaken during the lifecycle of a CBDRR programme. For example, the community selection process, VCA, drills and simulations and CBO formation.

**Sustainability:** the factors that result in greater and lasting impact

A number of the *key determinants* should be continual processes, which do not end with the official withdrawal of the external partners from a community. This means ensuring that the community itself takes full ownership of and sees real value in the programme. These *key determinants* are specifically highlighted from within the first three groups.

Table 3 *Key determinants* identified in the literature review

CONTEXT	APPROACH	PROCESS
Political will and governance	Sufficient time	Contextualisation
Policy and legal framework	Transparency	Socialisation and orientation
Institutional policy	Participation	Branch training
Culture	Partnerships and cooperation	Project management
Relevance	Dissemination	Community selection process
Branch capacity		Community actors
Planning Policy		VCA
		Risk management
		Disaster response plans
		Roles and responsibilities
		CBO formation and training
		Budgets
		Education
		Training of trainers
		Refresher training
		Drills/simulations
		Community review and updates
		Community disaster plans
		Monitoring and evaluation
		Accountability
		Implementation training
Please note: Factors identified specifically in relation to <b>SUSTAINABILITY</b> are highlighted in blue.		

A detailed description of the findings from the literature review can be found in Appendix B1.

## 3.2 Meta-Analysis of Lessons Learned

Meta-analysis of 15 programme evaluations or final reports identified 255 lessons learned or recommendations in relation to the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes. These were analysed and grouped into five themes:

- **Community:** Community selection, motivation, capacity and participation.
- **Red Cross Red Crescent:** The organisational capacity and relationships between RCRC stakeholders
- **External actors:** The motivation and capacity of the local and national government and relationships with government, NGOs and the private sector.
- **Programme design and management:** The approach and activities required to design and manage successful CBDRR programmes.
- **Sustainability:** Actions required to ensure long lasting impact of the programme.

A more detailed description of the findings from the meta-analysis of lessons learned can be found in Appendix B2.

### Community

Several authors noted that the level of **community participation and ownership** had a direct impact upon both the success and sustainability of a CBDRR programme. It was recommended that communities are consulted in the earliest stages of programme inception to ensure the programme meets their needs and captures their support (Bhatt, 2009, Burton & Brett, 2009). It was noted that ‘regular meetings...and inclusion in decision making and monitoring processes are solid prerequisites for the building of ownership, positive rapport and trust between the programme and the wider beneficiaries.’ (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

Authors from all countries highlighted the importance of **community selection** and that this was most effective when done in partnership with local government and other stakeholders. The external evaluation of the IFRC’s programme in Sri Lanka simply states that more methodical selection of districts would have produced better results (SLRCS, 2010).

Several authors noted the importance of engaging **community leaders** as they become part of, or have direct influence over, the community-based organisations established. It was noted that mobilisation of community leaders was easier if the CBDRR programme had the support of local government (SLRCS, 2010:76; Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4) and recommended that community leaders participate in CBDRR training to ‘promote better information sharing and understanding among RC[RC] and local communities’ (Kunaphinun, 2008:25).

Several authors noted the importance of community participation in the **(H)VCA** process to ensure that CBDRR programmes meet the needs of communities and are perceived as relevant. However, a number of authors noted that although communities were consulted their input was not used to influence the programme design/activities (Sida, 2010a:32; Burton & Brett, 2009:21) and that the risks identified by the communities may not have been the focus of CBDRR programmes (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:27).

**Community action teams or management committees** are consistently described as significant achievements of CBDRR programmes, and valued by communities as useful additions (BRCS Maldives, 2008:26; Bhatt, 2009:26). They were considered most effective where linkages were made with other community based organisations to allow sharing of information and experiences and encourage coordination of activities ((BRCS Maldives, 2008; SLRCS, 2010). The selection of appropriate members for the committees or action teams was also critical to the success of the programme (AmCross Indonesia, 2010).

‘In the first phase of AmCross’s programme in Indonesia, CBATs were selected by the CDMC and ‘the process was not transparent’ – leading to a low level of commitment from the CBAT as they were not volunteers. In the second phase, CBAT members were recruited through a transparent process (including an interview) and ‘as a result, the selected CBAT members showed a higher level of engagement in ICBRR project implementation’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:21).

A number of evaluations highlighted the importance of focussing on and supporting **vulnerable groups** through the CBDRR process (Burton & Brett, 2009:29; DRC Sri Lanka, 2001:33; SLRCS, 2010:76). Two reports/evaluations from Sri Lanka noted the importance of ensuring that ‘immediate benefits... go to widest section of the community or to the most vulnerable groups’ (SLRCS, 2010:76; DRC Sri Lanka, 2001:33).<sup>7</sup> While evaluations of the BRC programmes in Indonesia and the Maldives highlighted the importance of considering vulnerable groups in the targeting of CBDRR programmes (Burton & Brett, 2009; BRCS Maldives, 2008).

In Indonesia it was identified that women can be particularly active and enthusiastic members of community action teams and management committees (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4; Bhatt, 2009:14) as women had more free time to commit to the programmes and are less likely to leave communities (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:5). However to take full advantage of these qualities significant consideration has to be given to overcoming barriers to female participation (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009).

Communities often reported that **drills and simulations** were beneficial and successful elements of CBDRR programmes (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010) Sida, 2010a) but Sida highlighted that they should be relevant to the risks communities face (Sida, 2010a:5). Several evaluations recommended that they should be included in future programmes for example the Belgian RC noted that they allowed opportunities for coordination with local government and the RCRC branch emergency response team (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009).

Sida (2010b) recommends that the focus of CBDRR programmes ‘should be on teaching communities how to plan for disaster’ and that they can ‘move on’ to more complex work [such as **mitigation projects**] after achieving the basics’ (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010: 40). He states that ‘there should not be a presumption that a community will undertake a mitigation project, and this should be seen as an evolution once the team formation and training has been successfully completed’ (Sida, 2010b:44). Where mitigation projects do occur ‘communities should be involved with the design and implementation’ (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010:33; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:29-30) and they ‘should

<sup>7</sup> Although these can be seen as competing objectives.

always include a significant community contribution' (Sida, 2010b:44) to ensure relevant projects are undertaken and maintained after the end of the programme (Sida, 2010a:17).

## Red Cross Red Crescent

Several authors noted that **branch capacity**<sup>8</sup> to implement CBDRR programmes was a critical factor in their immediate and long-term impact and that it should be assessed before programme design and implementation (Burton & Brett, 2009; AmCross Indonesia, 2010; Bhatt, 2009:30).

### Steps taken to increase HNS capacity included:

- Increasing staff numbers (Kunaphinun, 2008:10)
- Investment in equipment and material resources (Kunaphinun, 2008; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010; Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010)
- Providing training to increase range and effectiveness of skills (Kunaphinun, 2008; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010; Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010).
- Using the (H)VCA as a training exercise for branch staff (Wilderspin, 2007), and as a knowledge gathering exercise for the branch in another (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010)

### Recommendations to increase HNS capacity in future programmes included:

- Field visits and lateral secondments of key members of an experienced CBDRR team into future CBDRR programmes (CRC Indonesia, 2009:29,31)
- Including specific objectives to build project management capacity of the HNS into future CBDRR programmes (Bhatt, 2009:30)
- Using the 'well-prepared national society' (WPNS) checklist as a tool to help the HNS review its strengths and weaknesses (Kunaphinun, 2008: 25)
- Creating a CBDRR team within the RCHB (Sida, 2010a)

A large number of authors reported that programmes were short-staffed and highlighted that the **availability of sufficient numbers of appropriately skilled staff and volunteers** was a significant factor affecting programme success and implementation timescales.

Almost every organisation experienced challenges with high volunteer dropout rates and staff turnover (SLRCS, 2010; DRC Indonesia, 2009; Sida, 2010a:36; Bhatt, 2009:25; Wilderspin, 2007:17; BRCS Maldives, 2010:34). The Danish Red Cross in Indonesia identified significant costs associated with a high turnover of staff; recruitment of replacement staff incurred financial costs, in addition to the loss of momentum to the project whilst new staff members are trained (Danish Red Cross Indonesia, 2009:26). Activities were delayed (Kunaphinun, 2008:9) or projects were scaled back (Sida, 2010a:6) as result of insufficient staff in Thailand.

<sup>8</sup> In the documents reviewed there were few comments on the capacities of chapters – despite the PMI chapter in Aceh playing a significant role in the coordination and implementation of the CBDRR programmes in Indonesia.

**Reasons given for high staff turnover:**

- The short-term (commonly one year) contracts under which staff were employed (Wilderspin, 2007:17; Sida, 2010a:36)
- Staff leaving to take up better paid employment with other organisations (Wilderspin, 2007:17; Bhatt, 2009:25)
- Staff being unhappy with the working environment and level of autonomy they were allowed in their work (Wilderspin, 2007:17).

The external evaluation of the IFRC's programme in Sri Lanka recommended that community facilitation teams should include people with a range of technical expertise - particularly engineering, sociology and livelihoods in addition to DRR (SLRCS, 2010) while 'selection of people with sufficient capacity to work with communities is compulsory' (SLRCS, 2010:xv). Beyond community facilitation, the ability to conduct an HVCA was highlighted as a specialist skill, with one method of overcoming limited capacity in this area being to establish a centralised HVCA unit to support community facilitators at this key stage (Sida, 2010b:7).

Where staff did not have the necessary skills, significant **training** was required, and this was particularly true for new staff members or when implementing a new programme. An induction process (including training about the RCRC and what they do and do not do) was recommended for new staff and volunteers (Wilderspin, 2007; Bhatt, 2009). Significant 'project team capacity building through training, provision of project implementation guides, manuals, and IEC materials' was recommended to familiarise project teams with new procedures prior to implementation (AmCross Indonesia, 2010). The Thai Red Cross identified the CBDRR programme itself as 'an incubator for staff to gain valuable project management skills' (Kunaphinun, 2008:25). They also undertook study visits to learn about similar programmes in Bangladesh and Indonesia (ibid:12 & 21).

A successful **relationship between the HNS and PNS** can be a significant factor in determining the success of a programme. Sida (2010b:43) states that working in partnership needs to be understood from the outset and that partnership management should be adequately resourced.

Sida & Pranawisanty recommend that 'all levels of the organisation [should be involved] in project design' (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010:40) while the external evaluation of the Canadian RC programme in Indonesia goes further in stating that future CBDRR programmes should 'Start with PMI. End with PMI. Run with PMI' (Bhatt, 2009:29), emphasising that (where the HNS has experience of CBDRR programmes) the HNS should lead in completing assessments, designing the programme and setting programme targets, timelines and indicators, with the support of the PNS.

The AmCross final report in Indonesia highlighted that 'committee and working groups serve as a coordination mechanism at the program policy level and are critical to ensuring all stakeholders have a similar understanding of program implementation' (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:23). The DRC final report in Indonesia highlights the importance of workgroup and SATGANA volunteer meetings – particularly at branch level – but describes how these did not materialise in 2008 and 2009 due to communication problems within PMI (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

Several evaluations highlight the importance of a **clear management structure** and understanding of roles and responsibilities in the programme combined with direct links and a transparent mechanism for coordination and support from the HNS NHQ down to the branches and communities (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; Kunaphinun, 2008:24, 26; AmCross Indonesia, 2010:22; Sida, 2010a:43).

## External actors

Several authors noted that **partnerships between communities and local governments**<sup>9</sup> have a key role to play in ensuring sustainability of a CBDRR programme following the withdrawal of the RCRC from a community (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:28; Kunaphinun, 2008:23; SLRCS, 2010; Kunaphinun, 2008; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39). The DRC final report in Sri Lanka recommended ‘provid[ing] opportunity for local government staff to participate in training together with community members and leaders’ (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33) while the BRCS report from the Maldives noted that capacity building of government can be done through RedR ‘intermediaries’ ‘as a long-term strategy for affecting change without compromising neutrality’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:40).

### Reasons for engaging with local government:

- ‘They have a clear mandate to engage communities and ensure their participation in planning and monitoring’ (SLRCS, 2010:76)
- They control local finances and resources (SLRCS, 2010:xv; Kunaphinun, 2008:25)
- They can provide technical support in the design and construction of community infrastructure projects (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33)
- Local government support, and formal recognition of the community based teams/committees, has a significant impact on the sustainability of the organisations established (Sida, 2010b; SLRCS, 2010:74).

In some instances **partnerships with other NGOs** were used as a sustainability strategy to ensure continued support for a programme after RCRC exit it was recommended that partnerships with other NGOs can provide specialist skills (Burton & Brett, 2009). The potential of **partnering with the private sector** is highlighted in two of the reports/evaluations (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; Bhatt, 2009:30) but specific benefits/activities are not identified other than the potential of commercial mobile phone providers to assist in transmission of early warnings (Bhatt, 2009:30).

<sup>9</sup> Specifically the office responsible for DRR in addition to departments responsible for schools, hospitals and health centres.

## Programme design and management

Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of adequate **assessment** of the context, including cultural and religious factors, (Kunaphinun, 2008:24; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:10) before beginning the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes and the American Red Cross in Indonesia recommended ‘conducting a baseline survey at the beginning of the project helps the team decide on program strategy and key activities’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:21).

It was noted that CBDRR programmes may not be appropriate in low risk contexts or middle income countries (BRCS Maldives, 2008) and that ongoing or recent conflict can have significant negative impacts on programme implementation (Kunaphinun, 2008:24; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:31; Wilderspin, 2007:13; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:4).

A key challenge identified when implementing CBDRR programmes at scale was the conflict between developing simple, **standardised** approaches to enable programmes to be replicated at scale and the need for **sufficient flexibility** to meet the requirements of individual communities. Sida noted that ‘a structured approach to programme design... allows implementation by organisations and staff with limited experience’ (2010b:7) but that ‘ARC wanted to implement a tight programme on budget and on schedule and this does not facilitate open-ended community development type processes’ (Sida, 2010a:43). While several evaluations recommended increased flexibility in programme design to ensure that programmes meet the needs of communities, ensure a ‘bottom-up’ approach and support greater community ownership (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010; SLRCS, 2010, Sida, 2010a).

Around half of the reports/evaluations discussed the advantages or disadvantages of the **integration** of community-based DRR with schools-based DRR programmes, or with programmes in other sectors (such as shelter and livelihoods (BRC Maldives and Indonesia) or health (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010:18). However, it was noted that where integration does occur, care should be taken to avoid conflict between core and non-core programme activities (Wilderspin, 2007).

Several external evaluations recommended greater levels of integration between programmes in future projects (Kunaphinun, 2008:23; BRCS Maldives, 2008:27; Bhatt, 2009:30) while the British Red Cross recommended that disaster risk reduction should be part of every programme (BRCS Maldives, 2008:4). The VCA was highlighted as a useful tool in the design and implementation of integrated programmes (Burton & Brett, 2009:29). However, it was noted that where integration does occur, care should be taken to avoid conflict between core activities and subsidiary activities (Wilderspin, 2007:21).

It was noted that mitigation projects can be integrated with other projects to meet multiple objectives, for example livelihoods projects (Bhatt, 2009:11), and healthcare projects (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:14). While a number of evaluations noted that a holistic approach to hazards, where the community-based organisations established tackle day to day development issues, as well as larger-scale disasters, increases the sustainability of the organisations established (SLRCS, 2010 & Sida, 2010b).



DRR programmes in schools were run alongside community-based DRR programmes in all countries (apart from the Maldives) and ‘schools represent a huge opportunity, especially...if tied to community work’ (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010:40). In Sri Lanka it was recognised that the schools programme was ‘one of the best ways to disseminate DRR activities’ but that the schools programme should be integrated with the CBDRR programme ‘so that the schools programme will not be isolated’, to create strong links between the Disaster Management Committee, SCH and SHI, and ‘so that disaster related information could be collected by school children’ (SLRCS, 2010:xvi & 74).

A common recommendation made within programme evaluations and reports was that more **time** was needed to complete a CBDRR programme than originally allocated (Burton & Brett, 2009:21; Kunaphinun, 2008:6). Several evaluations recommended that CBDRR programmes require at least a three year timeframe (Burton & Brett, 2009:21; Bhatt, 2009:30; Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010:44; Sida, 2010b:7).

Programmes must allow for significant two-way communication with communities and this requires adequate staff numbers, with specific technical expertise in community participation (Burton & Brett, 2009:29; BRCS Maldives, 2008:40). It is also important that programmes accommodate key religious activities (for example it is sensible to avoid activities during Ramadan) (Kunaphinun, 2008:25) and the daily schedules of communities to ensure everyone has the opportunity to participate (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

The documents reviewed highlighted fewer lessons with regard to **financial management** although problems were encountered in transferring funds between the PNS and HNS, and from HQ to branch level (Bhatt, 2009:25; Sida, 2010a:37) with delayed or irregular funding making it hard for programmes to maintain momentum.

**It was recommended that financial management could be improved by:**

- Development of programme budgets and funding sources/timescales with both board members and staff at National, Chapter and branch levels to ‘minimise the risks of over or under budgeting’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:22) and ‘so that local teams know what to expect and how to plan’ (Bhatt, 2009:31).
- Establishing an agreed accounting system (Bhatt, 2009:30)
- Increased reporting (Wilderspin, 2007:28)
- Undertaking periodical budget monitoring activities (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:22)
- Providing ‘training in financial management and reporting’ (Wilderspin, 2007:28)

Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of developing adequate **reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms** (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; Kunaphinun, 2008:24). It was noted that ‘monitoring findings had a positive impact on the qualitative nature of activities as these were identified, discussed and amended at more regular intervals.’ (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:18). Yet in order for monitoring to play a useful role it must be integrated throughout the project from the start, rather than added at the end, as it was in the Maldives (BRCS Maldives, 2008:32). Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of documenting and disseminating lessons learned (DRC Sri Lanka,

2010:33; SLRCS, 2010:xvi; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39), specifically through developing guidelines (SLRCS, 2010) or supporting knowledge transfer between staff (Bhatt, 2009:30; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

## Sustainability

The need for the development and dissemination of an **exit and sustainability strategy**, in partnership with communities, RCRC and external stakeholders, was highlighted in several evaluations to ensure that the community feels supported in the future and hence feels able to continue the programme without the presence of the RCRC in the community (AmCross Indonesia, 2010; SLRCS, 2010).

### **It was noted that the sustainability of CBDRR programmes could be improved by:**

- Building the capacity of the HNS in resource mobilisation and fundraising so that they can continue to support communities (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:6)
- Running additional simulations (Sida, 2010a:43) and providing refresher training to CBATs (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010:40; Sida, 2010a:43; DRC Indonesia, 2009:33)
- Running regular public information campaigns (for example about dengue) to keep the community organisations active (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010:44).
- Providing training to the community organisations established (DMTFs) in basic organisation running and fundraising before the end of the programme and support them to make realistic plans for future sustainability (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39)
- Providing training in financial management so that communities can manage emergency/contingency community effectively where these funds have been established (SLRCS, 2010:74)

**Continued RCRC support** to communities after the completion of the project was highlighted as key to the sustainability of the community-based organisations established (Sida, 2010b; Bhatt, 2009). However, the DRC in Indonesia describe how maintaining the CBDRR programme after its completion will be the ‘biggest challenge’ for PMI ‘due to lack of resources (financial and human) unless supported by the branch/chapter/NHQ as well as the local government authorities’ (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

### 3.3 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews conducted in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia identified the following critical factors that influence the immediate and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes (*key determinants*). Although an inductive approach was taken (allowing themes to emerge separately from each data source) the findings of the key informant interview have also been presented under the five themes identified in the meta-analysis:

- **Community:** Community selection, motivation, capacity and participation.
- **Red Cross Red Crescent:** The organisational capacity and relationships between RCRC stakeholders
- **External actors:** The motivation and capacity of the local and national government and relationships with government, NGOs and the private sector.
- **Programme design and management:** The approach and activities required to design and manage successful CBDRR programmes.
- **Sustainability:** Actions required to ensure long lasting impact of the programme.

A more detailed description of the findings from the key informant interviews can be found in Appendix B3.

#### Community

**The level of community motivation** was highlighted as a critical factor by a high number of interviewees in all four countries. The relevance of CBDRR to a community's needs was noted as the critical factor in their level of motivation - with higher levels of community motivation noted in areas with frequent natural hazards. Motivating communities to participate in CBDRR programmes in a disaster recovery context was noted as particularly challenging as "...the community are not interested in development when they need food/water" (Indonesia).

**Community selection** was a key contributing factor to community motivation and this was often completed in partnership with local government. However, the policy of some agencies to run CBDRR programmes in tsunami-affected rather than high risk communities, and the relevance of CBDRR programmes focussing on early warning/preparedness activities for communities facing stresses such as droughts and health problems, led to lower levels of community motivation.

In addition to their motivation to participate it was noted **that the level of capacity within the community** has a significant impact on the success of CBDRR programmes during their implementation. Interviewees noted that a community's capacity to engage in CBDRR programmes was dependent on the level of community cohesion or 'unity', the amount of time community members can commit to CBDRR programmes and their level of education and literacy – and that there can be significant variations between rural and urban communities in all three of these factors.

**The motivation and capacity of community leaders** was highlighted as a critical factor in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives. In Indonesia and the Maldives the Head of Village or Island Chief was sometimes the head of the

community committee established, while in Sri Lanka it was government policy that the Village Leader fulfilled this role. Interviewees noted that community leaders were motivated to participate if the community faced a high level of risk and/or if they had received a letter from sub-district or district government encouraging them to participate.

**The motivation and capacity of the community committee/action team members** was noted as a specific critical factor in Thailand and Indonesia – with particular relevance to the sustainability of CBDRR programmes. In both countries several comments were made that the community action team “must understand that they have the responsibility to implement after the PMI programme” (Indonesia) and that “committee members need to take these responsibilities seriously” (Thailand).

While mentioned infrequently **the inclusion of a wide section of community members** was highlighted in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia as a weakness where this had not been achieved. This is noted in comments such as “the main issue and weakness of the project is that it is limited to only a proportion of the community” (Sri Lanka) or “the evacuation space is the safe shelter building in the harbour and everyone in the community knows this. But we don’t have a proper communication system that can reach all the community in case of a disaster” (Maldives).

Generating a high **level of community ownership** was highlighted by several interviewees in Sri Lanka as critical to the success of CBDRR programmes – particularly in relation to sustainability. This was noted as being particularly challenging in a post-disaster context as the tsunami had created a “dependency mentality...so changing [that mindset] was difficult”.

It was noted that the **VCA and community action planning** are key steps in developing community ownership over the programme and that the way in which the VCA is conducted has a significant impact on community ownership. Several interviewees noted that “it is important that [the VCA] belongs to the village, not to the RC[RC]” and that “the idea for the steps came from the community, they initiated the next steps and the RC[RC] provided assistance”.

## Red Cross Red Crescent

**The level of HNS motivation and capacity** was consistently noted across all four countries as key to the success of CBDRR programmes. ‘Capacity’ had many facets and included: the motivation of board members and branches, skills and experience (in both individuals and organisations), availability and continuity of staff and volunteers and the existence of guidelines and manuals.

**Having a clear and agreed understanding of the CBDRR approach/concept** was highlighted as a critical factor by several interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In both countries the lack of a pre-defined CBDRR approach and the time taken to reach agreement between RCRC actors and develop manuals, guidelines and training programmes caused significant delays.

One interviewee in Sri Lanka asked “the IFRC have a programme called 'safer communities' the German Red Cross's programme is about Climate Change, the Danish Red Cross's programme is called 'conflict preparedness' and the Canadian Red Cross's programme is called 'Integrated programme approach'. How do they link together? How will it be useful to the SLRCS?”

**The skills and capacity of the PNS DRR delegate** was highlighted as a critical factor by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Interviewees noted that technical delegates had been a “massive support” but that they carried a lot of responsibility, and sometimes did not have sufficient technical expertise or local experience.

In addition to the capacity of the HNS and PNS, **having clear coordination, decision-making and management structures and procedures** within the RCRC was highlighted as a critical factor in Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia. Challenges were experienced with “unnecessary bureaucracy” in the management of CBDRR programmes, confused reporting lines, the lack of a standardised approach to programme management, difficulties in communication between branches/head office and the PNS, delays in designing the programme and transferring funds for implementation.

The importance of **having adequate monitoring and evaluation procedures**, to enable progress to be monitored and programme adjustments made, was highlighted by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, but “one of our weaknesses is the M&E” and challenges were experienced in both countries with limited time and capacity. Monthly field visits by senior PNS staff had been a successful strategy for one PNS in Indonesia while it was recommended that future CBDRR programmes should have standardised formats for reporting (progress and finance) to make it easier for the Chapter to monitor progress.

**The adequate and timely provision of financial assistance from RCRC and external partners** was a challenge identified by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In Sri Lanka delays in the provision of funding meant that “the village was flooded one more time” or that “the VDMC/community [had to] spend their own money - then the branch reimbursed.” In Indonesia challenges were noted with budgets and programmes being set (and revised) by the PNS or Chapter, with knock-on effects on the implementation of programmes on the ground.

## External actors

**The support of the national government for disaster planning or mitigation** was highlighted as a critical factor for the success of CBDRR programmes in all four countries. In Sri Lanka, the formation of Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMC) was part of the government “road map”, while in Thailand and Indonesia interviewees noted that the establishment of new government disaster management agencies meant that there were greater opportunities for collaboration.

**The motivation, capacity and support of local government** was highlighted by interviewees in all four countries as critical to both the short and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes. However, this was challenging due to lack of capacity within local governments and a lack of understanding of the CBDRR approach.

Interviewees noted that “more support by government... would have led to greater sustainability” but that “even the government officers are rotating” and “we are working on developing the capacity of the DMC themselves.”

Despite challenges experienced as a result of low capacity in local government interviewees in all four countries noted the importance of strong connections and coordination with external actors (especially local government) to both the immediate and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes. One interviewee commented that “in disaster management no one can do it alone.”

## Programme design and management

Several interviewees in Indonesia and Sri Lanka recommended greater **integration** of CBDRR programmes with other RCRC programmes – frequently health and livelihoods but also organisational development and schools. Crucially, it was noted that communities view resilience holistically - “from their perspective livelihoods, CBDRR and health are overlapping” - and that greater integration leads to more successful programmes during implementation and greater sustainability of programme impacts.

Several interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia highlighted the importance of having **sufficient time** to implement CBDRR programmes and **sufficient flexibility within the schedule** to be able to make changes to suit the needs, capacities and contexts of specific communities. To allow greater flexibility, interviewees in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka recommended greater control over the time schedule by those involved in implementing it.

Some interviewees in Indonesia described the specific challenges of trying to implement CBDRR after a disaster – specifically during the recovery phase. One PNS delegate noted that “CBDRR was not appropriate until 2 years after – [we] had to keep postponing” while another interviewee described “one of the biggest problems for us is that the community are busy. ICBRR should be done after recovery.”

Linked to both integration and having sufficient time, several interviewees in Sri Lanka noted the importance of **having sufficient flexibility within programme design**. Several interviewees in Sri Lanka noted that a lack of flexibility in programme design led to: inappropriate activities, the distribution of inappropriate equipment, an inability to meet the needs identified by communities and running CBDRR programmes in communities which did not need them.

## Sustainability

While many interviewees discussed factors affecting the sustainability of CBDRR programmes only a few interviewees explicitly highlighted the importance of having an **exit and sustainability strategy**. It was noted that the exit and sustainability strategy “needs to be designed strategically - it should be tailor made and localised,” developed early in the programme and in partnership with all stakeholders.

Many of the key informants interviewed described the challenges associated with retaining knowledge and trained personnel within communities and the importance of **having procedures so that knowledge and action teams are sustained**. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka many of the people selected for the

community-based action teams were in their late teens or early twenties – so that they were physically fit enough to assist others in an emergency and had free time to participate in training. However, several interviewees noted that this had a negative impact on the sustainability of CBDRR programmes as many of the team members had left the community to get married or look for work. Where changes in committee/action team members had occurred, challenges were often experienced in identifying replacement members and in handing over information and documentation to the new representatives.

Several interviewees highlighted challenges experienced with the **community contingency fund (CCF)**. One interviewee in Sri Lanka stated that "activity wise the biggest challenge was the CCF... conceptually it's a good idea, but the difficulty is that it is microfinance and it needs a mechanism to replenish." One programme had included training in community-based accountancy so that communities learnt how to manage and raise funding, while other interviewees recommended that it would be better to include the CCF in the community contingency plan (CCP).

In Sri Lanka and Indonesia several interviewees specifically highlighted the importance of having **formal links between the village committee/action team and government or RCRC** in increasing the sustainability of the community organisations established. Several interviewees in Sri Lanka described how once the VDMC is registered as an NGO (in accordance with the government plan) they can open a bank account, collect funds, "implement things" and contract with the government for local infrastructure projects. In Indonesia, where the groups formed by the RCRC are not formally recognised by the government, it was recommended that there should be "a formal link between the CDMC/CBAT and PMI" and that the "CDMC and CBAT should have legal status – particularly in conflict areas."

**The level of continuing support to the community after the completion of the project** was highlighted as a critical factor for the sustainability of CBDRR programmes by interviewees in all four countries. Comments centred on two main themes – firstly an ongoing relationship between the committees/action teams established and their RCRC field officer or branch and secondly the provision of refresher training as an activity which can be provided by the RCRC to support ongoing committee/action team activity.

Although mentioned infrequently, a critical factor which affected the sustainability of CBDRR programmes **was the quality and continued usefulness of the mitigation project**. In some communities mitigation projects continued to be used (and consequently maintained) by the whole community, while in others mitigation projects had subsequently fallen into disuse because they were no longer meeting the community's needs or were not maintained.

Another critical factor for the sustainability of CBDRR programmes was the provision of **appropriate and adequate equipment**. This was highlighted in all four countries in comments such as "we don't have the proper tools," "the loudspeakers do not reach the whole community" or "to provide a first aid service they need caps and jackets."

### 3.4 Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussions conducted during the fieldwork in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia highlighted a number of themes which were common across all four countries or multiple contexts. However, there was variation within and between countries as to the quality of CBDRR programmes in relation to the areas identified. A more detailed description of the findings from the focus group discussions can be found in Appendix B4.

The importance of **community engagement and involvement** in CBDRR programmes was consistently noted in focus groups in all four countries. In each country examples were cited of good community engagement but there were also assertions that the community had not been adequately informed of or involved in the programme. In Sri Lanka and the Maldives, comments about problematic community engagement and involvement outnumbered the positive examples cited, whereas this was more balanced in Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, inadequate introduction and explanation of the programme was also mentioned as contributing to poor community engagement.

In all countries, most communities discussed the **appropriateness and effectiveness of CBDRR programme components**. Infrastructure, assets, training, CBAT formation, committees and livelihood support were appreciated. However, in each country some communities noted shortcomings in areas such as:

- inappropriate training (Thailand and the Maldives)
- poorly constructed infrastructure (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)
- incomplete works (Thailand, Sri Lanka)
- inadequate funding (all countries)
- inappropriate selection of activities (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand)
- inadequate time for the programme (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)

In all four countries, **external relationships** were frequently mentioned, particularly those with different levels of government and with HNSs. In Indonesia, government assistance in the forms of finance, health services, relief items and construction were seen as strengths or opportunities. Some communities in Indonesia and Thailand mentioned that CBDRR programmes had positively increased their knowledge of who to seek assistance from and how to advocate for that assistance. However, focus groups in all four countries often noted shortcomings in Government support:

- lack of government awareness (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives)
- inadequate budgets (Indonesia)
- poor coordination (Sri Lanka)
- interference with projects (Sri Lanka, Thailand)

The **relationship with the HNS** was also mentioned by communities in each country. In each country support from the HNS and good relationships with their staff were cited as strengths and opportunities. However, in Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka cessation of activity by or support from the HNS was noted as a negative. In Indonesia and Thailand comments were made noting that once CBDRR programmes had finished, knowledge and activity in relation to DRR had declined. In Indonesian focus groups, the absence of HNS support was sometimes associated with CBAT and disaster management committee inactivity.



## 4 Analysis

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This section is structured in two parts as follows:

- The first section draws on the findings from the literature review and the fieldwork to develop a set of *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR programme.<sup>10</sup>
- The second section considers the performance of CBDRR TRP programmes in the context of the *key determinants*.

### 4.1 Key determinants of a successful CBDRR programme

The outcomes of the literature review and meta-analysis of lessons learned, plus key informant interviews and focus groups completed during the fieldwork were compiled into a spreadsheet. This enabled the data to be sorted and categorised into critical issues or *key determinants* based on data from across all four sources. Table 4 summarises which *key determinants* were identified by which sources.

The key nine determinants identified fell into three categories which reflect the thematic groups identified in the initial literature review (context, approach and process):

- Those related to the **stakeholders** involved in the programme
- Those related to **programme design** and approach
- Those related to **programme management**

Sustainability was not considered as a separate *key determinant* (or category of key determinant), as factors relating to the sustainability of CBDRR programme impacts are already inherent in the nine *key determinants*.

Further detailed analysis of the data related to each *key determinant* then provided further justification and rationale for it being a key determinant, and identified:

- Contextual conditions making it more likely that CBDRR programmes would be successful (conditions to assess before the programme)
- Key activities which can be undertaken during the programme to increase the likelihood of CBDRR programmes being successful (activities to undertake during the programme)

Appendix B5 includes the full version of the *key determinants* analysis.

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<sup>10</sup> As the definition of *key determinants* used by Arup includes both internal and external factors this section also answers the question - Under which 'critical factors and conditions...[do] CBDRR interventions have a greater probability of success'?

Table 4 Critical factors that influence the immediate and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes (*key determinants*) identified in each of the data sources.

	Literature Review	Meta-analysis of Lessons Learned	Key Informant Interviews	Focus Group Interviews
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>				
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	X	X	X	X
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	X	X	X	X
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	X	X	X	X
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>				
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	X	X	X	X
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors		X	X	
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.		X	X	
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>				
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes	X	X	X	X
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes	X	X	X	X
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.	X	X	X	

This research identified the following critical factors that influence the short and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes (*key determinants*).

## Stakeholders

### 1. The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders

**Justification:** Communities are the main actors in both the implementation and sustainability of CBDRR programmes. Community leaders often become part of, or have direct influence over, the community-based organisations established. Their support and engagement allows the CBDRR programmes to access existing internal and external networks and provides a mechanism for wider community mobilisation and long-term engagement.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

#### Before the programme:

- Communities face a high degree of risk.
- There is an existing culture of risk reduction.
- Communities have sufficient time to participate.
- Communities have higher levels of community cohesion or 'unity'.
- Communities have higher levels of education and literacy.
- Communities have prior positive experience of the RCRC movement.

NOTE: Levels of community cohesion, education and the amount of time they have available will vary between urban and rural contexts and between developmental and disaster-recovery situations.

NOTE: These factors are critical in the community selection process and in programme design. If the CBDRR programme is intended to target communities with low levels of community cohesion and education (more vulnerable communities) higher levels of staff, time and funding may be required to make the CBDRR programme a success.

#### During the programme:

- Standardised community selection criteria are developed and communities are selected in partnership with local government and other stakeholders.
- Community leaders are identified and their support obtained during the community selection process. (Note: It can be beneficial for local government to meet with or write to village leaders and encourage them to participate.)
- The CBDRR programme is adequately explained to the community (and community leaders). They understand the programme, the value to them in implementing and maintaining it, and have a shared vision of a safe and resilient community.
- Community leaders are included in CBDRR activities and long-term planning.
- CBDRR activities undertaken are relevant to the needs of the community as identified in the VCA.
- Appropriate and adequate tools and equipment (e.g. uniforms, loudspeakers, first aid kits) are provided to support the CBOs established in responding to emergencies and encourage long-term engagement.

- The mitigation project is of sufficient quality and considers future scenarios so that it has continued usefulness beyond the completion of the project.
- Adequate time and funding is allowed to complete the works.

NOTE: Where new staff or programmes are introduced, develop capacity through increasing staff numbers and providing training, or developing guidance notes and implementation manuals.

## 2. The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.

**Justification:** RCRC staff and volunteers are the main actors in the implementation of CBDRR programmes, the creation of an enabling environment and the long-term support of the community organisations established. Lack of capacity can increase costs and cause delays in programme implementation.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

### Before the programme:

- Staff members and organisations (HNS/PNS) at all levels (NHQ/Branch) have skills and experience in designing and implementing CBDRR (or community-based) programmes.
- Guidelines, training materials and manuals already exist.
- Board members and branches are motivated to participate in the implementation of CBDRR programmes and long-term support of CBOs established.

### During the programme:

- HNS capacity is assessed and all RCRC stakeholders are involved in programme design.
- RCRC stakeholders are identified, roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, and clear and transparent decision-making, coordination and management structures are established at all levels.
- The requirements for working in partnership are understood at the outset and partnership management is adequately resourced.
- There are adequate numbers and continuity of staff and volunteers.
- Staff and volunteers are managed and supported, are happy with their working environment and have authority to make decisions over their own work.
- Equitable salaries/remuneration policies are established, and incentives are provided for meeting targets and good service.
- Guidelines, training materials and manuals are developed/contextualised
- Comprehensive training is provided for branch staff/volunteers including how to train new trainers in the community.
- There is an induction process for new staff/volunteers.
- Staff undertake study visits to learn from CBDRR programmes in other locations.

- Key members of experienced CBDRR teams are seconded into new programmes.
- Community facilitation teams include people with a range of technical expertise (particularly engineering, sociology and livelihoods in addition to DRR).
- Simulations maximise opportunities for coordination with the RCRC branch.
- The capacity of the HNS in resource mobilisation and fundraising is developed so that it can continue to support communities after completion of the programme.

#### **After the programme:**

- RCRC branches have sufficient capacity to support and ongoing relationship with the CBOs established – to assist with advocacy to external actors, provide support in emergencies or provide refresher training as required.

NOTE: A specialist VCA team at provincial/national level can support branch staff in the completion and analysis of this crucial and complex activity.

### **3. The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (primarily government, but also NGOs and the private sector)**

**Justification:** Resilience is multi-sectoral and requires a range of actors to be involved. Working in partnership with external actors encourages information sharing, coordination, and provides a solid foundation for the support of DRR activities. Local government has a clear mandate to engage communities and ensure their participation. It controls local resources and can provide support to the community in the form of finance, health services and relief items – both during and after the completion of the CBDRR programme. External actors (including local government) can provide specialist skills and technical support in the design and construction of community infrastructure projects.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

#### **Before the programme:**

- Legal and regulatory systems (including building regulations and land use policies) support risk reduction activities.
- There is an established political, administrative and financial environment for CBDRR programmes within national/local government.

#### **During the programme:**

- Key actors are identified and local government support is obtained.
- Mechanisms for coordination and working in partnership are established in the initial stages of the programme, and partnership management is adequately resourced.

- Local government staff are encouraged to participate in CBDRR training and simulations with the community.
- Capacity building support is provided to local government
- A sustainability strategy is developed early in the programme and in partnership with all stakeholders.
- The CBOs established are formally recognised by national government and long-term partnerships are established between communities and local government.

#### **After the programme:**

- External actors have the capacity to provide continued support to the community after the completion of the CBDRR project.

NOTE: The RCRC are uniquely placed to work with government in the development of disaster management procedures and the generation of national level support for community-based DRR programmes.

## **Programme design**

### **4. The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme.**

**Justification:** The greater ownership a community has of a CBDRR programme, the more successful it will be during implementation and the more sustainable its impacts will be after completion.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

#### **During the programme:**

- Existing community-based organisations are identified, targeted and included in the CBDRR programme.
- There is adequate introduction to, and explanation of, the programme, so that community members understand the value of the programme, and its relevant to their needs.
- Community-based organisations (Disaster Management Committees/Disaster Response Teams) are established to provide a mechanism for community participation in the programme, where these do not already exist.
- Members of CBOs are carefully selected to ensure that they have sufficient capacity and motivation to implement the CBDRR programme and maintain activities once the RCRC supported CBDRR programme is completed.
- Leaders of different sub-villages are included in the CBO established to ensure they are representative of the whole community.
- CBO members are provided with training in assessment and the planning, implementation and maintenance of CBDRR programmes/activities.

- The VCA is used as an engagement tool, to raise awareness of hazards and risks communities face and to pro-actively engage them in managing their risks.
- Vulnerable groups are included in the (H)VCA process and their needs and capacities are identified and included.
- Simulations are relevant to the risks communities face and can be used as training devices for CBOs and to test community response
- Regular meetings are held between the RCRC, the CBOs established, village leaders and the whole community, and key outputs/documents from the CBDRR programme (e.g. VCA, Risk Reduction/Action Plan) are widely circulated, to ensure adequate understanding of the programme by all stakeholders.
- Communities develop their own Risk Reduction/Action Plans and they initiate next steps while the RCRC provides assistance.
- Communities lead the design and implementation of mitigation projects, to ensure relevant projects are undertaken and maintained after the end of the programme.
- The whole community (not just the management committee/action team) update the VCA and Risk Reduction/Action Plan to reflect issues arising out of drills, simulations or real events.
- The CBO is provided with a Community Contingency Fund (CCF), members of the CBO receive training in community-based accountancy and the CCF has a mechanism to replenish itself.
- Linkages are made between the CBOs established and other community-based organisations to allow sharing of information and experiences, encourage coordination of activities and increase the sustainability of the organisations established.
- Training of trainers ensures that knowledge can be passed on to other members of the community, after external agency staff have left, in order to sustain skill levels.
- Refresher training is provided to support ongoing committee/action team activity.
- Handover procedures are established so that when changes in committee/action team members do occur knowledge is transferred and activities are maintained.

NOTE: Women may make good members of community action teams/management committees. They may have more flexibility in their working hours which enables them to participate in CBDRR activities during the day and they may be less likely to leave communities and take the skills and experiences with them.

NOTE: Not every community will need or have the capacity to implement a physical mitigation project. If they do occur they should be driven by communities to ensure community participation and relevance to their needs.

## 5. The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors.

**Justification:** Increased integration with other sectors increases the efficiency and impact of CBDRR programmes during implementation and their long-term sustainability as they become part of everyday activities.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

### During the programme:

- Specialist multi-sectoral teams of RCRC staff/volunteers are developed so that the VCA can be used to holistically identify hazards and risks to the community and develop CBDRR programmes (in any sector) which respond to the community's needs
- Opportunities are maximised for cross-sectoral impacts of activities and the 'multi-purpose' use of mitigation projects – such as creating livelihoods opportunities in construction.
- Projects are coordinated geographically, rather than sectorally, with greater authority given to a multi-sectoral manager at branch level to allow greater integration of staff, programmes and activities.
- Longer timeframes are allowed for CBDRR programmes to enable the completion of longer-term developmental projects, tackling the root causes of vulnerability and risk (such as livelihoods or health programmes).
- A holistic approach, where the CBOs established tackle day-to-day development issues, as well as larger-scale disasters, is encouraged - to increase the relevance of CBDRR activities and increase the sustainability of the CBOs established.
- Community-based and school-based DRR programmes are run in the same villages and links are established between them to:
  - reinforce DRR messages
  - increase dissemination of DRR messages
  - support the recruitment of new CBDRR volunteers
  - support the sustainability of the CBOs established.

NOTE: The flexibility to support communities in identifying their needs holistically (not just those related to natural hazards) and working with them to develop and implement disaster risk reduction measures to specifically target those needs is crucial to the success of CBDRR programmes.

## 6. Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.

**Justification:** To enable CBDRR programmes to be understood by all stakeholders and implemented quickly and efficiently (allowing them to go to scale) while allowing alteration to activities and timelines to meet the needs of specific communities, ensure a bottom-up approach and support greater community ownership.



A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

**Before the programme:**

- Standardised locally agreed and contextualised methodologies for the implementation of CBDRR programmes (including manuals, guidelines and training programmes) already exist prior to implementation.

**During the programme:**

- Sufficient flexibility is allowed within the standard methodology to allow appropriate communities to be selected and for the programme to be tailored to meet the needs of specific communities.
- Timelines allow sufficient flexibility to enable changes to be made.
- Control over the time schedule is given to those involved in implementing it.

## 7. Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes

**Justification:** To allow time for the completion of all processes and activities and ensure new roles and activities are understood and performed well.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

**Before the programme:**

- At least three years are allowed for the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes.

**During the programme:**

- Timelines are developed in partnership with both experienced PNS/HNS staff and those responsible for implementing the programme at branch level.
- Timelines allow sufficient time to recruit and train new staff and work with local government/external partners prior to implementation.
- Programmes accommodate key cultural or religious activities and the daily schedules of communities.
- Programmes allow time for two-way communication with communities and this requires adequate staff numbers, with specific technical expertise in community participation.

NOTE: The prior existence of context specific manuals, guidelines and training programmes can significantly decrease the time required for the start-up of CBDRR programmes.

NOTE: Communication with communities requires adequate staff numbers, with specific technical expertise in community participation.

## 8. Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes.

**Justification:** To ensure all programme activities can be completed and prevent delays in implementation while waiting for funds to be released.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

### During the programme:

- Budgets and funding sources/timescales are developed in partnership with PNS/HNS staff at NHQ, chapter and branch levels to minimise the risk of over or under budgeting and so that local teams know what to expect and how to plan.
- Efficient systems for transferring funds between the PNS and HNS and between HQ and branches are established.
- An agreed accounting system is established.
- Training in financial management and reporting is provided.
- Financial reporting is integrated into standard reporting and monitoring procedures.

## 9. Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.

**Justification:** To collect data which enables strategic decisions to be made during programme design, improve the quality of CBDRR programmes as opportunities for improvement can be identified, discussed and acted upon at more regular intervals and capture lessons learnt and best practices to inform future programmes.

A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:

### During the programme:

- Adequate assessment of the context (including cultural and religious factors) is carried out at the beginning of the project (this can be a baseline assessment).
- Monitoring is integrated throughout the project from the start
- Standardised formats for reporting (progress and finance) are developed to make it easier to monitor progress and training is provided to branch staff so that they can successfully complete monitoring activities and use the outputs to better manage their programmes.
- Paper-based reporting can be supplemented by field visits by senior HNS/PNS staff
- Lessons learnt are documented and disseminated through developing guidelines or supporting knowledge transfer between staff

NOTE: CBDRR programmes may not be appropriate in low risk contexts of middle income countries. Ongoing or recent conflict can also have significant negative impacts on programme implementation.

## 4.2 Performance of TRP CBDRR programmes in the context of the *key determinants*

The performance of the CBDRR TRP programmes was reviewed retrospectively in the context of the *key determinants* in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of particular interventions and approaches. Baseline assessments were typically not completed or not available in the programmes studied; or were not directly comparable across programmes or countries. Consequently, any comparison of CBDRR programmes is subjective, nevertheless provides some useful insights.

### Stakeholders

#### 1. The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders

In Indonesia it was noted that communities were sometimes selected as ‘belonging to the areas worst hit by the 2004 tsunami’ (DRC, 2009) or where other RCRC programmes were already in operation (DRC 2009, Burton & Brett, 2009) and that sometimes this lead to minimal buy-in from communities (Burton & Brett, 2009:21). In Thailand, communities were only selected if there was ‘willingness of local stakeholders to participate’ in CBDRR programmes (Kunaphinum, 2008; Sida, 2010), however, low levels of participation still prevented further increases in capacity (Sida, 2010a).

In Sri Lanka, where a significant number of communities were neither tsunami-affected or prone to rapid-onset hazards, it was noted that ‘communities were not consulted in the selection process’ (SLRCS, 2010:70) and that communities required significant convincing to see the value of the programme (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010). The SLRCS also experienced challenges working with communities as a result of lack of trust due to its previous activities during the conflict (SLRCS, 2010).

In the Maldives it was noted that communities struggled to see the value of the CBDRR programme, due to their low risk context, and that many of those who were trained as a result of the programme (often young people) had left the island after the completion of the programme and taken the knowledge and increased capacity with them. However, it was noted that where communities were led by older, more authoritative leaders communities had increased motivation and the CBDRR programmes were most effective (Author unknown, 2008).

## **2. The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strengths of partnerships between them**

In Indonesia, most programmes cited frequent staff and volunteer turnover (Burton & Brett, 2009; Bhatt, 2009; DRC, 2009) or lack of skills and experience in CBDRR (Burton & Brett, 2009; Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010) as significant challenges to the programme. This was echoed in Thailand with comments such as ‘human resources is the major challenge of the programme’ (Kunaphinum, 2008:24) and ‘TRCS could not deploy sufficient numbers of staff to deliver the project at the desired scale in the timeframe’ (Sida, 2010a:6). In the Maldives the BRCS ‘light’ staffing policy was criticised for leaving community facilitators unsupervised and unable to effectively communicate (Author unknown, 2008:3).

In Sri Lanka it was the relationships between the branch/NHQ and SLRCS/PNS which proved critical to the success of the programme. In some programmes it was noted that the environment was plagued by sentiments of suspicion (Sida and Jayawardhana, 2010), while others highlighted the lack of close relationship between the branch and NHQ and poor dissemination down to branch level (SLRCS, 2010).

## **3. The capacity of external actors (government, NGOs, private sector) and the strength of partnerships with them**

During the Tsunami Recovery Programme in Indonesia, the national government put in place a new disaster-response organisation and structure, and this was slowly filtering down to provincial and district levels. Despite efforts to partner with local government, and recognition of the importance of their support to the sustainability of the CBDRR programmes, several programmes experienced challenges identifying and working with local government disaster-response/risk reduction actors. This is reflected in several evaluations through comments such as government DRR structures exist but are not clear (Burton & Brett, 2009) and doubts raised over who would do what following the completion of the CBDRR programme (Bhatt, 2009).

In Sri Lanka a strong institutional framework for CBDRR was established in the National Disaster Management Act No. 13 in 2005 and the ‘roadmap or Sri Lankan Disaster Management’ (SLRCS, 2010). This strongly influenced the short and long-term impact of the programme as the district government played an important role in supporting the programme, including participation in training and mitigation projects (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010), and strong links with government meant that District Disaster Management Units were able to support VDMCs after completion of the programme (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010).

In Thailand, ‘TRCs built up closer relationship with government and NGOs during programme implementation’ to the extent that ‘the local Tambon [sub-district] Administration Office integrated [the] community disaster risk reduction plan... into the TAO’s annual plan’ (Kunaphinum, 2008:22-23). In the Maldives a desire to retain a neutral position from government meant that liaison with government was through RedR partners. However, concerns are expressed that this resulted in the lack of support to CBDRR programmes after RCRC withdrawal from communities (Author unknown, 2008).

## Programme design

### 4. The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme

Most programmes, across all countries, stated their intent to ‘put the community at the backbone of the programme’ (Belgian RC, 2009:3) and ‘creat[e] ownership of the programme by the beneficiaries’ (DRC, 2010:9), however, many experienced challenges meeting this objective. The evaluation of the BRCS programme in Indonesia notes that due to time constraints “the TRP shifted from a focus on community participation in decision-making and implementation... to one of BRCS-led implementation” (Burton & Brett, 2009:25). While developing community ownership appeared to be particularly challenging in Thailand where both evaluators noted that ‘the programme does things for communities rather than with them’ (Sida, 2010:32) and ‘the sense of ownership needs to be further developed in the communities’ (Kunaphinum, 2008:23).

Different approaches to community participation are highlighted in the varying use of the VCA across the different PNS programmes. The DRC final report in Indonesia highlighted the role of the VCA as a foundation for social analysis and ‘self learning’ by communities before undertaking risk mapping (DRC, 2009:14) and this was echoed in Sri Lanka with the VCA credited as ‘one of the best participatory methods of project implementation and creating awareness at the same time’ (SLRCS, 2010:17). However, evaluations of the American Red Cross programmes noted that in Indonesia the role of the VCA was reduced due to lack of staff capacity (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010), little of the gathered data was used to full potential in Sri Lanka (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010) and that in Thailand VCAs were completed but the participatory exercises were ‘largely symbolic’ (Sida, 2010:6) and made little use of community identified information.

### 5. The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors

The British Red Cross Society implemented CBDRR programmes as part of a suite of community support programmes – running CBDRR alongside housing and livelihood support programmes in both Indonesia and the Maldives. This had positive impacts on community resilience (the integration of DM aspects into household rainwater harvesting projects was cited as very successful) and increased integration was recommended (Author unknown, 2008).

The Canadian and Danish Red Cross CBDRR programmes in Indonesia and Sri Lanka typically worked with communities where other programmes (housing, livelihoods, psychosocial) had already been undertaken. This was typically co-existence rather than integration but it was still identified that ‘projects which addressed livelihood issues [were] particularly successful’ (Bhatt, 2009).

There was some evidence of combining mitigation projects with those from other sectors (e.g. WATSAN) in the American Red Cross programme in Sri Lanka (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010) but despite ‘integrated’ appearing in the title of their programme in Indonesia there was little evidence of this being the case (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010).

## **6. Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design**

Very different levels of flexibility were identified across the different PNS programmes. These ranged from an extremely flexible approach adopted by the DRC in Indonesia where baseline surveys, the VCA and community action plans informed a revised programme prior to implementation (DRC, 2009) to the very inflexible, reflected in comments such as ‘project objectives [were] formed at national level, those objectives did not meet the ground conditions’ (SLRCS, 2010:70) or ‘hazard kits were not relevant to the most pressing hazards of the communities who received them’ (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010:33).

More commonly some things changed but others did not. For example in the American Red Cross programme in Thailand the programme was refined from 13 steps to 8 as the design evolved over time to reflect experience (Sida, 2010). However, it is suggested that planning was driven by budgets rather than assessment results and the programme did not adapt to local hazard conditions – for example, it did not teach people how to respond to hazards other than tsunamis (Sida, 2010).

## **Programme management**

### **7. Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes**

Several programme evaluations noted that insufficient time had been allowed for the CBDRR programmes (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010; Burton & Brett, 2009; Bhatt, 2009; Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010; Sida, 2010a) and programmes were frequently scaled back or received time extensions (Sida, 2010; Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010). Evaluators noted that ‘activities were rushed as a result’ (Bhatt, 2009:24) and that this ‘may have affected the depth of understanding and commitment in some villages’ (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010:6).

Several evaluations recommended that at least three years should be allowed for CBDRR programmes (Burton & Brett, 2009; Bhatt, 2009; Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010) as the ‘programme duration [was] too short to build sustainable disaster preparedness capacity within fragmented, traumatised communities’ (Burton & Brett, 2009:21) and ‘a longer time frame may have guaranteed greater sustainability’ (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010:6).

### **8. Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes**

In Indonesia, the evaluation of the BRCS CBDRR programme stated that implementation faced major challenges due to lack of resources (Burton & Brett, 2009). While in Sri Lanka funding was a contentious issue as different amounts of funding were allocated to different areas (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010).

For the CRC programme in Indonesia problems were experienced in transferring funds from CRC to PMI, so that ‘PMI [found] it hard to maintain momentum when resource flows are not predictable’ (Bhatt, 2009:25). The American Red Cross programme in Indonesia was limited by PMIs capacity to handle the funds available (Sida & Pranawisanty, 2010) while in Sri Lanka, the American Red Cross retained control of the budget and used its own financial management system. This prevented adoption of a single, shared system, and caused confusion and delays (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010).

## 9. Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures

Only one PNS programme report stated that monitoring ‘had a positive impact on the qualitative nature of activities as these were identified, discussed and amended at regular intervals’ (DRC, 2009:18). In other cases systems for reporting and monitoring did exist but some were so complex that they delayed activities (DRC, 2010).

In the meta-evaluation of American Red Cross programmes it was noted that monitoring systems were unhelpful to project staff as they failed to pick up on delays or measure success (Sida & Pranasisanty, 2010:36), they were based on numerical targets which were not updated to keep them relevant as the programme progressed (Sida & Jayawardhana, 2010:40), or they focused on expenditure and deadlines, rather than project success and sustainability (Sida, 2010:38).

A final category of evaluations noted that ‘effective reporting and M&E mechanisms are needed to be developed for future implementation’ (Kunaphinun, 2008:24) - indicating that they were not already in place. Or stated that monitoring did occur, but was given a very low priority in the DM part of the programme and described as a ‘last minute add-on’ (Author unknown, 2008:32).

### TRP CBDRR programmes

All TRP CBDRR programmes showed a strong awareness of the importance of stakeholder engagement and that a range of stakeholders needed to be involved. A fundamental step in stakeholder engagement is the community selection process and this was most successful when undertaken in partnership with local government, when communities selected faced significant or regular hazards and understood the relevance of CBDRR programmes to their needs.

Lack of CBDRR capacity within the RCRC movement (particularly the HNS) was a key challenge faced in many of the TRP CBDRR programmes, as were relationships between the large number of RCRC stakeholders involved. Capacity had many facets and included a range of issues from a shortage or high turnover of staff and volunteers, through lack of skills and experience, to a need for pre-existing manuals, guidelines or training materials, and many of these could be improved in future CBDRR programmes.

The wider enabling environment created by national government, and the capacity of local government to engage in CBDRR, had a critical impact on all programmes and led to significant variation between countries. In the most successful programmes local government was involved throughout the CBDRR process and provided continuing support to communities after completion of the RCRC programme within a supportive national government context.

Most TRP CBDRR programmes stated their intent to create community ownership over the programme, however this was difficult to achieve in practice. A critical activity in building ownership is the VCA process; both the way in which it is conducted and the response of the RCRC to the priorities and actions identified as a result. Increased RCRC capacity in the facilitation of the VCA process and in their ability to respond to the priorities identified in the VCA (in any sector) would significantly improve the impact of CBDRR programmes. However, the flexibility to respond to the needs of specific communities must be

balanced against the requirements for standardisation, in order for the RCRC to implement CBDRR at scale.

The *key determinants* under stakeholders and programme design are specific to CBDRR programmes, while those under programme management are more generally applicable. Many TRP CBDRR programmes faced challenges with programme management and this led to scaling back or revision of objectives in many programmes. Allocating sufficient time for the completion of CBDRR programmes and improved mechanisms for assessment, monitoring, evaluation and financial management, combined with strong programme managers would significantly improve the success of future CBDRR programmes.



## 5 Conclusions and recommendations

Based on this research, the *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR programme fall into three categories: stakeholders, programme design, programme management. The nine *key determinants* are as follows:

### Box 2: Key determinants of a successful CBDRR programme

#### Stakeholders

1. The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders
2. The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them
3. The capacity of external actors (government, NGOs, private sector) and the strength of partnerships with them

#### Programme design

4. The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme
5. The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors
6. Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in programme design

#### Programme management

7. Having sufficient time to implement CBDRR programmes
8. Having sufficient funding to implement CBDRR programmes
9. Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures

These *key determinants* are based on detailed analysis of a wide range of data much of which is specific to the TRP communities where CBDRR programmes had been carried out. This provides a basis for further research in other regions, and also in communities where there has not been previous DRR interventions, in order to understand the extent to which these are globally representative.

### Recommendations

- Develop a standardised CBDRR methodology, including community selection criteria, which can be applied at scale yet allows sufficient flexibility to respond to the needs of specific communities.
- Clearly communicate programme objectives and methodologies to all stakeholders through guidelines, tools and training.
- Increase RCRC capacity in the facilitation of the VCA process and in the ability to respond to the priorities identified in the VCA (in any sector).
- Improve staff/volunteer retention on CBDRR programmes and relationships between RCRC stakeholders.
- Involve local government throughout CBDRR programmes and advocate for the incorporation of DRR and CBDRR into national government policies
- Allocate sufficient time for the completion of CBDRR programmes and develop improved mechanisms for assessment, monitoring, evaluation and financial management of programmes
- Incorporate *key determinants* into standardised reporting procedures for programme implementation and into the terms of reference for external consultants undertaking evaluations of CBDRR programmes.

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## **Appendix A**

### **Process Documentation**



# **A1      Concept Note for a Disaster Risk Reduction Study for the International Federation's Tsunami Recovery Programme**

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## Concept Note for a Disaster Risk Reduction Study for the International Federation's Tsunami Recovery Programme

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### 1. Background

For the past five years the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has been running one of its biggest recovery operations to help populations affected by the tsunami that swept across the Indian Ocean in December 2004. In its wake came extraordinary generosity. The recovery programmes have supported almost 5 million people across the four worst-affected countries - Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. More than 57,000 houses have been built or are being completed. Over 650,000 people now have clean water to drink. More than 94,000 households have boats, fishing nets, agricultural tools or have used cash grants to help them recover their livelihoods. At least 363 hospitals and clinics have been built or rehabilitated. 161 schools have been constructed with a further 11 under way. These results have been made possible from the funds (3.1 billion Swiss francs Federation-wide) and expertise of more than 100 Red Cross or Red Crescent societies from around the globe.

A running thread throughout this effort has been the aim to leave behind communities that are stronger and safer to withstand future disaster risk. While building community resilience has been at the heart of all the recovery projects in health, water and sanitation, construction or livelihoods, a number of projects have also directly focused on reducing people's vulnerability to natural hazards. For example, "community-based risk reduction projects are running in 500 villages across Aceh as well as in disaster-prone districts of Sri Lanka. Village-level disaster teams made up of volunteers are taking the lead in mapping the hazards they face in their communities, as well as learning skills in emergency first aid and spreading awareness amongst the old and young who take part in mock evacuation drills. Further, in Sri Lanka, 400,000 people are benefiting from a grassroots early warning system run by more than 1,000 volunteers who disseminate warnings and help to safely evacuate people during disasters. 3D digital hazard evacuation maps have been developed for all of the communities involved in the project in collaboration with the government's disaster management centre and UN OCHA."<sup>1</sup>

These community based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR) projects work with and build on the knowledge and skills of the people who live in 'at risk' communities, so that they better appreciate the dangers in their environments, understand how to respond to early warning messages, and have the skills and equipment to help themselves and each other. It is expected that by the end of Tsunami Recovery effort more than 1200 communities will have disaster preparedness or a risk contingency plans, implemented through nearly 600 risk reduction programmes managed by various National Societies (NS's) in the four worst-affected countries.

During the same period (2006-2009) IFRC has also progressed in mainstreaming disaster risk reduction within its wider area of work. This mainstreaming initiative has focused on three key axes: 1) improving the understanding of DRR concepts and commitments, 2) increasing the scale of DRR investments, and 3) measuring results of IFRC DRR investments.

The work on improving DRR understanding has resulted in a *Framework for community safety and resilience (Framework)*. This *Framework* was developed through an extensive Federation-wide consultation that included at least 70 NS's from around the globe. The *Framework* provides a strong foundation on which all IFRC programmes, projects and interventions in DRR can be created, developed and sustained.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/News/pr09/6909.asp>

To increase investments in building safer and resilient communities IFRC also established a Global Alliance on DRR (GADRR). The GADRR is a mechanism through which work on DRR will be scaled up over a five year period (2009-2013). However the GADRR is not the only instrument for scaling up DRR investments; other existing programming channels will continue to be maintained but efforts will be made to align them to both the *Framework* and the GADRR.

Efforts to measure the results of our DRR work have led to a) longitudinal impact evaluations of DRR projects in few countries, b) cost benefits studies of DRR interventions and c) development of standard indicators for more robust development of baselines and monitoring of DRR projects. The missing link in measurement of DRR investments has been at the outcome level leading to a need for a robust set of indicators on what constitutes a “safe and resilient community”.

The current DRR study for the International Federation’s Tsunami Recovery Programme sits within this wider background. The current study will focus on the recovery programme but will also contribute to wider DRR progress outlined above, contributing to developing and improving our global programming and activities. As such, guidance will be produced on DRR in general but also in terms of what, based on the tsunami experience, is realistic within a recovery context and timeframe.

## 2. Purpose and objectives

The purpose of the study is to identify and document lessons learned in implementing at scale CBDRR<sup>2</sup> projects to strengthen community safety and resilience during the Tsunami recovery programme. The study will also use its large evidence base to research new ideas and contribute to the wider efforts in improving CBDRR work within the IFRC.

The four specific objectives of the study are as follows:

- a) Compile a “WWW (What, Where, Who)” database of all CBDRR projects that will capture standard information (beneficiary numbers, project costs, baseline etc) to be used to track long term outcomes. This shall include information on NS capacity building and organisational development.
- b) Research and identify key determinants of what makes for a successful CBDRR intervention with a particular focus on the role vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA) plays in these programmes (“*key determinants*”). This will also research and identify critical factors and conditions under which CBDRR interventions have a greater probability of success. Further, identify the most effective interventions and services within the context of *key determinants*, critical factors and conditions, with a specific focus on the sustainability of actions and impacts.
- c) Research and agree a limited set of characteristics of safe and resilient communities (“*characteristics*”). What do communities perceive as the most important characteristics needed to be safe and resilient? Is there a set of such characteristics that are common across all communities despite being located in different countries and settings? Since the tsunami, how do communities rank their changes in these characteristics (quantitatively, for example on a scale of 1-5), and how have RCRC interventions contributed to these changes (positive or negative)? How can/do the determined indicators and their changes over time reflect shifts in community attitudes and behaviours towards risk?
- d) A meta-analysis of all existing project evaluations of the tsunami CBDRR projects that will distil a practical summary of lessons learned for future at scale CBDRR implementation.

These objectives, though distinct, are interlinked. A clear WWW database will allow for easier research. Agreement on a limited set of *characteristics* will allow for evidence-based research on what elements of CBDRR projects help achieved these within the tsunami recovery programme. Finally the meta-analysis of

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<sup>2</sup> The study shall investigate only community-level actions with a specific disaster risk reduction aim. For ease of reference the acronym CBDRR is herein used in an all-encompassing manner, with the aim to avoid a potential “acronym soup” of different branding approaches (for example CBDRP, CBHFA, CCA, ICBRR, etc.).



evaluations will be informed by the outputs of research on *key determinants* and *characteristics* so as to make lessons learned more evidence-based.

As outlined above, the *characteristics* will become part of the standard for measuring DRR outcomes (impacts) at the community level over time. Similarly, *key determinants* of successful CBDRR shall inform the design future CBDRR programming, especially with regards to the GADRR.

### 3. Scope and methodology

The scope of the study would be Federation-wide (i.e. covers PNS/ONS projects) and would take into account at minimum all CBDRR projects in the four (Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand) tsunami worst-affected countries. All projects, irrespective of their end dates, will be studied.

The study would compile a database on all the CBDRR projects implemented within the tsunami recovery programme. The WWW database would include at minimum the following: project name, project costs, target communities, method(s) used for identifying and reaching the most vulnerable, beneficiaries per community, key activities, baselines, monitoring reports, project evaluations and information on capacity/organisational development support provided to the local NS, when available.

Desk-top research will compile all existing literature on *key determinants* and *characteristics*. The desktop research will also help design a participatory research methodology to identify *characteristics* that will be developed from community-provided data, from a large sample of the total 1200 targeted communities.

In addition both qualitative and quantitative analysis will support identification of *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR project, including critical factors and conditions under which CBDRR interventions have a greater probability of success. Key findings from the analysis will be summarised in way that enables practitioners to easily adopt the learning.

Research questions for the *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR project include:

- I. What are key drivers of impact and sustainability of CBDRR interventions in the communities and conversely, what are less effective interventions and why?
- II. What contributory role does VCA play in successful and sustainable CBDRR interventions?
- III. Under what circumstances does VCA contribute to a successful and sustainable CBDRR and under what circumstances is it less effective?
- IV. Linked to both VCA and CBDRR interventions, to what degree does community ownership play a role in impact and sustainability and how can ownership be fostered and measured/monitored?
- V. What minimum capacities are needed by NS's at different levels (HQ and branch) to successfully manage and implement CBDRR?
- VI. What are the necessary processes and components for effective RC-movement coordination to ensure demand-driven CBDRR approaches and sustainability?

Collected data on the defined resilience *characteristics* shall be used to help research the above questions.

### 4. Expected outputs

The study will result in the following outputs:

1. A set of *characteristics* (no more than ten) that define a safe and resilient community.
2. A research report that identifies *key determinants* of a successful CBDRR project, including identification of the most effective interventions and services (also in terms of sustainability) in the context of these *key determinants*, as well as minimum NS capacity requirements at HQ and branch levels.
3. A lessons-learned report (no more than 30 pages) on how to design and implement at scale CBDRR.
4. A database, available on a CD-ROM, which compiles key basic information on all CBDRR projects.
5. A timely workshop to discuss results and agree the final versions of outputs 1-4.

## 5. Duration and indicative schedule

9 months will be allocated for this study, which shall commence no later than 31<sup>st</sup> August 2010 and be completed by 30<sup>th</sup> April 2011. While the consultancy will be ultimately responsible for the study implementation timeline, the following indicative schedule is envisioned.

Key Activities	2010					2011			
	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Create WWW database									
Desktop research & methodology									
Data collection & field visits									
Data analysis & first draft outputs									
Workshop to discuss initial drafts									
Finalisation of analysis & outputs									

## 6. Management

The study will be fully implemented by a consultancy hired for the duration of the study. The consultancy will officially report to the Head, Community Preparedness and Risk Reduction Department (CPRR Geneva); however on practical and technical day-to-day management the consultancy will liaise with the Senior Officer, Disaster Risk Reduction, CRPP Geneva.

In addition, the project will be guided by a Working Group comprised of key stakeholders (see separate Working Group terms of reference). The IFRC Tsunami Unit in Kuala Lumpur will provide budgetary support and issue the consultancy contracts as per Working Group guidance, with CPRR Geneva officially relaying Working Group decisions to the IFRC Tsunami Unit.

### Prepared and approved

Working Group for the Tsunami Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Study

08 June 2010



## A2 Key Informant Interviews: Semi-Structured

The following template is to be used as a guide and modified to suit each individual being interviewed. At the beginning of each interview explain that this is not an evaluation but a research study. We are interested in candid answers to the questions to identify what the RCRC can learn from the project and how they can improve their future CBDRR programmes.

<b>Introductions</b>
1. What is your name?
2. What is your role?
3. How long have you worked for/with the RCRC/your organisation?
4. Which programmes have you worked on?
5. What is your experience of CDBRR programmes?

<b>Understanding CBDRR programmes</b>
1. Can you explain a CBDRR programme to me? What are the key stages?
2. How do you select communities to work with?
3. How do you select participants within communities?
4. How do you design CBDRR programmes?
5. What is the role of the VCA?
6. How do you monitor and evaluate CBDRR programmes? Can I see an example?

7. How does a CBDRR programme end in a community? What happens when the RCRC programme finishes?

8. How do you scale-up CBDRR programmes?

### **Understanding scale and success**

1. Of the CBDRR programmes you have experience of - which programme or community do you think was most successful?

*Programme-*

*Community –*

2. How do you know it was successful? What do you think is a successful project?

3. Why do you think the project was successful? What contributed to its success?

4. What factors within the RCRC do you think make CBDRR programmes more or less successful?

5. What external factors do you think make CBDRR programmes more or less successful?

6. What capacities are needed by NS's at branch/national level to successfully manage and implement a successful CBDRR programme?

*Branch-*

*National-*

7. Are CBDRR projects sustainable? What makes CBDRR projects sustainable?







## **Appendix B**

### **Supporting Documentation**



## B1 Literature Review

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The literature review set out to: “Research and identify *key determinants* of what makes for a successful CBDRR<sup>11</sup> intervention with a particular focus on the role vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA) plays in these programmes (“*key determinants*”). This will also research and identify critical factors and conditions under which CBDRR interventions have a greater probability of success.”<sup>12</sup>

This literature review addresses the questions identified in the initial Concept Note (ToR)<sup>13</sup>.

The term *key determinants* is not used in any of the documents reviewed. A determinant is defined by Oxford Dictionaries as “a factor which decisively affects the nature or outcome of something”<sup>14</sup>. The addition of the word ‘key’ to this term emphasizes the critical nature of these factors. Therefore for the purposes of this review we define *key determinants* to be:

**‘...a critical factor that influences the impact and sustainability of a programme...’**

Other authors have referred to *key determinants* as “process indicators” (ADPC, 2006) and “indicators of progress” (UN ISDR, 2008).

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<sup>11</sup> Throughout the literature the authors used numerous acronyms and terms to describe programmes concerned with increasing the safety and resilience of communities. For the purpose of clarity, and as recommended by the original concept note, the term **Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR)** will be used throughout this document.

<sup>12</sup> Concept Note for a Disaster Risk Reduction Study for the International Federation’s Tsunami Recovery Programme

<sup>13</sup> Concept Note for a Disaster Risk Reduction Study for the International Federation’s Tsunami Recovery Programme

<sup>14</sup>

[http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m\\_en\\_gb0220480?p=emailAywXLr47sEJV2&d=m\\_en\\_gb0220480](http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0220480?p=emailAywXLr47sEJV2&d=m_en_gb0220480)

## B1.1 Methodology

This literature review examined a range of key documents (see Table 1, Literature Reviewed, below), covering:

- guidance for those conducting CBDRR interventions (e.g. ADPC, 2006; Twigg, 2009, UN ISDR, 2008; USIOTWS, 2007)
- lessons learnt from implemented CBDRR interventions, and suggested best practices for ensuring successful and sustainable interventions (e.g. BRCS, 2008 IFRC, 2006; Sida, 2010)


Table 1: Literature Reviewed

Author	Document/text
ADPC (2006)	Critical Guidelines: Community-based disaster risk management
BRCS (2008)	Process documentation on BRCS's participatory and integrated approach to build community resilience
IFRC (2009)	Integrated Community Based Risk Reductions (ICBRR) in Aceh
IFRC (2006)	Vulnerability and capacity assessment: Lessons learned and recommendations
Kafle, S. (2010)	Measuring Community Resilience: A tool for baseline survey, program monitoring and progress reporting of a Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction Program
Sida, L. (2010)	Meta-evaluation of the American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Programme
Sida, L. (2009)	Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami Operation: Evaluations and Lessons Learned Review
Twigg, J. (2009)	Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community: A Guidance Note
UN ISDR (2008)	Indicators of Progress: Guidance on measuring the reduction of disaster risks and the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action
UN ISDR (2004)	A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives – Subchapter 3.4 “Community Action”
USIOTWS (2007)	How Resilient is Your Community?: A guide for evaluating coastal community resilience to tsunamis and other hazards

This literature review addresses the questions identified in the initial Concept Note (ToR)<sup>15</sup>.

The *key determinants* identified were mapped against project stages and process themes to provide a framework for analysis (Figure 1). This allowed comparison between programmes, highlighting critical activities, and their timings in the project cycle.

Figure 1: Analysis framework



<sup>15</sup> Concept Note for a Disaster Risk Reduction Study for the International Federation's Tsunami Recovery Programme

## B1.2 Findings

Figure 2 presents the *key determinants* that have been identified throughout the literature review, mapped against project lifecycle. These range from gathering local knowledge on hazardous conditions (ADPC, 2006; UN ISDR, 2004) to training and mobilising community volunteers to implement disaster risk reduction activities (IFRC, 2009).

These have been summarised and described under the following headings:

- **Process:** *the factors that are critical during the programme lifecycle*
- **Context:** *external factors and conditions*
- **Approach:** *the factors relating to the manner in which the programme is implemented*
- **Sustainability:** *the factors that result in greater and lasting impact*

### *key determinants*

#### Process

The following *key determinants* are important factors, typically processes or activities, during the lifecycle of a CBDRR programme:

#### *Groundwork for CBDRR (feasibility & initiation)*

1. **Contextualisation.** Training material, curricula and the programme approach should be contextualised for the circumstances in which the programme design will take place (Kafle, 2010).
2. **Socialisation and orientation.** Pre-community selection, branch staff and volunteers should be familiarised with the concepts of the CBDRR programme (IFRC, 2009).
3. **Branch training.** Training for the branch staff/volunteers in advocacy, budget management, project management, the CBDRR approach and activities, and also how to train new trainers in the community (IFRC, 2009).
4. **Project management.** Preparation, socialisation and approval of operating plans, budgets, log frames are completed (IFRC, 2009).

#### *Community selection*

5. **Community selection process.** Communities should be targeted for participation in accordance with standard selection criteria (ADPC, 2006; Kafle, 2010). Communities should be interested in the programme as they need to perceive value in implementing it for it to be sustainable (IFRC, 2009).
6. **Community actors.** Training of community volunteers to coincide with activities designed to increase community support, such as socialisation of CBDRR for community stakeholders (IFRC, 2009). Potential community

leaders should be identified and their buy-in obtained before any community assessments occur (ADPC, 2006; IFRC, 2009). This ensures a full awareness of local circumstances is considered in the assessment processes.

## Design

7. **VCA.** Vulnerability and capacity assessments offer an opportunity for communities and implementing agencies to explore the risks facing a community as well as the assets and resources the community can use to cope (Twigg, 2009; Kafle, 2010). These exercises serve as a key engagement tool for communities within the programme design and enable the community to develop a risk management plan. The most vulnerable members of the community should be mapped and considered during hazard assessment processes. (BRCS, 2008; Sida, 2010)
8. **Risk management.** For example, measures which establish sustainable resource management, and protection of fragile ecosystems, to minimise risk impact (USIOTWS, 2007; Twigg, 2009). Risk reduction measures should be developed with community members as they have a better knowledge of local circumstances than external partners (ADPC, 2006).
9. **Disaster response plans.** Preparation of disaster response plans drawn up before review and testing (Twigg, 2009). Any mitigation projects to be implemented should also be incorporated into these plans
10. **Roles and responsibilities.** Once the key actors have been identified roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined (USIOTWS, 2007; Kafle 2010).
11. **CBO formation and training.** Self-organising community based organisations<sup>16</sup> should be formed to develop a mechanism for community participation in all stages of disaster risk planning, assessment and activities (Sida, 2010). Where such organisations already exist these should be targeted and trained too (ADPC, 2006). CBO members should be trained to complete assessments, and in planning/management activities. Volunteers should be managed and receive ongoing training to ensure they are supported throughout the programme (BRCS, 2008). CBOs are key to ensuring high levels of community participation (ADPC, 2006) – see also 31. Participation.
12. **Budgets.** Sufficient funds should be allocated from the start of a programme to allow completion of all planned activities. The establishment of a community-based contingency fund allows for the provision of financial support to victims of a disaster, as well as a source of financing for risk mitigation projects (USIOTWS, 2007).
13. **Education.** Schools programmes teach future generations the value of risk reduction, and provide a key tool to ensure sustainability of the CBDRR programme (UN ISDR, 2008).
14. **Training of trainers.** Volunteers should be identified as potential trainers (IFRC, 2009; Twigg, 2009). Training of trainers ensures that knowledge can

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<sup>16</sup> Note that CBOs are often referred to by terms such as “Community Based Action Teams” (CBAT) or Community Disaster Management Committees (CDMC) in Indonesia, or “Village Action Teams” (VAT) as in Sri Lanka.

be passed on to other members of the community, after external agency staff have left, in order to sustain skill levels.

### *Appraisal (also see 20. Monitoring and Evaluation)*

- 15. Refresher training.** Refresher training should be provided to community organisations, volunteers and staff to continue interest and hone skills in disaster risk reduction (ADPC, 2006; IFRC, 2009).
- 16. Drills/simulations.** Used as training devices for community based organisations and to test community response (USIOTWS, 2007).
- 17. Community review and updates.** The community should be involved in the review of the disaster risk management plan, and open dialogue will promote trust and feedback of ideas (USIOTWS, 2007). These ideas should be used to inform changes made to existing plans. Updates should be made to disaster management plans as a result of any issues which arise during a drill, simulation or real event (Twigg, 2009).

### *Implementation*

- 18. Implementation training.** Relevant training should be provided for those involved. For example, those involved should understand why the project is occurring, how it will mitigate risk, and how it should be maintained (ADPC, 2006).
- 19. Community disaster plans.** These should now be finalised and widely circulated, to ensure the entire community is aware of them (Twigg, 2009).

### *Evaluation*

- 20. Monitoring and evaluation.** This should be an ongoing process, to allow the community to constantly monitor, evaluate and update their disaster plans, ensuring they stay relevant (USIOTWS, 2007; Twigg, 2009). As detailed in the branch programme evaluations, knowledge of lessons learnt and best practices can be highlighted by this process, and used to inform future programmes (Sida, 2009).

### *Context*

Critical factors and conditions describe the context in which a programme is implemented and form what Twigg (2009) describes as an “enabling environment”. They may positively or negatively influence a programme. The literature identified a number of contextual *key determinants* that should be considered:

- 21. Political will and governance.** Will governments approve selected communities for participation? (ADPC, 2006) Are citizens rights recognised? Is there a democratic form of governance? (Twigg, 2009)
- 22. Policy and legal framework.** Is there an established political, administrative and financial environment for CBDRR programmes within



international/national/local governments? (ADPC, 2006) Are legal and regulatory systems supportive of disaster risk reduction? (Twigg, 2009)

- 23. Institutional policy.** Is CBDRR mainstreamed throughout government, NGO sectors and/or development plans and actions? (ADPC, 2006)
- 24. Planning policy.** Do building regulations and land use policies support this risk reduction culture? (USIOTWS, 2007)
- 25. Culture.** Is there an existing culture of protection against hazards or risk avoidance? (UN ISDR, 2004) Does the community have a shared vision of a prepared/resilient community? (Twigg, 2009) Is the media interested in covering CBDRR issues? (IFRC, 2006)
- 26. Relevance.** Are local leaders/communities interested in the programme? Do they perceive value in implementing it? (IFRC, 2009). Is it relevant to the daily lives of community members? (UN ISDR, 2004).
- 27. Branch capacity.** Does the branch have the capacity to ensure support for the creation of an enabling environment? (IFRC, 2009)

Whilst many of the critical factors stem from national level policy and social structures, it may be possible to take action that will influence the enabling environment in the longer term. E.g. introducing risk reduction and preparedness into school curricula (UN ISDR, 2008); this will educate community members from a young age, ensuring future generations share an awareness of risk reduction and vulnerability.

In such instances it may be preferable to design a programme that seeks to tackle some of these underlying conditions. The scale of the programme will inform the degree to which it is possible to address this.

## Approach

A range of *key determinants* related to the programme approach were identified. They can be considered as underlying themes and are important to consider throughout the project cycle:

- 28. Sufficient time.** It is important to allow sufficient time to complete all processes and activities within the programme cycle. For example, training activities should be fully completed, to ensure new roles and activities are understood and performed well.
- 29. Transparency.** Policy decisions should be taken (mindful of contextual *key determinants*) to ensure that decision-making processes are fully transparent (ADPC, 2006).
- 30. Accountability.** Efforts should be made to build accountability, and to encourage community ownership of the programme, and volunteerism (Twigg, 2009).
- 31. Participation.** The more ownership a community has of a CBDRR programme, the more successful and sustainable it will be (Sida, 2010). Communities should be helped to perceive the value of the programme, to make them willing to commit the necessary time and resources to maintain it. Value will be perceived if risk reduction programmes are made relevant to the

community circumstances (see also 26. Relevance). This requires activities such as gathering information on local hazards and coping mechanisms by soliciting local knowledge (UN ISDR, 2004; ADPC, 2006).

**32. Partnerships and cooperation.** Partnerships can allow information-sharing, coordination of activities and provide a solid foundation of support for DRR activities (Twigg, 2009). Resilience is multi-sectoral, and requires a range of actors to be involved. Mechanisms for cooperation should be established initially, to create a dialogue through which all stakeholders can exchange knowledge and resolve misunderstandings or conflicts as they arise (UN ISDR, 2008).

**33. Dissemination.** Any disseminated materials must be easily accessible (Twigg, 2009). Translation into appropriate languages/formats may be necessary (UN ISDR, 2004). Information and knowledge surrounding scientific/technical capacities and innovation should be disseminated throughout the community (Twigg, 2009). Knowledge should be freely shared between branches (IFRC, 2006; Sida, 2009).

## Sustainability

“Sustainability is a goal of the regional strategy” (Sida, 2009:2). A sustainable CBDRR intervention should allow for the programme activities to continue indefinitely after the external partners have withdrawn from a community. This means ensuring that the community itself takes full ownership of and sees real value in the programme.

A number of the *key determinants* for successful and sustainable CBDRR interventions should be continual processes, which do not end with the official withdrawal of the external partners from a community. These *key determinants* have been extracted from the previous sections, as critical processes or factors which have an impact upon the sustainability of a programme:

- **Training (6. & 14.).** Refresher training for volunteer activities and continual management of volunteers (IFRC, 2009; ADPC, 2006) For example, those with an aptitude for technology and maintenance should receive training and be involved in the construction of any technological mitigation projects; again, this ensures programme sustainability, as technology can be maintained by in-community skills, rather than being dependent upon external partners for assistance (USIOTWS, 2007).
- **Planning policy and culture (24. & 25.).** Establishment of hazard resilient planning and land use as the norm (Twigg, 2009); monitoring and enforcement of land use policies and building standards incorporating risk reduction measures (USIOTWS, 2007). Incorporation of disaster planning and preparedness into public health systems (Twigg, 2009). Maintaining community warning and evacuation systems/infrastructure (USIOTWS, 2007).
- **Monitoring and evaluation (20.).** Monitoring and evaluating local capacities and disaster preparedness responses (USIOTWS, 2007), updating response plans as necessary (Twigg, 2009)


- **Budgets (12.).** Ensuring commitment for budgetary support, and continued existence of community-based financial systems and social protection systems (Twigg, 2009; USIOTWS, 2007)
- **Education (13.).** Conducting public education outreach programmes to improve awareness within the wider community(USIOTWS, 2007)
- **Risk management (8.).** Practicing sustainable and sensitive use of natural resources and ecosystems, to minimise hazard risk (Twigg, 2009; USIOTWS, 2007); may require policy change to enforce.

## B1.3 Additional observations

Our analysis of the literature review has highlighted four additional issues.

### 1. Different *key determinants* are important at each stage of the project cycle

Figure 3: Key determinant groupings



The literature review highlighted the importance of different *key determinants* occurring at particular stages within the programme lifecycle.

- Most context *key determinants* are important in the initial stages of the programme; from policy development to community selection.
- Process *key determinants* occur at all stages of the programme, although most are relevant from the design stage onwards.
- The sustainability *key determinants* are the activities and approaches which should be perpetuated throughout the programme; such as dissemination of information or updating disaster response plans (Twigg, 2009).

For example, there is no point creating a community disaster risk reduction plan before some form of community risk assessment has been completed. Without the knowledge of the local context gathered in the earlier assessment activity, the risk reduction plan may be inappropriate and irrelevant. This highlights that *key determinants* need to be sequenced correctly.

### 2. Different critical activities and processes should run for different lengths of time

Many critical activities have limited timescales, i.e. they need only run for a matter of weeks or months.

The VCA process, for example, can be completed in a number of weeks and does not need to be repeated. However updating community risk maps (one output of the VCA tools) is an activity which should regularly occur (Twigg, 2009). This

should be included in an ongoing process of community monitoring and evaluation to ensure sustainability of the programme.

Certain activities may have finite timescales, such as the translation of community risk reduction plans, which should take no more than a few weeks. But the process of ensuring that these plans are accessible to all members of the community needs to last for much longer.

### **3. Aims of individual processes and activities**

Each process 'key determinant' undertaken should not merely allow the programme to advance to the next stage in the project cycle. Instead each determinant should have a distinct impact upon the community, which will lead to the long-term sustainability of the programme.

For example, a schools programme should not be viewed simply as a method of increasing community understanding to gain support for the implementation of the programme (UN ISDR, 2008). Instead it should be understood as a longer-term measure aimed at creating a culture of risk awareness and reduction, which will better structure the enabling environment.

Likewise completing a risk mapping exercise does not merely provide data to inform the creation of community action plans. This exercise of data-collecting helps educate the community about their environment, raising awareness of the most vulnerable members of the community (Twigg, 2009).

### **4. Different stakeholders are critical when involved at different project stages**

Different actors are involved with the *key determinants* at different stages in the programme cycle. During the initial stages of the project cycle the 'key determinant' activities are predominantly managed by actors at branch or national level. Once the community has been selected however the majority of key processes should be driven by community organisations; this will ensure sustainability and community ownership of the programme, without external support.

For example, branch staff should lead the orientation and training of community volunteers and organisations. However once trained the community volunteers should drive any community-based activities within the design and implementation phases of the programme.

The role of community actors becomes far more significant following the withdrawal of external partners from the programme. Once a programme has been implemented the continual monitoring and evaluation activities should be undertaken by community stakeholders, to ensure that the programme is sustained without the need of external support (Twigg, 2009; USIOTWS, 2007).

## B2 Meta-analysis of lessons learned

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This meta-analysis examined a range of programme evaluation documents of tsunami CBDRR projects. These documents were produced for Partner National Societies working in Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand (see Table 1, Programme evaluations analysed).

A review of 15 programme evaluations or final reports identified 255 lessons learned or recommendations. These were analysed and grouped into four themes:

- **Community engagement:** *Level of engagement with and participation of communities in key CBDRR programme activities*
- **Red Cross organisational capacity:** *The organisational capacity and staffing of RCRC branches and HNS*
- **Partnerships:** *Between the HNS/PNS, with government, NGOs and the private sector.*
- **Programme design and management:** *Activities, timescale and resource management (inc. integration with other RCRC programmes)*

Key lessons learned are outlined below in the executive summary, and discussed in further detail in the later sections of this report.

Table 1: Programme evaluations analysed

Country	PNS	Report title	Reference
Indonesia	American Red Cross	Sida, L. & Pranawisanty, T.G. (2010) <i>Final Evaluation of the Indonesia Integrated Community based Risk reduction Program. June 2010</i>	AmCross Indonesia, 2010a
	American Red Cross	AmCross (201) <i>Final Project Report: Integrated Community-Based Risk Reduction, July 2006-June2010.</i>	AmCross Indonesia, 2010b
	Belgium Red Cross	Belgium RC (2009) <i>DGDC Report – Action Plan – Year 2009</i>	Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009
	British Red Cross	Burton, C. & Brett, J. (2009) <i>British Red Cross Society Tsunami Recovery Programme, Aceh, Indonesia. Impact Evaluation</i>	BRCS Indonesia, 2009
	Canadian Red Cross	Bhatt, M.R. (2009) <i>Integrated Community-Based Risk Reduction and Early Warning System in Post-Tsunami Indonesia: An External Mid-term Evaluation for the Canadian Red Cross</i>	Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009
	Danish Red Cross	Danish Red Cross (2009) <i>Integrated Community Based Risk Reduction Programme: Aceh Jaya District, Indonesia. Final Report, December 2009</i>	DRC Indonesia, 2009
Maldives	British Red Cross	? (2008) <i>BRCS MRP Final Evaluation Report</i>	BRCS Maldives, 2008
Sri Lanka	IFRC	SLRCS (2010) <i>Final Evaluation Report of Community Based Disaster Management (CBDM) Project</i>	IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010
	American Red Cross	Sida, L. & Jayawardhana, L.C. (2010) <i>Final evaluation of the Sri Lanka disaster preparedness program, August 2010.</i>	AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010
	British Red Cross	Wilderspin, I. et al (2007) <i>Mid-term review of the community based disaster risk management project in Batticaloa</i>	BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007
	Danish Red Cross	DRC (2010) <i>Final Report: Community Based Disaster Management Program, SLRCS Monaragala Branch</i>	DRC Sri Lanka, 2010
	Danish Red Cross	DRC (2010) <i>Final Report: Community Based Disaster Management Program, SLRCS Ampara Branch</i>	(not referenced in meta-analysis due to similarity to DRC Sri Lanka, 2010)
Thailand	IFRC (and AmCross)	Kunaphinun, A. (2008) <i>Disaster Management Programme Final Report</i>	IFRC Thailand, 2008
	American Red Cross	Sida, L. (2010) <i>Evaluation of the American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Programme in Thailand</i>	AmCross Thailand, 2010
Tsunami Recovery Programme	American Red Cross	Sida, L. (2010) <i>Meta-evaluation of the American Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Programme</i>	Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010

## B2.1 Executive summary

### Community engagement

1. The greater the level of **community ownership** over a CBDRR project, the higher their level of participation during project implementation and the greater the sustainability.
2. The **support of community leaders** that represent the community's needs is crucial to the success and sustainability of CBDRR programmes as they often become part of, or have direct influence over, the community-based organisations established and tap into existing networks. Mobilisation of community leaders is easier if the CBDRR programme has the support of local government.
3. Community action teams/management committees are most effective where **linkages** were made with CBDRR teams/committees in other villages, other community based organisations, the RCRC or government structures.
4. **Women** may have more free time to commit to CBDRR programmes and be less likely to leave the community (taking the knowledge with them) having a positive impact on the long term sustainability of the project.
5. Community-based organisations that are established during the project cannot only consist of, or be representative of, **vulnerable groups**. Specific mechanisms need to be developed to ensure that they benefit from CBDRR programmes.
6. Adequate **introduction to and explanation** of the purpose and objectives of the CBDRR programme at the earliest stages, is crucial to achieving community support.
7. Community participation in the **(H)VCA** process and the incorporation of the outcomes into programme design is a critical step in achieving sustained community engagement and ensuring that CBDRR programmes meet their needs.
8. **Simulations, equipment and mitigation projects** catalyze for community engagement. Simulations should be relevant to the community's highest risks and they enable communities to test their contingency plans in partnership with the RCRC and local government. Not every community will need or have the capacity to implement a physical mitigation project, and if they do occur they should be driven by communities to ensure community participation and relevance to their needs.
9. Continued **RCRC support** to communities increases the sustainability of the community-based organisations established. Mechanisms for formalising this relationship include MoUs between communities and the HNS, registering team/committee members as RCRC volunteers.

### Red Cross Capacity

10. Having adequate numbers of appropriately skilled **staff and volunteers** is key to the success of CBDRR programmes. Community facilitation teams should include people with a range of technical backgrounds in addition to community facilitation expertise and they should be supported by disaster management coordinators at branch and programme management level. When



training new staff or training existing staff that have no experience of CBDRR programmes manuals and guidelines are required, if these are not available they will need to be developed as the first stage of implementation.

11. **Branch capacity and ownership** is key to the success of the programme. Capacity can be increased through increasing staff numbers and the provision of materials and training while ownership can be increased through the appointment of a disaster management coordinator at branch level.
12. Having a **clear management structure**, combined with direct links and a transparent mechanism for coordination and support from the HNS NHQ down to the branches and communities, increases the successful implementation of CBDRR programmes.

## Partnerships

13. Partnerships with **local government** are critical to the success and sustainability of CBDRR programmes. Local government can encourage the participation of communities, provide technical and financial support during the programme and contributed to the sustainability of the community-based organisations established.
14. A strong **relationship between the PNS and HNS** can be a significant factor in determining the success of a programme. This partnership needs to be understood by both partners from the outset and adequate resources allocated to partnership management for the duration of the programme.
15. Partnerships with other **NGOs/the private sector** may provide opportunities for the continued support of communities (after RCRC withdrawal) or for the access of specific technical expertise.

## Programme design

16. The local context and the capacity of the HNS should be **assessed** prior to the commencement of CBDRR programmes.
17. **Community selection** is key to the success and sustainability of CBDRR programmes. Community selection should be done in partnership with local government and other stakeholders. Communities are likely to have greater motivation to participate in CBDRR programmes if they are vulnerable/at risk and if they have a high level of community cohesion.
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18. The requirement for **standardisation** of CBDRR programmes, to enable them to be replicated by unskilled volunteers (achieving speed and scale), must be balanced with the requirements for **flexibility** to meet the needs of individual communities and contexts.
19. **Integration** with other sectors (especially livelihoods, health and education) can increase the impact and sustainability of CBDRR programmes.
20. An exit and **sustainability strategy** should be developed and disseminated to all stakeholders at an early stage in programme design.

## Programme management

21. High **staff**/volunteer turnover has a negative impact on CBDRR programmes, causing financial costs and programme delays. The development of a

supportive working environment, longer term contracts, the provision of training and supervision by more experienced staff and equitable policies of salaries/remuneration can help retain staff, as can the provision of bonuses or incentives for meeting targets and good service.

22. A short **timeframe** can negatively impact on CBDRR programmes and a minimum of three years is recommended. This must be flexible to allow the needs of individual communities to be met.
23. Delays in transferring funds (from PNS to HNS, or from HQ to branch level) can result in delays in programme implementation. Financial management can be improved through the development of budgets and timescales in partnership with HNS/branch staff and the development of standardised reporting and accounting mechanisms.
24. **Monitoring and reporting** processes should be integrated from an early stage into the programme. The monitoring process should be useful to the HNS in order to inform its development and design, rather than solely an exercise in data compiling for donors. This will highlight potential factors likely to affect the success and sustainability as they emerge, and will allow alterations to the programme design to correct elements which may lead to stalling or failure.

## B2.2 Community engagement

The level of community participation has a direct impact upon both the success and sustainability of a CBDRR programme. It was noted that ‘placing the community at the wheel of the development vehicle’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:xv; Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:3) should be the objective of a CBDRR programme, to ensure that the programme is effectively maintained after RCRC exit (IFRC Thailand, 2008:23; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:10).

The DRC final report from Indonesia also noted that community participation in CBDRR programmes had wider benefits as ‘communities’ understanding of rights, responsibilities and roles built confidence and abilities in demanding information and accountability in service provision and in fostering better planning and implementation of own, and externally supported development initiatives’ (DRC Indonesia, 2009:34).

In evaluating AmCross’s CBDRR programmes Sida (2010) found that ‘communities are most enthusiastic about DP programmes when they feel they own them and drive the process’ (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:7) but a sufficient level of community participation will only be achieved if the community perceives the programme to be of relevance, i.e. to address risks posed by significant local hazards and ‘something that is real and present and needed’ (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:33).

### Who to engage with

#### Village leaders

Achieving the buy-in of community leaders is crucial to the success and sustainability of CBDRR programmes as they become part of, or have direct influence over, the community-based organisations established. It was noted that mobilisation of community leaders was easier if the CBDRR programme had the support of local government (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:76; Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4). One report recommended that community leaders participate in CBDRR training to ‘gain more understanding in roles and responsibilities of TRCS on disaster management and CBDRR project implementation [to] promote better information sharing and understanding among RC[RC] and local communities’ (IFRC Thailand, 2008:25).

#### Action teams/management committees

Two different sorts of community based organisation were formed during CBDRR programmes: action teams and management committees. Sometimes these were formed based upon existing community based organisations and social structures, which was cited as a factor likely to ensure their continued existence (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:9). It was also recommended that ‘the more structure that can be achieved with community teams and committees, generally the better’ (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:7).

Community action teams are consistently described as significant achievements of CBDRR programmes, and valued by communities as useful additions (BRCS Maldives, 2008:26; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:26). In Thailand the formation of CBATs was credited with the additional benefit of increasing the level of community cohesion (AmCross Thailand, 2010:22). Community action

teams/management committees were considered most effective where linkages were made with other community based organisations (BRCS Maldives, 2008:27). Similar linkages, allowing sharing of information and experiences between village disaster management committees in Sri Lanka was also identified as good practice, and created competition between communities to operate efficiently (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:72).

With the community organisations established being drivers of the programme within the community and key to the sustainability of the programme in the long term, the selection of members for the committees or action teams was critical to the success of the programme. The AmCross final report in Indonesia stated that ‘developing and communicating clear criteria and expectations during the selection process of CBAT members [is crucial in] recruit[ing] the right candidates to ensure their commitment and level of engagement in the project’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21).

For example: ‘In the first phase of AmCross’s programme in Indonesia CBATs were selected by the CDMC and ‘the process was not transparent’ – leading to a low level of commitment from the CBAT as they were not volunteers. In the second phase, CBAT members were recruited through a transparent process (including an interview) and ‘as a result, the selected CBAT members showed a higher level of engagement in ICBRR project implementation’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21).

## **Women**

It was noted in a number of programmes in Indonesia that women were particularly active and enthusiastic members of community action teams and management committees (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:14). Women had more free time to commit to the programmes and were less likely to leave communities, taking skills learned with them (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:5). However to take full advantage of these qualities significant consideration has to be given to overcoming barriers to female participation, dictated by gender relations (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:10 & 19)

## **Vulnerable groups**

One evaluation from the Maldives notes the importance of considering vulnerable groups in the selection of members for the community organisations when stating that ‘it is a mistake to assume that community organisations can ever be truly ‘representative’ of the breadth of community opinion. With respect to targeting, this is particularly so, as the socially excluded are very seldom represented by community organisations, by their very nature’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:40)

A number of other evaluations highlighted the importance of focussing on and supporting vulnerable groups through the CBDRR process (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:29; DRC Sri Lanka, 2001:33; IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:76). Two reports/evaluations from Sri Lanka noted the importance of ensuring that ‘immediate benefits... go to widest section of the community or to the most vulnerable groups’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:76; DRC Sri Lanka, 2001:33) although the external evaluation of the IFRC’s programme in Sri Lanka noted that ‘there is no evidence to prove that this project was designed to achieve this objective’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:76).

The external evaluation of the BRCS programme in Indonesia noted that additional capacity building was required in ‘targeting and working with poor and marginalised groups to ensure they receive the full benefits of recovery programming and increase their resilience to future shocks and hazards’ (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:29).

## Process of engagement

Participation and consultation with communities is repeatedly identified as needing to occur at the earliest stages of programme inception, to ensure relevance of programme activities (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:11). Failure to orientate and encourage socialisation within communities at the programme’s earlier stages was cited as a reason for limited community buy-in for the programme by the British Red Cross in Indonesia (2009:21). While the DRC programme final report from Indonesia states that ‘regular meetings, ongoing interaction, involvement and consultation with volunteers, CBAT members, communities and inclusion in decision making and monitoring processes are solid prerequisites for the building of ownership, positive rapport and trust between the programme and the wider beneficiaries.’ (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

### (H)VCA

Community participation in the (H)VCA process is a critical step in ensuring that CBDRR programmes meet the needs of communities, and are thus perceived as relevant by communities themselves. This in turn will ensure they continue the programmes in the future (AmCross Thailand, 2010:31). Communities are valuable sources of information about the context of a CBDRR programme.

A number of programmes recorded the fact that although communities were consulted their input was not used to influence the programme design/activities (AmCross Thailand, 2010:32; BRCS Indonesia, 2009:21). This suggests that the most significant risks, identified by the communities, may not have been the focus of CBDRR programmes (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:27).

The failure to encourage full community participation in this process also misses an opportunity to educate communities with planning skills (AmCross Thailand, 2010:33) and increase community risk and needs awareness (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:14; IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:71; AmCros Indonesia, 2010a:26). These skills, in planning for disasters, were identified as those which communities most needed to master (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:40).

### Contingency plans

As the most effective contingency plans built upon the results of the (H)VCA, communities should participate in the creation of these plans. The Belgian RC noted that ‘DP/DR and Contingency plans of communities can be more sustainable if these include DP/DRR activities and projects that community and CBAT can do by themselves and with other stakeholders (e.g., local health departments)’ (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4). While according to AmCross in Thailand (2010:15), the best contingency plans:

- Included emergency contact telephone numbers/details
- Outlined roles and responsibilities

- Were easily accessible by the communities (i.e. posted in a public place)

### **Simulations**

Communities often reported that drills and simulations were beneficial and successful elements of CBDRR programmes (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:5; AmCross Thailand, 2008:16) and several evaluations noted that they were an element of the programme which should be replicated in future programmes. However, some community members however felt they raised memories of traumatic events (IFRC Thailand, 2008:24).

Any drills and simulations should be relevant to the community's highest risks. AmCross reported that although tsunami drills were conducted in communities in Thailand, community members were not sure what to do in the event of floods or storms, which were more significant risks in the area (AmCross Thailand, 2008:5). This may have been a similar challenge in other countries with, for example, the BRCS in the Maldives recommending 'more work on emergency drills, basic manuals and trainings for the most frequent scenarios' (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

Simulations/drills also allowed opportunities for coordination with the local government disaster response structure, and the branch emergency response team (SATGANA) (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:5).

### **Mitigation projects**

Both simulations and mitigation projects acted as tests of the level of community engagement. In evaluating AmCross's CBDRR programmes Sida (2010) recommends that the focus of CBDRR programmes 'should be on teaching communities how to plan for disaster' and that they can 'move on' to more complex work [such as mitigation projects] after achieving the basics' (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a: 40). He states that 'there should not be a presumption that a community will undertake a mitigation project, and this should be seen as an evolution once the team formation and training has been successfully completed' (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:44).

Where mitigation projects do occur 'communities should be involved with the design and implementation' (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:33; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:29-30) and they 'should always include a significant community contribution' (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:44) to ensure relevant projects are undertaken and maintained after the end of the programme (AmCross Thailand, 2010:17).

### **After completion of the CBDRR project**

Continued RCRC support to communities after the completion of the project was highlighted as key to the sustainability of the community-based organisations established (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:7) and the external evaluation of the Canadian RC programme in Indonesia states that there must be 'significant local branch involvement in any long term programme' (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009: 29). However, the DRC in Indonesia describe how maintaining the CBDRR programme after its completion will be the 'biggest challenge' for PMI 'due to lack of resources (financial and human) unless supported by the branch/chapter/NHQ as well as the local government authorities' (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

Mechanisms for formalising the relationship between communities and the RCRC included:

- linking the action teams/management committees to the RCRC formally through an MoU between the RCRC and the community (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:40)
- providing places for active VDMC members on refresher training (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44)
- registering action team/committee members as RCRC volunteers, or forming Youth Red Cross groups as part of the DRR schools programme (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:18; Danish RC Indonesia 2009:33).
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- These mechanisms have the added advantage of CBDRRs programmes contributing produce a pool of trained volunteers to support the work of the Red Cross.

## B2.3 Red Cross capacity

### Staff

The importance of recruiting staff or volunteers and building teams of appropriately skilled personnel was highlighted in many of the reports/evaluations. A lack of sufficient skills amongst staff was cited by the BRCS in the Maldives (2008:33) as a significant issue, associated with an inadequately staffed programme. While in Thailand it was noted that ‘until recently the health stations were mainly involved in health related and emergency services while the RCRC chapters were previously also mainly focused on disaster relief, at the same time coping with limited financial and human resources’ (IFRC Thailand, 2008:25).

Volunteers play an important role in the implementation of CBDRR programmes, however, there was tension between volunteers and paid staff in some programmes (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:33; AmCross Indonesia, 2010:21). It is important that volunteers are made to feel valued (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:33) and they require a supportive working environment with the Belgian RC (2009) noting ‘branch volunteers were found almost totally dependent on [the] branch to tell them what to do’ (ibid:4).

The external evaluation of the IFRC’s programme in Sri Lanka recommended that community facilitation teams should include people with a range of technical expertise - particularly engineering, sociology and livelihoods in addition to DRR (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010) while ‘selection of people with sufficient capacity to work with communities is compulsory’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:xv). Beyond just community facilitation, the ability to conduct a HVCA was highlighted as a specialist skill, with one method of overcoming limited capacity in this area being to establish a centralised HVCA unit to support community facilitators at this key stage (Sida, L, 2010:7).

Further up the management structure, having a competent disaster management coordinator at Branch level was identified as crucial (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:28) while ‘programme management should be done by a field experienced generalist who is able to bring the different technical components into the overall programme’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

Where staff did not have the necessary skills, significant training was required, and this was particularly true for new staff members or when implementing a new programme. An induction process (including training about the RCRC and what they do and don't do) was recommended for new staff and volunteers (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009). While significant 'project team capacity building through training, provision of project implementation guides, manuals, and IEC materials' was recommended to familiarise project teams with new procedures prior to implementation (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b). The Thai Red Cross identified the CBDRR programme itself as 'an incubator for staff to gain valuable project management skills' (IFRC Thailand, 2008:25). They also undertook study visits to learn about similar programmes in Bangladesh and Indonesia (ibid:12 & 21).

## Branches<sup>17</sup>

Branch capacity to implement CBDRR programmes has a significant impact upon its success, and should be assessed before programme design and implementation (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:42; AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21). Insufficient branch capacity, in particular in terms of consistent programme management, is thus blamed for a programme's failure, as in the case of the British Red Cross in Sri Lanka (2007:16) or for the branches inability to meet targets (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21).

Branches must fully understand the purpose and process of the CBDRR programme in order for it to be successful. The external evaluation of the IFRC programme in Sri Lanka recommends a two-stage approach:

- 'Inception – dissemination of project objectives to all branches through a workshop
- Implementation – A detailed training programme on concepts of DM for selected branches including the management of staff and a thorough knowledge in CBDRM by technically qualified experts' (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:73)

Steps undertaken to increase branch capacity included:

- Training to increase range and effectiveness of skills (IFRC Thailand, 2008:10; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:10)
- Using the (H)VCA as a training exercise for branch staff (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:8), and as a knowledge gathering exercise for the branch in another (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:26)
- Investment in equipment and material resources (IFRC Thailand, 2008:10; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:10)
- Increasing staff numbers (IFRC Thailand, 2008:10)

An increased sense of branch ownership of a project can be achieved by the appointment of a Branch Disaster Management Coordinator (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:iii) Without branch ownership it was noted that CBDRR programmes can

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<sup>17</sup> In the documents reviewed there were few comments on the capacities of chapters – despite the PMI chapter in Aceh playing a significant role in the coordination and implementation of the CBDRR programmes in Indonesia.



suffer from a lack of consistent management, and PNS can struggle to coordinate with the HNS (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:9).

## HNS

The capacity of the HNS more generally was also highlighted as an important factor in many evaluations/reports. There were reported problems of HNS capacity being overestimated by the PNS, and hence struggling to implement the CBDRR programme (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:14). The Canadian RC recommends greater involvement of the HNS from the beginning of the programme's design to ensure this issue does not recur.

Strategies for building the capacity of the HNS included:

- field visits and lateral secondments of key members of an experienced CBDRR team into future CBDRR programmes (CRC Indonesia, 2009:29,31)
- including specific objectives to build project management capacity of the HNS into future CBDRR programmes (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30)
- using the 'well-prepared national society' (WPNS) checklist as a tool to help the HNS review its strengths and weaknesses (IFRC Thailand, 2008: 25)
- creating a CBDRR team within the RCHB (AmCross Thailand, 2010:43)
- creating a centre of excellence in relief work (both policy and practice) within the RCHB with a 'professional cadre of relief workers' (AmCross Thailand, 2010:43)
- providing training and equipment for the HNS (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:24-25).

The capacity of the branch/HNS can also be increased by extending relationships with other organisations to reinforce dissemination (IFRC Thailand, 2008:7). Collaboration can also enhance time and cost effectiveness (IFRC Thailand, 2008:24). In Aceh it was noted that PMI had a long term strategy for maintaining its strength in the region, however without major additional resources (i.e. supplied by forming relationships with other organisations/partners) it could not sustain sufficient levels of equipment and staffing indefinitely. (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:6; Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:6).

Several evaluations highlight the importance of a clear management structure and understanding of roles and responsibilities in the programme combined with direct links and a transparent mechanism for coordination and support from the HNS NHQ down to the branches and communities (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; IFRC Thailand, 2008:24,26; AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:22; AmCross Thailand, 2010:43). In Sri Lanka particular challenges were identified as a result of unclear coordination/reporting relationships between the project officer, Branch Executive Officer (BEO) and Project Manager (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:75; BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:28).

## B2.4 Partnerships

### Between HNS and PNS

A successful partnership between the HNS and PNS can be a significant factor in determining the success of a programme as evidenced in Indonesia, by the relationship developed between AmCross and the PMI (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:6). This particular example cited mutual trust and regular communication as key in maintaining this partnership. Failure to establish close relationships between the branch and national HQ has also, in some cases, made coordination of stakeholders a challenge (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:75).

Sida (on AmCross TRP, 2010:43) states that working in partnership needs to be better understood from the outset and that partnership management should be adequately resourced. The external evaluation of the Canadian RC programme in Indonesia recommends using the ‘measurable partnership tool to guide the design of international response projects with the HNS and ensure more consistent focus on building those partnerships’ (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:29). CRC also recommends the PNS foster greater ‘openness’ between the HNS and PNS – emphasising that this should be initiated by the PNS and that it can be supported through ‘candid explanations of decision-making processes’ (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30).

Specific actions which placed the HNS/PNS partnership under strain included engaging volunteers from other branches or sub-branches without prior approval of PMI (causing confusion and envy) (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33) and ‘designing a program without involving all elements and levels of stakeholders (ARC, PMI NHQ, PMI Chapter, PMI Branches, communities and local government)’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21).

The external evaluation of AmCross’s programme in Indonesia recommends that ‘all levels of the organisation [should be involved] in project design’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:40) while the external evaluation of the Canadian RC programme in Indonesia goes further in stating that future CBDRR programmes should ‘Start with PMI. End with PMI. Run with PMI’ (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:29) emphasising that:

- the HNS and PNS should jointly complete project design assessments and agree programme priorities
- the HNS should set the programme targets, timelines and indicators
- the HNS should design the CBDRR programme (and then take comments from the PNS)

The AmCross final report in Indonesia highlighted that ‘committee and working groups serve as a coordination mechanism at the program policy level and are critical to ensuring all stakeholders have a similar understanding of program implementation’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:23). While ‘active and functioning committee and working groups can minimize misunderstandings and potential conflicts in project implementation’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:23). The DRC final report in Indonesia highlights the importance of workgroup and SATGANA volunteer meetings – particularly at branch level – but describes how these did not materialise in 2008 and 2009 due to communication problems within PMI (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

## With government

Partnerships between communities and local governments have a key role to play in ensuring sustainability of a CBDRR programme following the withdrawal of the RCRC from a community (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:28; IFRC Thailand, 2008:23). A number of reports/evaluations recommend that CBDRR programmes should ‘build and maintain upward links with local governments’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010; IFRC Thailand, 2008; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39), specifically the local government office responsible for DRR in addition to ‘schools, hospitals, and health centres’ (IFRC Thailand, 2008:25) ‘from the very start of the programme’ (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33) because:

- ‘they have a clear mandate to engage communities and ensure their participation in planning and monitoring’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:76)
- they control local finances and resources (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:xv; IFRC Thailand, 2008:25)
- they can provide technical support in the design and construction of community infrastructure projects (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33)
- local government support, and formal recognition of the community based teams/committees, has a significant impact on the sustainability of the organisations established (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010; IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:74).

The AmCross final report in Indonesia describes how community contingency plans were developed in each community as part of the CBDRR programme but that these ‘were not linked with the government plan’ and ‘the lack of links between community, sub-district and district contingency plans affects the effectiveness of the plan developed and undermines the preparedness capacity of the vulnerable community.’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:22).

The DRC final report in Sri Lanka recommended ‘provid[ing] opportunity for local government staff to participate in training together with community members and leaders’ (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33) while the BRCS report from the Maldives noted that capacity building of government can be done through Red R ‘intermediaries’ ‘as a long-term strategy for affecting change without compromising neutrality’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:40).

Education programmes were shown to be more likely to have a sustainable impact upon a community when it is placed within a supportive government framework; this was consistently recognised by American RC programmes (AmCross Thailand, 2010:26; AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:33; AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:18). Additionally, the AmCross external evaluation from Indonesia recommended that ‘drills with schools should be viewed as pilots with the aim of getting such practice adopted as policy in disaster prone areas’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:40).

## With other NGOs/the private sector

Partnership with other NGOs was used as a sustainability strategy to ensure continued support for a programme, following RCRC withdrawal; this was done in Indonesia by the British Red Cross where agreements were made with Austcare to continue work started by the BRCS following their withdrawal (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:21). The external evaluation of the BRCS programme in Indonesia also recommends the establishment of ‘corporate level agreements’ in

priority areas requiring specialist skills – for example with HelpAge International (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:29).

The potential of partnering with the private sector is highlighted in two of the reports/evaluations (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010: 33; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30) but specific benefits/activities are not identified other than the potential of commercial mobile phone providers to assist in transmission of early warnings (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30).

## B2.5 Programme Design

### Assessment

Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of adequate assessment of both the country context, including cultural and religious factors likely to affect the success of the programme, (IFRC Thailand, 2008:24; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:10) before beginning the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes. Assessment of the capacity of the HNS to implement CBDRR programmes was also highlighted as a critical factor (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:42; AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30). See sections 4.2 and 4.3 for further discussion of this topic.

The evaluation of the BRCS programme in the Maldives noted that CBDRR programmes are not suitable in all contexts and recommends that the RCRC should ‘consider a reduced DM programme in low risk environments’ and ‘examine more closely what are appropriate interventions in a middle income country’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

Ongoing and recent conflict was identified in a number of countries as having had an impact upon the implementation and operation of CBDRR programmes (IFRC Thailand, 2008:24; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:31; BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:13). Conflict in the Trincomalee district of Sri Lanka even prevented a planned programme commencing in the area (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:4).

The American Red Cross in Indonesia noted that ‘conducting a baseline survey at the beginning of the project helps the team decide on program strategy and key activities’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:21) while the Canadian Red Cross recommended ‘project design assessments should be done jointly’ by the HNS/PNS (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30).

### Community selection

Several reports/evaluations highlight the importance of community selection; with the external evaluation of the IFRC’s programme in Sri Lanka stating simply that more methodical selection of districts would have produced better results (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:73).

The reports/evaluations identified three criteria for the selection of communities:

- Communities which had been affected by the tsunami (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:9)
- Communities which had already received other RCRC programmes (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:21; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:11)

- Communities which are high-risk/vulnerability (BRCS Maldives, 2008:28); this method of selection in the Maldives considered a set of vulnerabilities identified by the WFP, and this was identified within the programme report as ‘good practice’.

It was noted that the ‘readiness and willingness of other stakeholders and community members’ is a key factor which should be considered in the community selection process (IFRC Thailand, 2008:24) and that greater ‘community spirit, cohesion and unity’ increases the likelihood of the success of CBDRR programmes (DRC Indonesia, 2009:34; Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:???) while ‘internal and political conflict could cause a negative impact’ (IFRC Thailand, 2008:24).

The IFRC’s external evaluation from Sri Lanka recommends that the process of selection should engage more with local community stakeholders, as well as government officers, to produce better results (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:70). The use of initial feasibility studies or pre-VCAs was also recommended but rarely seems to have occurred in practice (ibid:73; BRCS Maldives, 2008:29; AmCross Thailand, 2010:32).

## Standardisation versus flexibility

A key challenge identified when implementing CBDRR programmes at scale was the conflict between developing simple, standardised, approaches to enable programmes to be replicated at scale and the need for sufficient flexibility to meet the requirements of individual communities.

In the external evaluations of the AmCross CBDRR programmes in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand it was noted that ‘a structured approach to programme design... allows implementation by organisations and staff with limited experience’ (Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:7) but that ‘ARC wanted to implement a tight programme on budget and on schedule and this does not facilitate open-ended community development type processes’ (AmCross Thailand, 2010:43).

A common problem which emerged was that communities felt projects were fully designed before they were consulted (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:70) rather than ‘decid[ing] the project objectives/activities after a needs assessment at the ground level... to ensure a bottom-up approach’ (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:73; AmCross Thailand, 2010:43). Several evaluations recommended increased flexibility in programme design as ‘the greater flexibility a programme is able to design into its approach, the more potential there is for community ownership and thus engagement and support’ (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44).

## Integration

Around half of the reports/evaluations discussed the advantages or disadvantages of the integration of community-based DRR with schools-based DRR programmes, or with programmes in other sectors (such as shelter and livelihoods (BRCS Maldives and Indonesia) or health (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:18). The VCA was highlighted as a useful tool in the design and implementation of integrated programmes with the British Red Cross in Indonesia recommending that future programmes should ‘make greater and earlier use of the VCA to

identify hazards/vulnerabilities and design more integrated programmes' (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:29).

Several external evaluations recommended greater levels of integration between programmes in future projects (IFRC Thailand, 2008:23; BRCS Maldives, 2008:27; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30) while the British Red Cross recommended that disaster risk reduction should be part of every programme (BRCS Maldives, 2008:4). However, it was noted that where integration does occur, care should be taken to avoid conflict between core activities and subsidiary activities (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:21).

One evaluation recommended that CBDRR programmes should focus on 'ensuring sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction' (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:75) while another recommended maximising livelihoods opportunities within the CBDRR programme (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009) for examples by 'using local contractors or local people to build various physical infrastructure with appropriate CRC or host national society technical support' (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30). Mitigation projects can be integrated with other projects to meet multiple objectives, examples include livelihoods projects (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:11), and healthcare projects (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:14).

DRR programmes in schools were run alongside community-based DRR programmes in all countries (apart from the Maldives) and 'schools represent a huge opportunity, especially...if tied to community work' (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:40). In Sri Lanka it was recognised that the schools programme was 'one of the best ways to disseminate DRR activities' but that the schools programme should be integrated with the CBDRR programme 'so that the schools programme will not be isolated', to create strong links between the Disaster Management Committee, SCH and SHI, and 'so that disaster related information could be collected by school children' (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:xvi & 74).

A number of evaluations noted that a holistic approach to hazards, where the community-based organisations established tackle day to day development issues, as well as larger-scale disasters, increases the sustainability of the organisations established (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010 & Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010). It was also noted that integration between community- and school-based DRR programmes can increase the sustainability of the community-based organisations established as well as generating greater public awareness and behavioural change (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010).

## Exit and sustainability strategy

The need for an exit and sustainability strategy was highlighted in several evaluations to ensure that the community feels supported in the future and hence feel able to continue the programme without the presence of the RCRC in the community.

The AmCross final report from Indonesia recommended developing and disseminating a sustainability strategy to communities, RCRC and external stakeholders (particularly local government) at an early stage in the programme and involving community members (not just the CBAT) in monitoring and evaluation of project activities to increase the level of ownership and understanding about the programme (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:22). While the IFRC external evaluation from Sri Lanka recommended continuing project offices

for at least six months after the close of the project and inform communities well in advance of project office closure (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:76).

It was noted that the sustainability of CBDRR programmes could be improved through:

- building the capacity of the HNS in resource mobilisation and fundraising so that they can continue to support communities (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:6)
- running additional simulations (AmCross Thailand, 2010:43) and providing refresher training to CBATs (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:40; AmCross Thailand, 2010:43; DRC Indonesia, 2009:33)
- running regular public information campaigns (for example about dengue) to keep the community organisations active (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44).
- providing training to the community organisations established (DMTFs) in basic organisation running and fundraising before the end of the programme and support them to make realistic plans for future sustainability (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39)
- providing training in financial management so that communities can manage emergency/contingency community effectively where these funds have been established (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:74)

## B2.6 Management

### Staff

A large number of programmes reported that they were short-staffed and this lack of sufficient numbers of staff/staff with the appropriate skills was cited as a significant factor affecting programme success and implementation timescales.

While it was noted that experienced CBDRR staff and volunteers are ‘a valuable asset’ to future CBDRR programmes in other regions and countries (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2010:8, 18 & 29) and that ‘volunteer management is extremely important’ since volunteers are the backbone of [the RCRC movement] (DRC, 2009: 33), almost every organisation experienced challenges with high volunteer dropout rates and staff turnover (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010; DRC Indonesia, 2009; AmCross Thailand, 2010:36; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:25; BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:17; BRCS Maldives, 2008:34).

Reasons given for high staff turnover were:

- the short-term (commonly one year) contracts under which staff were employed (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:17; AmCross Thailand, 2010:36)
- staff leaving to take up better paid employment with other organisations (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:17; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:25)
- staff being unhappy with the working environment and level of autonomy they were allowed in their work (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:17).

The Danish Red Cross in Indonesia identified significant costs associated with a high turnover of staff; recruitment of replacement staff incurred financial costs, in addition to the loss of momentum to the project whilst new staff members are trained (2009:26). Activities were delayed (IFRC Thailand, 2008:9) or projects were scaled back (AmCross Thailand, 2010:6) as result of insufficient staff in Thailand.

A number of reports/evaluations highlighted that both staff and volunteers need a supportive working environment (DRC Indonesia, 2009; AmCross Indonesia, 2009) with appropriate training and supervision by more experienced staff (AmCross Indonesia, 2009). AmCross recommended that equitable policies and application of salaries, per diems and expenses avoid jealousy and conflict (AmCross, 2010). The external evaluation of CRC's programme in Indonesia recommended the use of 'incentives for meeting early targets in large and complex international programmes' (Canadian RC Indonesia, 31) and suggested that 'bonuses for staff that maintain good service for the duration of the project... [could include]... training and participation in project completion events' (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:31).

## Timeline

A common recommendation made within programme evaluations and reports was that more time was needed to complete a CBDRR programme than originally allocated (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:21; IFRC Thailand, 2008:6). Several evaluations recommended that CBDRR programmes require at least a three year timeframe (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:21; Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30; AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44; Sida on AmCross TRP, 2010:7). Responses to the issue of insufficient time included:

- Applying for/granting no-cost time extensions (IFRC Thailand, 2008:6)
- Scaling back projects (AmCross Thailand, 2010:6)
- Fast-tracking activities, which will likely reduce quality (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:14-15) and lead to them being superficial rather than effective (AmCross Indonesia, 2010a:27)

Programmes must allow significant for two-way communication with communities and this requires adequate staff numbers, with specific technical expertise in community participation (BRCS Indonesia, 2009:29; BRCS Maldives, 2008:40). It is also important that programmes accommodate key religious activities (for example it is sensible to avoid activities during Ramadan) (IFRC Thailand, 2008:25) and the daily schedules of communities to ensure everyone has the opportunity to participate (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

## Finance

The documents reviewed highlighted fewer lessons with regard to financial management although problems were encountered in transferring funds between the PNS and HNS, and from HQ to branch level (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:25; AmCross Thailand, 2010:37) with delayed or irregular funding making it hard for programmes to maintain momentum.

Overspending of budgets was not a common issue, however Danish RC reported this happening in Sri Lanka, as they had completed additional activities not accounted for in the original programme design; such as extra training sessions, repeat assessments and additional equipment purchasing (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:23). In contrast the British Red Cross in Sri Lanka significantly under spent its budget before suspending the programme (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:i).

It was recommended that financial management could be improved through:



- Development of programme budgets and funding sources/timescales with both board members and staff at National, Chapter and branch levels to ‘minimise the risks of over or under budgeting’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:22) and ‘so that local teams know what to expect and how to plan’ (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:31).
- Establishing an agreed accounting system (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30)
- Increased reporting (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:28)
- Undertaking periodical budget monitoring activities (AmCross Indonesia, 2010b:22)
- Providing ‘training in financial management and reporting’ (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:28)

## Monitoring and evaluation

Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of developing adequate reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; IFRC Thailand, 2008:24). It was noted that ‘monitoring findings had a positive impact on the qualitative nature of activities as these were identified, discussed and amended at more regular intervals.’ (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:18). Yet in order for monitoring to play a useful role it must be integrated throughout the project from the start, rather than added at the end, as it was in the Maldives (BRCS Maldives, 2008:32).

The AmCross external evaluations from both Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand highlighted the importance of understanding the purpose of monitoring and reporting. It was noted that reporting numbers to demonstrate progress is different from monitoring where they are in the project cycle (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44; AmCross Indonesia, 2010:40) and that the focus of monitoring activities should be project success and sustainability rather than financial expenditure and meeting deadlines (AmCross Thailand, 2008:38).

Many programme evaluations/reports identified monitoring and evaluation as aspects of the programme which were not completed well by branches (BRCS Sri Lanka, 2007:10) and this was often due to the activities being relatively new to the HNS, particularly at branch level (IFRC Thailand, 2008:23-24). The external evaluation of the BRCS programme in the Maldives recommended that the MRCS should ‘consider building in-house capacity to undergo programme evaluations, or even for the IFRC to do so’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:40). While on a more day-to-day level the external evaluation of the Canadian RC in Indonesia recommended the development of ‘a simple and clear timeline or “scorecard”... to demonstrate progress being made’ (CRC Indonesia, 2009:30).

Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of capturing lessons learned:

- Documenting approaches and lessons learned (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:xvi; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39)
- Developing guidelines (IFRC Sri Lanka, 2010:xvi)
- Knowledge transfer between staff (Canadian RC Indonesia, 2009:30; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39)
- Developing ‘a culture of internal learning’ (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44)
- Documenting and disseminating success stories to increase the RC profile and generate additional funding (AmCross Sri Lanka, 2010:44)

## B3 Key Informant Interviews

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### B3.1 Methodology

During the field work, 72 semi-structured key informant interviews were completed across the four countries – 24 in Indonesia, 20 in Sri Lanka, 15 in the Maldives and 12 in Thailand. Key informants included:

- HNS volunteers, field officers, branch staff, national staff and board members
- Country representatives, DRR specialists and programme coordinators from the PNSs
- Local and national government representatives
- Heads of Village and village elders
- Members of Village Action Teams/Village Committees
- UN Agencies

Prior to the fieldwork a set of standardised questions were developed to guide the interview process. Of these questions several directly related to the identification of *key determinants* (see below) while comments on *key determinants* also emerged in answer to other questions and more general discussion.

Interviews in all four countries were completed in either the local language, with real-time translation, or in English and detailed hand-written notes were taken. Several interviews in the Maldives were completed entirely in Maldivian and later transcribed.

Informed by the findings of the literature review and meta-analysis of lessons learned the notes from the interviews were later analysed and coded to identify themes. An inductive approach was taken whereby themes were allowed to develop from the data and either supported or added to the *key determinants* identified in the literature review and meta-analysis of lessons learned.

#### Sample Questions from the Key Informant Interviews

Of the CBDRR programmes you have experience of - which programme or community do you think was most successful?

Why do you think the project was successful? What contributed to its success?

What factors within the RCRC do you think make CBDRR programmes more or less successful?

What external factors do you think make CBDRR programmes more or less successful?

Are CBDRR projects sustainable? What makes CBDRR projects sustainable?

## List of Interviewees

Sri Lanka			
Number	Date	Name	Role
1	01/02/2011	Muditha Padmage	Community Facilitator, SLRCS
2	01/02/2011	Sumudu Liyanage	Social Development Officer, GoSL
3	02/02/2011	Suranga Amarajeewa	Field Officer, SLRCS- Kalutara Branch
4	02/02/2011	Ayuanthi Fernando	Acting Branch Executive Officer (Previously Assistant Accountant), SLRCS- Kalutara Branch
5	02/02/2011	Major Sanjeeva Samaranyake	District Disaster Management Coordinator, Disaster Management Center, GoSL
6	03/02/2011	Vhari Maghesh	Branch Executive Officer, SLRCS- Ratnapura Branch
7	04/02/2011	XXXX	Branch Executive Officer, SLRCS- Monaragala Branch
8	05/02/2011	Ranjit Loyanage	Acting Branch Executive Officer, SLRCS- Badulla Branch
9	06/02/2011	Badulla North (Community)	Grama Niladari, GoSL
10	07/02/2011	XXXX	(Ex) Project Coordinator & Assistant Project Coordinator, SLRCS- Matale Branch
11	07/02/2011	Community Members Egodawewa, Matale	VDMC: Secretary & Committee Members
12	08/02/2011	Ruwan Abeywardena	Branch Executive Officer, SLRCS- Gampaha Branch
13	08/02/2011	Manjula Pushpakumara	Programme Officer, CB Early Warning Programme, IFRC
14	08/02/2011	Community Members Duwa Pitipanaa, Gampaha	VDMC Members
15	09/02/2011	XXXX	Field Officer, SLRCS- Greater Colombo Branch
16	09/02/2011	Dr. Ananda Mallawatantri	Assistant Resident Representative Team Leader: Environment, Energy and Disaster Management, UNDP
17	10/02/2011	Shesh Kanta Kafle	Disaster Risk Reduction Delegate, Canadian Red Cross
18	10/02/2011	Jose Ravano	Delegate- Head of Programs, American Red Cross
19	10/02/2011	Eric XXXX	Disaster Risk Management Delegate, Danish Red Cross
20	10/02/2011	Nandana Mohottige	Programme Manager- Disaster Risk Reduction, IFRC
	10/02/2011	Gothami Chandraratne	Programme Officer 4DP/DRR, SLRCS
	10/02/2011	Radhika Fernando	Admin Assistant - Disaster Management, SLRCS
Thailand			
21	16/02/2011	Kamonwan Sitoakdee, Oranuth Lo-onnlum, Pallin Phukit, Maolwan Klubsri	DDPM (CBDRM Team)
22	17/02/2011	<b>TRC National team:</b>	Deputy director of Relief and Community Health Bureau (RCH), in charge CBDRR project of RCH
		Dr Pichit Siriwan,	Assistant director of RCH.
		Ms. Orasa Petkhong	Acting head nurse. Her department is key department to implement CBDRR project funded by Tsunami Programme.
		Ms. Suprancee	Nurse. She is one of key persons to implement existing CBDRR project of RCH. Involved in M&E.
		Ms. Pavinee Yuprasert	Implemented both pilot project and ARC CBDRR projects.
		Mr. Phaitoon Noviset	Implement both IFRC, ARC projects.
		Ms. Ning/ Pannee	Implemented AC
Mr. Samart Nakyangone	Project Coordinator TRC CBDRR field study team		
23	21/02/2011	Ms. Wassika, Ms. Wilailak,	TRC CBDRR field study team
24	23/02/2011	Mr. Sommai and Ms. Monpicha	
25	21/02/2011	Mr. Somehai Srimok	DDPM Trang
26	21/02/2011	a. Mr. Samreng Wongmunceworn b. Mr. Wanchai Nissara,	a. DDPM chief, Satun Province
		c. Mr. Jirayut Bunticaw	b. DDPM officer, Satun Province
			c. DDPM offices, Satun Province
27	21/02/2011	a. Ms. Jaturapom Kulboon	a. Former IFRC coordinator for tsunami recovery
		b. Mr. Monit Thachun	b. Head of Admin TRC Chapter Trang

28	21/02/2011	a. Ms. Wichitra Karunwannapat	a. TRC Chapter President, Satun Province
		b. Namerah Madteh	b. Former IFRC coordinator for tsunami recovery, Satun
		c. Chintana	c. Head of Admin
29	22/02/2011	Mr. Anu Saraban and	Village Head and
		Ms. Napatsorn Yangpaknam	Village Head's Assistant, Thung Sa Boe
30	23/02/2011	Mr. Cornsak Angsukanjanakul	Village head, Thung Ma Hnang, Satun
31	24/02/2011	Mr. Pun Madbu, and	CDMC chairman and
		Mr. Aurak Wanmusa	assistant village head, Koh Mook, rang
32	25/02/2011	Mr.Sommai Madting	Sub-district leader, CDMC chairman, Laem Ma Kham, Trang
<b>Maldives</b>			
33	06/02/2011	Mr. Mohamed Yasir	Programme Analyst, Environment, Energy and Disaster Risk Management Unit, UNDP, Male
34	07/02/2011	Full Names Please- SIYAH khaled, hasan and ??	3 Island Chiefs, Raa Hulhudhufaar.
35	07/02/2011	Names Please- SIYAH	Former Island Chief, who worked with IFRC, Raa Hulhudhufaar.
36	07/02/2011	1. Ms. Fathimath Hassan	1. Health Auxiliary of the Health Centre/ Vice president of the Women's
		2. Ms. Maimoona Mohamed	2. Hospital Attendant/Member of the WDC, Raa Hulhudhufaar.
37	08/02/2011	Mr. Ibrahim Rashid's family	Family members of former Governing Council Member, MRC, Laamu Fohnadoo Island.
38	09/02/2011	Mr. A and Mr. B	Island Chiefs, Tha Buruni
39	09/02/2011	Community members of Buruni	Candid discussion and their reflections on Tsunami and IDP conflict
40	10/02/2011	1. Bilala, Ripon, Kaosar and Mohidul Islam	1. Bangladeshi farmers, Laamu Isdhoo
		2. Abdul Gafoor	2. Farmowner, Laamu Isdhoo
41	10/02/2011	Mr Ibrahim Mohamed and	A couple who built tsunami resilient house by themselves and the lady got BRCS livelihood cash grant in Laamu Isdhoo.
		Mrs Shaheedha Ismail	
42	11/02/2011	Ms. Jameela Halid	Housewife, with five children got relocated in Laamu Gaan.
43	11/02/2011	Mr. Ibrahim Rashid	Former governing council member, Laamu Fohnadoo.
44	13/02/2011	Mr. Ali Nasheed	Island Chief, Kaafu Maafushi
45	07/02/2011	Mr. Ahmed Nacen(Tour guide for CBDRR	Former American Red Cross Sewerage System Operator - 4 months in Maafushi in
46	07/02/2011	1. Ms. Aminath Sharmela,	1&2. Former BRCS and 3.IFRC staff who are all currently working for the MRC in different positions.
		2. Mr. Mohamed Adeel and	
		3. Mr. Ibrahim Fawaz	
48	08/02/2011	Mr. Ahmed Zaki	Deputy Minister of Housing and Environment, NDMC lead
<b>Indonesia</b>			
Number	Date	Name	Role
49	24/02/2011	Mr William Halder	Belgian Red Cross Country Representative
50	24/02/2011	Mr Ritwan Miss Desi	PMI DM Staff, Jakarta
51	01/03/2011	-	Head of Village (also head of CDMC), Gamping Cot Village Treasurer (also head of CBAT), Gamping Cot
52	02/03/2011	Ihsan Zulfadi	CBAT Members, Pulot Village
53	03/03/2011	-	Head of Village, Deah Glumpang
54	03/03/2011	Erna Mirna Iskandar	Heads of PMI ICBRR Volunteers
55	04/03/2011	Didik Sugiyanto, MT Zulchaidir, S.Si	Secretary, TDRMC, Banda Aceh DRR Trainer Assistant, TDRMC, Banda Aceh
56	04/04/2011	Mr Armi	BPBA, Banda Aceh
57	04/04/2011	Syarifah Marlina Al Mazhir	Program Coordinator, American Red Cross, Banda Aceh
58	04/04/2011	Darmami	PMI DM Staff, Banda Aceh
59	04/04/2011	Zaitin	BRC and CRC Volunteer, 2007-2008, Arup Fieldwork Translator
60	05/03/2011	-	Head of Village, Jaboi
61	05/03/2011	Burhansyah	CBAT Member, Jaboi
62	07/03/2011	Muliade Adan	Head of CDMC, Patek Fajar
63	08/03/2011	Mohammed Ali Sakh	Head of Village, Cot Langsat
64	10/03/2011	Mr Farid	PMI Aceh Board Member, Head of DM Sector for Aceh Province
65	10/03/2011	-	Head of Village, Suak Ribbee
66	12/03/2011	Abu Bakar	Chairman of PMI Bener Meriah
		Lesiana Irlan	Field officer for CBDRR Programme Secretary
67	12/03/2011	Masyhubulhag	Head of Juha Peut (Village Elders Committee)
68	13/03/2011	Armia	Head of PMI Aceh Tenggara
		Arlaidist	Aceh Tenggara DM Staff
		Armansyah	Deputy Secretary
		Dedi Nasution	Administrative Staff
69	15/03/2011	Mr Fauzi Husani	Head of DM, Aceh Province
70	16/03/2011	Baktiar	Head of PMI Langsa Office
71	21/03/2011	PNS Representatives	Jakarta
72	21/03/2011	PMI DM Team	PMI Jakarta

## B3.2 Findings

According to the key informant interviews conducted in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia the critical factors that influence the impact and sustainability of CBDRR programmes (*key determinants*) are:

### Community

- **The level of community motivation** was highlighted as a critical factor by a high number of interviewees in all four countries. The relevance of CBDRR to a community's needs was noted as the critical factor in their level of motivation - with higher levels of community motivation noted in areas with frequent natural hazards. Motivating communities to participate in CBDRR programmes in a disaster recovery context was noted as particularly challenging as "...the community are not interested in development when they need food/water" (Indonesia).
- **Community selection** was a key contributing factor to community motivation and this was often completed in partnership with local government. However, the policy of some agencies to run CBDRR programmes in tsunami-affected rather than high risk communities and the relevance of CBDRR programmes focussing on early warning/preparedness activities for communities facing stresses such as droughts and health problems led to lower levels of community motivation. Even if communities at high risk are chosen it was noted that SLRCS "tried to get participation from all the community. But the VDMC came from the most affected areas".
- In addition to their motivation to participate it was noted **that the level of capacity within the community** has significant impact on the success of CBDRR programmes during their implementation – and that there can be significant variations in capacity between rural and urban communities.

The level of community cohesion and 'unity' was cited as critical by many interviewees in Sri Lanka with comments such as "rural people they sense 'this is our village'" and "in Sri Lanka you can't find the real 'community' - most are heterogeneous. It is difficult to get their participation. This is very difficult."

The amount of time community members can commit to CBDRR was also a significant factor and this was noted in comments such as "in urban areas people have less flexible employment (e.g. for government) and so they can't be flexible with their time." (Sri Lanka). "It is also important to know that due to the economic state of the people, they cannot afford to commit their time for volunteerism" (Maldives) and "if they make activities during harvest... community can't come." (Indonesia)

A third factor noted in community capacity was their level of education and literacy. This was particularly highlighted in Indonesia in comments such as "in the beginning we were doing announcement boards but people couldn't even read" and "most people here don't have good education. [We] try to explain about DRR but community think disasters from God" (Indonesia).

- **The motivation and capacity of community leaders** was highlighted as a critical factor in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives through comments such as "leadership of the community - many things depend on this" and "when we design a programme the GN is the most important factor".

It was noted that community leaders were motivated to participate if the community faced a high level of risk, but also if they had received a letter from sub-district or district government encouraging them to participate. While in Indonesia comments were made that "in some communities there was not enough support, so we stopped the programme... When we do orientation with the leaders, then we decided".

In Indonesia and the Maldives the Head of Village or Island Chief was sometimes the head of the community committee established while in Sri Lanka it was government policy that they fulfilled this role. However, the capacity of community leaders was critical and it was noted that after the completion of the programme in the Maldives the "Island chief is now responsible for everything and we can't or have time to do everything".

- **The motivation and capacity of the community committee/action team members** was noted as a specific critical factor in Thailand and Indonesia – with particular relevance to the sustainability of CBDRR programmes. In both countries several comments were made that the community action team “must understand that they have the responsibility to implement after the PMI programme” (Indonesia) and that “committee members need to take these responsibilities seriously” (Thailand). However, it was noted that the capacity of the actions teams in Thailand were limited and that they "need more knowledge to deal with other hazards like drought and storms."
- While mentioned infrequently **the inclusion of a wide section of community members** was highlighted in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia as a weakness where this had not been achieved. This is noted in comments such as "the main issue and weakness of the project is that it is limited to only a proportion of the community" (Sri Lanka) or "the evacuation space is the safe shelter building in the harbour and everyone in the community knows this. But we don't have a proper communication system that can reach all the community in case of a disaster" (Maldives).
- Generating a high **level of community ownership** was highlighted by several interviewees in Sri Lanka as critical to the success of CBDRR programmes – particularly in relation to sustainability. This was noted as being particularly challenging in a post-disaster context as the tsunami had created a “dependancy mentality... so changing [that mindset] was difficult".
- It was noted that the **VCA and community action planning** are key steps in developing community ownership over the programme and that the way in which the VCA is conducted has a significant impact on community ownership. One participant noted that "the purpose of the VCA is to give the community a chance to realise their situation, getting the information is a secondary thing... Here they did the VCA to gather the information and that is wrong." Several interviewees noted that “it is important that [the VCA] belongs to the village, not to the RCRC” and that "the idea for the steps came from the community, they initiated the next steps and the RCRC provided assistance".

## RCRC

- **The level of HNS motivation and capacity** was consistently noted across all four countries as key to the success of CBDRR programmes. It is worth noting that ‘capacity’ had many facets and included: skills and experience (in both individuals and organisations), availability and continuity of personnel and the existence of guidelines and manuals.

A number of interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia highlighted the motivation of board members and branches as key to the success of CBDRR programmes. In Indonesia it was noted that in areas which had not been affected by the tsunami “branches had not received so much so they were keen to contribute.” While in Sri Lanka it was noted that “some governance members thought we should just give things, we have money, we should give everything on the very first day” and “at some branches the problem is the BEO not understanding community-based approaches. This is a huge threat to the programme.”

A number of interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia described the HNS lack of experience in CBDRR programmes prior to the tsunami and that implementing CBDRR programmes required specialist skills. Comments such as “the RCRC typically do relief” and “people weren’t used to the community-based approach” were common in Sri Lanka. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka interviewees commented that the HNS “was not ready” and lacked manuals and guidelines for the implementation of CBDRR.

Interviewees in Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia highlighted the importance of continuity in staffing to the success of CBDRR programmes both during implementation and after completion. One interviewee from Sri Lanka recommended that “the DM department should have a fixed position who will keep the CBDRM purpose.” While interviewees in Indonesia noted the challenges associated with continuing to support communities after completion of CBDRR programmes when there had been a significant reduction in programme staff.

Duplicate reporting lines in Sri Lanka meant that once staff were allocated to the programme they could not always be relied upon as there was “constant tension about whose staff are they? The BEO could take them off and say work on something else.” In Indonesia PMI found it hard to recruit and retain skilled staff as “people working for the PNS got higher pay.” They also experienced challenges in replacing staff which were ineffective as although the chapter recommended to branches “if someone is not capable they should be replaced” they were not directly able to influence HR procedures at branch level.

Lack of skills to implement CBDRR programmes was consistently highlighted across all four countries with comments such as “many people come and start from zero” (Sri Lanka) and “the capacity was not there in both PMI and [the PNS].” Challenges in producing manuals in Tamil at HQ level were noted in Sri Lanka, although this was “not a problem at field level.” While lack of skills was highlighted by one interviewee in Sri Lanka as a reason for the lack of integration “as CBDRR implementers we lack understanding of how to implement [livelihoods] activities.”

While it was recognised that “the field coordinator has a very big influence as they are the liaison between [the HNS] and the community” these positions

are often held by volunteers and this created challenges in terms of skills and continuity. It was noted in Indonesia that "volunteers are not used to working professionally - they don't know how to plan their work. Building their capacity is difficult - it's easier to just involve them in simple things."

- **Having a clear and agreed understanding of the CBDRR approach/concept** was highlighted as a critical factor by several interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In both countries the lack of a pre-defined CBDRR approach and the time taken to reach agreement between RCRC actors and develop manuals, guidelines and training programmes caused significant delays.

One interviewee in Indonesia highlighted the importance of a good understanding of the CBDRR approach at branch level stating that they "must understand that DRR is part of RCRC - not special... In some places people view CBDRR staff as part of the donor - not PMI". While in Sri Lanka one interviewee asked "the IFRC have a programme called 'safer communities' the German Red Cross's programme is about Climate Change, the Danish Red Cross's programme is called 'conflict preparedness' and the Canadian Red Cross's programme is called 'Integrated programme approach'. How do they link together? How will it be useful to the SLRCS?"

- **The skills and capacity of the PNS DRR delegate** was highlighted by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In Sri Lanka it was noted that "at the beginning there were many technical delegates [and] this was a massive support". However, with only one delegate from each PNS they carried a lot of responsibility. One interviewee in Sri Lanka questioned the technical capacity of the PNS delegate: "one person came for PSP, then joined CBH, then CBDM... He gave technical advice but how can he be an expert in all of these fields?"

In Indonesia it was noted that problems were encountered because of PNS management staff and in the PNS DRR delegate. "In 2006 we had 2 delegates - they couldn't agree...[and] the CBDRR programme was not successful until the DRR delegate was an Indonesian and had the skills in DRR."

- In addition to the capacity of the HNS and PNS, **having clear coordination, decision-making and management structures and procedures** within the RCRC was highlighted as a critical factor in Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia.

In Sri Lanka several interviewees noted "unnecessary bureaucracy" in the management of CBDRR programmes, difficulties in communication between branches/head office and the PNS, delays in designing the programme and transferring funds for implementation. It was noted that approval of activities proposed by the VDMC "often takes more than two months and people become demotivated because they can't see the activities joining up."

Lines of reporting were frequently highlighted as a constraint in Sri Lanka as "there was no standardised approach for programme management and the relationship between the Programme Manager, Programme Coordinator and Field Coordinator. Each PNS applied their own standard." In one example "the field officer has to report to the BEO and the PNS delegate [so] the project coordinator who is in charge of the project does... not directly control their staff".



Lines of reporting, coordination and management were also highlighted in Indonesia, although to a lesser degree than Sri Lanka. One interviewee noted that “we didn't spend enough time in programme start up. We didn't understand roles and responsibilities before going to the community.” A second noted that “even though [the PNS representative] sits in branch we have to wait for PMI Aceh to make decisions.” While another highlighted the importance of “develop[ing] a structure - you need a system/structure/tools” for successful programmes.

One interviewee in Sri Lanka stated that “the biggest challenges were the politics with the SLRCS (national and branch)” and there were calls for a “steering committee or monthly meeting with all staff... to share together and learn.” However, it was noted that although project coordination meetings were held every 2-3 months “the chairman or BEO did not attend these and the views of the field officer or project manager are not listened to.” Relationships within the HNS were also noted in Indonesia with one interviewee noting that “PMI work in divisions - they don't have a team concept” and “in Aceh they don't want to involve foreigners.”

The challenges experienced in Sri Lanka and Indonesia were echoed by one interviewee in Thailand with comments such as “there was a problem when PNS worked in its own and didn't report” and “we don't want to control the PNS, just want to know what's been done.” It was recommended that “if there are three RC/PNS then they should all be sitting in the TRC office for better coordination... As the officer from each PNS is hired they don't know the right channel for programme implementation we can advise on who to see, how to start.”

- The importance of **having adequate monitoring and evaluation procedures**, to enable progress to be monitored and programme adjustments made, was highlighted by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In Sri Lanka it was noted that “one of our weaknesses is the M&E” as “the BEO is very busy managing many projects [and he] also needs to be hunting new donors and writing new proposals.” This was echoed in Indonesia with the comments “at the time of the tsunami there were so many programmes at the same time - difficult to monitor. Also had volunteers with limited capacity”.

Monthly field visits by senior PNS staff to “make reports, recommendations and provide technical support/monitoring” had been a successful strategy for one PNS in Indonesia while it was also recommended that future CBDRR programmes should have standardised formats for reporting (progress and finance) to make it easier for the Chapter to monitor the progress of branches.

- **The adequate and timely provision of financial assistance from RCRC & external partners** was a challenge identified by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In Sri Lanka one interviewee described how “when we prepared for the sluice gate the estimate was done by the irrigation department and they took a long time... Because of the delay the village was flooded one more time” while another noted that delays in the provision of funding meant that “the VDMC/community spend their own money - then the branch reimbursed.”

In Indonesia one interviewee described how PNS programme budgets are set by their head offices (overseas) and “you have to spend equally over the time. [You are] forced to spend the money as if it's a straight programme. But in a three year programme it takes time to start-up and close out.” At a HNS

branch level they too experienced challenges as “sometimes the Plan of Action is revised by [the PNS] and PMI Aceh Chapter [during programme implementation] because of the budget.” While in another chapter it was noted that the “IFRC salary for staff stopped at end 2009” leaving branches with few resources to provide ongoing support.

## Government

- **The support of the national government for disaster planning or mitigation** was highlighted as a critical factor for the success of CBDRR programmes in all four countries.

In Sri Lanka...on the one hand “we form VDMC groups because of the government plan. The government road map says they should have these groups”. However, “the government are not concerned with resilience; they are concerned with how they will respond if something happens”

In the Maldives it was noted by two interviewees that “disaster planning should be organised at national level [by the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC)] and properly communicated...[but] we have had little support from the government.” However, in Thailand and Indonesia the establishment of new government disaster management agencies (the establishment of a Community-based Disaster Risk Management Department (CBDRM) in the Thai government and the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) in Indonesia) meant that there were greater opportunities for collaboration.

It was noted by officials in the Thai government CBDRM department that “CBDRM approach is the main policy since the establishment of our department in 2002... Our DDPM staff have learnt from ADPC and the RCRC, the RCRC is older than us and we rely on their knowledge” and that “DDPM not only receive support from RCRC, but they also support RCRC, for example to produce guide book.”

In Indonesia several interviewees stated that they were looking to collaborate with the newly established provincial and district level offices of BPBD to support existing or for the development of future CBDRR programmes. It was noted that there were significant opportunities for partnership with BPBD because “right now at government level they have money for disasters but no implementation plan... They have budget for disasters but don’t have volunteers in the village.”

- **The motivation, capacity and support of local government** was highlighted by interviewees in all four countries as critical to both the short and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes. However, this was challenging due to lack of capacity within local governments and a lack of understanding of the CBDRR approach: “for example through constructing a well they see the achievement as the digging of the well, not the change in the community’s behaviour...”

In Sri Lanka it was noted that “more support by government... would have lead to more sustainability” but “because of limited capacity within the government they cannot continue the programme.” One interviewee described how “we tried to link the communities into other agencies - government departments etc - [but it was] difficult to get the DMC involved... We are working on developing the capacity of the DMC themselves. It is different if you are linking to a well established organisation.”

Similar comments were made in Thailand where one interviewee described how "even the government officers are rotating. The new ones come, who may not know what has happened or may have less interest." In Indonesia it was noted that "at the moment community-based programmes should be submitted to the sub-district and district through the [newly established] *musrembang* [government participatory system of budget allocation]. But the mechanism for using disaster funding in non-disaster is not-clear." Also that "[CBDRR] was a success at the community level but sustainability is a problem... There are weak links between communities and the government - because at that time the government didn't have a plan."

- Despite challenges experienced as a result of low capacity in local government interviewees in all four countries noted the importance of strong **connections and coordination with external actors** (especially local government).

Several interviewees made comments such as:

- "The most important thing is to coordinate the internal and external issues. For example the canal, it would not be possible without external actors" (Sri Lanka)
- "if branch level have good coordination with government they can advocate for funding from government" (Indonesia)
- "In disaster management no one can do it alone" (Sri Lanka)
- "Trainings and workshops are important. But to sustain them we need to involve more NGOs and agencies" (Maldives)

In Indonesia a number of interviewees noted the importance of involving local government from the beginning of the CBDRR programme with comments such as "the first time [the PNS] came here they meet with the Bupati [Head of District] to explain when it will start finish. When we finished, the Bupati gave letter of thanks." In Sri Lanka comments were made that "the programme has increased coordination with other organisations [and] the community are now in direct contact with the DMC" and "if [the community] are organised they can coordinate with external actors themselves."

## Sustainability

- While many interviewees discussed factors affecting the sustainability of CBDRR programmes only a few interviewees explicitly highlighted the importance of having an **exit and sustainability strategy**. One interviewee in Sri Lanka stated that one of the main factors in sustainability "is the exit strategy for phasing out. However, it needs to be designed strategically - it should be tailor made and localised - not just for the sake of having one" while another described how "SLRCS needs to have a plan to sustain, market their skills to be attractive to donors." A third interviewee in Indonesia highlighted the importance of involving other actors in the sustainability strategy when stating that "there are weak links between communities and the government - because at that time the government didn't have a plan."
- Many of the key informants interviewed described the challenges associated with retaining knowledge and trained personnel within communities and the importance of **having procedures so that knowledge and action teams are sustained**.

In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka many of the people selected for the community-based action teams were in their late teens or early twenties – so

that they were physically fit enough to assist others in an emergency and had free time to participate in training. However, several interviewees noted that this had a negative impact on the sustainability of CBDRR programmes as many of the team members had left the community to get married or look for work. To overcome this problem one interviewee in Sri Lanka recommended that “it is good if [the RCRC] have knowledge or projects to retain the young generation... people who have been trained should train the next generation.”

Where changes in committee/action team members had occurred, challenges were often experienced in identifying replacement members and in handing over information and documentation to the new representatives. As one ex-Island Chief in the Maldives noted “we made a Disaster Management Plan also. I have handed over all those documents to the island office [when I resigned but] the DMC is not functioning since that time.”

- Several interviewees highlighted challenges experienced with the **community contingency fund (CCF)**. One interviewee in Sri Lanka stated that “activity wise the biggest challenge was the CCF... conceptually it's a good idea, but the difficulty is that it is microfinance and it needs a mechanism to replenish.” Several interviewees echoed the comment made in Sri Lanka that “our CCFs were a one-off - they used it and that's it.” One programme had included training in community-based accountancy so that communities learnt how to manage and raise funding, while other interviewees recommended that it would be better to include the CCF in the community contingency plan (CCP).
- In Sri Lanka and Indonesia several interviewees specifically highlighted the importance of having **formal links between the village committee/action team and government or RCRC** in increasing the sustainability of the community organisations established.

Several interviewees in Sri Lanka described how once the VDMC is registered as an NGO (in accordance with the government plan) they can open a bank account, collect funds, “implement things” and contract with the government for local infrastructure projects. One interviewee commented that “some of the other RCRC projects, such as in 2003 just came and left. This is much more sustainable as it is registered with the government.”

In Indonesia, where the groups formed by the RCRC are not formally recognised by the government, one interviewee recommended that there should be “a formal link between the CDMC/CBAT and PMI... at least two CBAT/CDMC members become formal PMI volunteers - they can go on refresher training etc.” While another recommended that the “CDMC and CBAT should have legal status – particularly in conflict areas – people with PMI uniform should have legality. If they are legal will get ID card and maybe support from the government.”

- **The level of continuing support to the community after the completion of the project** was highlighted as a critical factor for the sustainability of CBDRR programmes by interviewees in all four countries. Comments centred on two main themes – firstly an ongoing relationship between the committees/action teams established and their RCRC field officer or branch and secondly the provision of refresher training as an activity which can be provided by the RCRC to support ongoing committee/action team activity.

In Sri Lanka and Indonesia it was recommended that “there should be continuous coordination between the community and the RCRC.” Because:

- the community “don't have the courage to run the project alone”
- “they don't know what problems they will face in the future”
- communities need support from the RCRC to advocate to local government
- communities only have enough income for their daily lives and “if there is no disaster they will work for their own income.”

One interviewee in Thailand recommended that “we should have a programme representative in the province from the providers of the CBDRR programme. Because, now if we want to do something, want to contact someone we can't contact them as the programme has already finished.” However, in Indonesia it was noted that “right now we have a good relationship with the CBAT as the programme has just ended but we don't know what it will be like in five-ten years, we need more budget to continue.”

One interviewee in Sri Lanka described the importance of the relationship with the field officer “when people work here we don't use names - instead we say 'mother' 'brother' 'sister' so it's like a relationship... In the floods he comes to see the community to see how they are doing, like a friendship it works.” This was echoed by comments in Indonesia that “sometimes [CBAT members] call PMI – they miss them. The volunteers no longer come to the village but they talk over the phone,” “if something happens in the village (someone gets sick or have a party) they will ask PMI to come” and “if CBAT members pass the office they come by.”

In the most successful communities in Indonesia it was noted that CBAT members wear their CBAT uniforms with pride and “feel they are PMI volunteers.” One branch in particular had fostered this relationship (even without significant ongoing funding) through inviting CBAT members to come to the local office and participate in RCRC Volunteer day. They noted that

- Interviewees in all four countries recommended the provision of **refresher training** to committee/action team members. This was highlighted as a means of reminding people who have forgotten, training replacement committee/action team members, stimulating continued community activity and providing additional skills to communities (potentially in tackling additional shocks or stresses not covered in the original training). Where refresher training had not been provided it was unfortunately often the case that “there has been no follow-up, so nothing has been practiced” (Maldives).
- Although mentioned infrequently, a critical factor which affected the sustainability of CBDRR programmes **was the quality and continued usefulness of the mitigation project.**

Two positive examples noted in Sri Lanka was that “the well that was constructed is useful - not just to the community but to others (including the hospital)” and “the community ensured that good quality materials were used for the mitigation project [a bathing place] because they had ownership.” In both cases community members, in partnership with committee/action team members had continued to maintain and clean the facility.

On the other hand poor coordination with external actors in one community in Sri Lanka meant that “since they built the sluice gate the DMC have raised the height of the river bank. Now the community need to raise the height of the sluice gate.” While an (ex) Island Chief in the Maldives noted that “when the

[community building] was handed over to the island office they did not even know how to go about connecting power to it. Over time the place has broken down (toilets, roof), mainly due to lack of supervision by the island office."

Interestingly, several interviewees noted improved impact and sustainability of mitigation projects if they were 'multi-purpose'. For example:

- 'if you clean the canal the main effect is to empty it, the second is to cultivate [farmers abandoned land]. The maintenance is there" (Sri Lanka)
- "since having the kitchen utensils and equipment we can use them for other purposes (such as communal work)" (Sri Lanka)
- The community action team "try to integrate [CBDRR] into community activities, e.g. community composting - which was an activity before the ICBDRR programme" (Indonesia)
- Another critical factor for the sustainability of CBDRR programmes was **the provision of appropriate and adequate equipment** and this was highlighted in all four countries. One interviewee in the Maldives put this explicitly: the "most important thing for getting prepared for a disaster is to have the resources established...We can create awareness... but if they don't have the option or resources to opt for it, awareness can only do so much."

Several interviewees made comments such as:

- "to provide a first aid service they need jackets and caps" (Sri Lanka)
- "we know what to do but we don't have the proper tools. We have the first aid bag but not a stretcher for carrying the injured to hospital" (Thailand)
- "we don't have a proper communication system that can reach all the community in case of a disaster. The loudspeakers [we were provided with] do not reach the whole community." (Maldives)
- The search and rescue teams "don't have an emergency boat to send for rescue. We all have our own boat" (Thailand)
- "the warning tower will not work as we need an effective telecom device. Now we have 6 walkie talkies from the CBDRR to communicate internally. But not able to contact outside." (Thailand)

## Programme Design

### • The level of integration

Several interviewees in Indonesia and Sri Lanka recommended that CBDRR programmes are integrated with other RCRC programmes – frequently health and livelihoods but also organisational development and schools.

Reasons given for recommending greater integration included:

- Communities view resilience holistically. "From their perspective livelihoods, CBDRR and health are overlapping. Livelihoods is key, as is insurance for their property." Consequently, "if we can support livelihoods they like to help us" (Sri Lanka).
- Greater integration leads to more successful programmes during implementation. Programmes are more successful "if they've had a CBHFA programme before and trained community health volunteers" (Indonesia).
- Greater integration leads to greater sustainability. "If the CBDRR programme can be linked to the OD programme is more sustainable and

can have continued support" (Sri Lanka) and quite simply, “not integrated means [CBDRR] not sustainable” (Indonesia).

- An integrated approach is required to build resilience. “If we include all these components we can build a resilient community. If we can change livelihoods, we can change the super-structure - health, education etc... all these can be changed” (Sri Lanka).

Reasons given for a lack of integration were:

- The PNS was not receptive to this approach (Sri Lanka)
- Lack of organisational experience in CBDRR so integration was seen as secondary/an extension activity: "at that time there wasn't much experience of CBDRM so the programme couldn't put much focus on other things." (Sri Lanka)
- The long-term nature of livelihoods programmes and the difficulties implementing these within the standard three year timeframe (Sri Lanka)
- The “extra burden, extra risk” of livelihoods programmes including cash grants (Sri Lanka)
- "there were no tools or measures giving them a chance to link, to take into account other programmes" (Sri Lanka)
- Lack of skills in project staff: "as CBDRR implementers we lack understanding of how to implement these activities" (Sri Lanka)
- The current RCRC structure makes it difficult to run integrated programmes. "Internally it is hard [to run integrated programmes]... At branch level - who is responsible? How does that get translated? Who works? Who charges what to who?" (Sri Lanka).
- "everyone was very busy implementing their own programme and they didn't want to work together. The issue was in design, it's not just a AmCross problem but a movement problem" (Indonesia)
- In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka it was noted that there had been increased levels of integration between RCRC programmes in recent years. One interviewee in Indonesia noted that “most [CBDRR] now contains CBHFA.” While in Sri Lanka "SLRCS have recognised the need for integration, in the 5 year plan [CBDRR] is integrated with health and OD.”
- Several interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia highlighted the importance of having **sufficient time** to implement CBDRR programmes and **sufficient flexibility within the schedule** to be able to make changes.

One interviewee in Sri Lanka described how in a “[CBDRR] project we can't define a time... It changes from person to person, community to community, there are many differences” while another noted that "the sustainability of the project is a question mark because we did not have much time to implement.” A further comment was made that staff were under pressure to start “fundraising for the next project before the current project has been completed.”

One interviewee in Sri Lanka noted that insufficient flexibility within the schedule had led to construction of mitigation projects during the rainy season. "If there was a risk plan, they would have waited until after the rainy season. There was no flexibility; if it had been delayed it would have been a more resilient and stronger project.”

To allow greater flexibility, interviewees in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka recommended greater control over the time schedule by those involved in implementing it. “The drivers of the programmes should have an opportunity

to change it, otherwise you lose the money. If you go half-way in the journey but don't go all the way, it is wasted." (Sri Lanka) "Better if PNS inform a branch of the target then the branch can fix the programme. The programme here was based on the requirements of [the PNS]. Even though BRC person sits in branch have to wait for PMI Aceh to make decisions." (Indonesia)

Some interviewees in Indonesia described the specific challenges of trying to implement CBDRR after a disaster – specifically during the recovery phase. One PNS delegate noted that "CBDRR was not appropriate until 2 years after – [we] had to keep postponing" while another interviewee described "one of the biggest problems for us is that the community are busy. ICBRR should be done after recovery."

- Linked to both integration and having sufficient time, several interviewees in Sri Lanka noted the importance of **having sufficient flexibility within programme design**. Several interviewees in Sri Lanka noted that a lack of flexibility in programme design lead to:
  - Inappropriate activities. "Some activities were not suitable for here but they had to do it because it was in the plan" (Sri Lanka) "We used to do health, then we swapped with the Canadians and took their communities. It was not necessarily a good idea. In phase 2 there are more central areas - Matale, Badulla... the risks are not the same" (Sri Lanka)
  - Inability to address community needs. "Alcohol is a big problem here but it was not possible to address this, not flexible in the programme." (Sri Lanka)
  - Running CBDRR programmes in communities which did not need them. "They think that if we do the VCA, then we HAVE to do the programme but that is not true. If they have no disasters, then there is no need." (Sri Lanka)
  - Distribution of inappropriate kits. With "such a large programme [including] mountain/coastal communities etc. There's only so much you can do about uniformity. For example kit distribution - what goes inside the kit? Risks associated with different kits - but then we added on the more central areas - vulnerable to elephants/landslides etc and the kits don't make sense" (Sri Lanka)

Although many of these problems were noted at the time programme staff had little opportunity to make changes. "So we got to thinking is this approach suitable or not - does there need to be any changes but we had limited opportunity to reflect."



## B4 Focus Group Discussions

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### B4.1 Executive Summary

A number of themes emerged from the focus group discussions as common across all four countries or multiple contexts. However, there was variation within and between countries as to the quality of CBDRR programmes in relation to the areas identified. Such variation is also reflected in the specific actions or programme components that communities identified as influencing that quality.

The importance of community engagement and involvement in CBDRR programmes was consistently noted in focus groups in all four countries. In each country examples were cited of good community engagement but there were also assertions that the community had not been adequately informed of or involved in the programme. In Sri Lanka and the Maldives, comments about problematic community engagement and involvement outnumbered the positive examples cited, whereas this was more balanced in Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, inadequate socialisation of the programme was also mentioned as contributing to poor community engagement.

In all countries, most communities discussed CBDRR programme components and whether these were appropriate and effective. Infrastructure, assets, training, CBAT formation, committees and livelihood support were appreciated. However, in each country some communities noted shortcomings in areas such as:

- inappropriate training (Thailand and the Maldives)
- poorly constructed infrastructure (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)
- incomplete works (Thailand, Sri Lanka)
- inadequate funding (all countries)
- inappropriate selection of programme activities (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand)
- inadequate time for the programme (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)

In all four countries, external relationships were frequently mentioned, particularly those with different levels of government and with HNSs. In Indonesia, government assistance in the forms of finance, health services, relief items and construction were seen as strengths or opportunities. Some communities in Indonesia and Thailand mentioned that CBDRR programmes had positively increased their knowledge of who to seek assistance from and how to advocate for that assistance. However, focus groups in all four countries often noted shortcomings in Government support:

- lack of government awareness (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives)
- inadequate budgets (Indonesia)
- poor coordination (Sri Lanka)
- interference with projects (Sri Lanka, Thailand)

The relationship with HNS was also mentioned by communities in each country. In each country support from the HNS and good relationships with their staff were cited as strengths and opportunities. However, in Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka cessation of activity by or support from the HNS was noted as a negative. In Indonesia and Thailand comments were made noting that that once CBDRR programmes had finished, knowledge and activity in relation to DRR had

declined. In Indonesian focus groups, the absence of HNS support was sometimes associated with CBAT and disaster management committee inactivity.

## B4.2 Methodology

As part of the field work, participants in focus group discussions in eleven Indonesian, six Sri Lankan, four Thai and four Maldivian communities were asked to complete 'SWOT analysis' of CBDRR programmes. Focus groups were typically formed using a purposive sampling strategy that sought to include village leadership and people within the village with responsibilities relating to disaster risk reduction. Firstly, participants were asked to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the programmes themselves, and secondly the external factors contributing to their strengths and weaknesses (opportunities and threats).

Each comment made in SWOT exercises was contributed by an individual. In other words, each participant independently identified strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Consequently, responses are individual perceptions and not necessarily reflective of the opinion of all in the focus group or even the community. Furthermore, the SWOT findings are indicative of what communities appreciated or felt was lacking in CBDRR programmes, independent of whether the community felt that the programme was a success.

For each country, the findings from the SWOT activities were entered into a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet records each comment made, the community in which the comment was made and the number of times the comment was made. The findings for each country were then grouped into strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. These grouped findings were then manually analysed and categorised into themes. Categories were generated for each country on the basis of the material in the SWOT rather than sorting the comments into predefined categories.

## B4.3 SWOT analysis

### Indonesia

#### Community knowledge

In many of the focus groups, the ICBRR programme was seen as increasing community knowledge in regards to disasters. Community knowledge about disaster risk reduction, preparedness, response and recovery were considered to be strengths. Others valued CBAT disaster knowledge, particularly if used to assist the community. However, some weaknesses were identified in so far as CBAT did not share their knowledge from the programme with the rest of the community. Weaknesses were also mentioned in regard to the community not being sufficiently aware of the CBDRR programme and not understanding it.

#### Community engagement

In some focus groups, it was commented that the community lacked interest in the ICBRR programme, did not participate in it and did not support it. Interestingly, non-tsunami affected communities commented on positive community engagement. For example, that the community was aware, interested in disaster risk reduction, enthusiastic and that there were good relationships within the community.

#### Programme components

*Training* was mentioned as a programme strength in almost all of the tsunami affected communities. Specifically, first aid, disaster preparedness, disaster response and simulations were mentioned. Some stated that the community received training but it was not clear whether they intended this as the whole community or just CBAT members. Conversely, lack of training was identified as a weakness by participants.

A range of *mitigation infrastructure and assets* were considered valuable by participants. They mentioned CBAT equipment, evacuation routes, warning systems, drainage and contingency funds. However, there were comments indicating current problems with infrastructure. Problems noted were lack of maintenance and non-functioning or damaged infrastructure. In Sidodadi, participants mentioned that they lack the equipment needed for disaster response.

There were also comments made in regard to *socialisation* of the programme. One comment asserted that lack of socialisation “made the community negative towards the CBAT”. Another identified “lack of socialisation about the programme to the community” as a weakness.

In one community, the comment was made that there was no monitoring and evaluation, though it was unclear whether this referred specifically to PMI programmes.

#### Programme processes

In the two communities in Aceh Tengah, there were comments that the timing of the programme was not convenient. A similar comment was made in Bener Meriah “ICBRR programme run during harvest so people were busy.”

## CBAT

In many of the tsunami affected communities, focus group participants mentioned that CBAT activity was minimal or had ceased after ICBRR program ended. Reasons mentioned for lack of activity included employment needs competing with CBAT responsibilities; CBAT members getting married; CBAT needing more support from PMI; lack of shocks and stresses to respond to; and lack of commitment from CBAT members.

In Deah Geuleumpang and Pedekok, participants noted issues with the selection criteria for CBAT. One person stated that “the criteria were not good” Some specific criticisms were that the criteria “excluded people who rent” and that participants lacked “religious spirit and relations with religion”

Some participants noted shortcomings in CBAT relationships with other stakeholders. In some communities in Aceh Besar, participants stated that the CBAT didn't help the community or share their knowledge with them. In these communities, communication between CBAT and the head of village was seen as lacking.

### External support

The relationship between the community and government was raised in almost every focus group. Often this was the relationship with the sub-district and district levels. The presence of support was identified as an opportunity, whereas lack of support was identified as a weaknesses or threat. Examples of positive government support included relief assistance, health services, boats for evacuation, and vector control. Problematic aspects of government support included lack of support for facilities, having too many procedures, lack of responses and lack of budget support.

In relation to CBDRR programmes, some communities noted that the sub-district had not been aware of or involved in the ICBRR programme. For example, one person commented that PMI had worked directly with the head of village and had not involved the head of sub-district. Another stated the program had “poor coordination with the sub-district.

In several communities, it was felt the programme had helped the community improve their access to information, and to make reports and advocate for assistance from external actors. Others felt that greater external support was still needed.

## HNS

In some communities, the relationship with PMI was identified as a strength. One participant noted that having a CBAT “makes it easy for PMI to support the community.” On the other hand, in many communities, concerns were expressed that PMI support had ceased or was inadequate since the programme ended. Specific comments were made that “ICBRR staff made false promises” to the community and that “the programme is not sustainable.”

## Maldives

### Programme components

Communities valued *construction and infrastructure*: permanent housing, waste collection, rain water storage were all cited as strengths. However, quality issues with housing were noted in one focus group. In Isdhoo and Maafushi, issues with sewage systems were mentioned. These included poor consultation with the community, construction issues, substantial maintenance requirements, and use of inappropriate technologies for the system. One person in Maafushi felt “the money for the sewerage project could have been used for something more beneficial.”

*Training* and other activities that increased community knowledge and capacity, not necessarily in regard to disasters were also noted as important components of ICBRR programs. However, in Hulhiddhufaa, one participant questioned the adequacy and relevance of training provided and another observed that the training targeted the wrong people.

*Livelihood* support was also mentioned as a strength by some focus groups. Examples of this included improved access to government allowance, experience gained by volunteers in the CBDRR programme and financial assistance for income generation.

In Maafushim, erosion was raised as a hazard that has not been adequately addressed.

### Programme processes

Issues were noted in regards to some project processes. One person noted that “some people running the projects were not qualified for the job.”

### Community involvement and engagement

The extent of community involvement and engagement was also a prominent theme in the focus groups. A participant in one of the focus groups noted as positive that the ICBRR programme involved the “community, youth and CBO.” However, in listing weaknesses, inadequate involvement of the broader community was a recurring theme. Participants noted issues with information not being disseminated to the community and with decisions and actions undertaken that disregarded the views of the community or ran contrary to “public interest”. Lack of community support and participation were noted as threats in Hulhuddhufaa, Buruni and Isdhoo.

Interestingly, in the Maldives, issues of equitable distribution were noted in the SWOT. In particular, participants in some communities noted that there was “inequality when giving aid” and that there was “inequality between beneficiaries in service delivery.” Furthermore, one community noted that there was “Corruption in handing out aid money.”

### Communication and coordination

A number of issues relating to communication and coordination were noted. Comments included that false information was given, information was not shared with stakeholders. Involvement of the island office was seen as a strength and an opportunity by some participants. Increasing government awareness was also

raised as an opportunity. Poor communication and relationships between groups within the community were noted as threats.

### **Sustainability**

Interestingly, one participant mentioned that the programme had made the community dependent on outside assistance.

### **Access to services**

In Maafushi, participants identified many services and facilities that the community lacks including a library, waste management, higher education, health care and a cyber cafe.

## **Sri Lanka**

### **Infrastructure and facilities**

In almost all of the focus group discussions in Sri Lanka, the provision of infrastructure and facilities were identified as a programme strength. Infrastructure included wells, roads, drains, canals, sluice gates, bathing facilities and bridges. However, problems in relation to infrastructure were identified as weaknesses by participants from many communities. The lack of infrastructure for community identified needs was raised in some focus groups. For example, multiple participants in one focus group commented on the failure to construct a pipeline. In another focus group they noted that erosion problems were not addressed, and that the widening of the river had resulted in flooding. The quality, dimensions and materials of infrastructure were also described as being less than optimal by several focus groups.

### **VDMC**

The formation of committees was noted as positive [assume that this is the VDMC?]. Sustainability issues were also raised with the VDMC in some communities being identified as no longer functioning. In one case this was noted as being due to VDMC members being involved in other committees. In another focus group this was attributed to insufficient training for the VDMC.

### **Training**

Some participants saw training received through the programme as a positively influencing community safety: “now everyone knows how to face a tsunami”.

### **CDRTs and equipment**

The formation of CDRTs and the provision of training to them were also noted in several workshops. There were comments that the provision of CDRT equipment was seen as a strength. Participants noted equipment including first aid kits, kitchen utensils. There were some criticisms in regard to equipment. Some participants noted that the equipment was not sufficiently durable, while a participant in another focus group stated “there was no use in receiving the items as the village are not getting any use out of them.”

## **Health related interventions**

Interventions for health issues were also noted as strengths in several communities. In one community “Dengue, tsunami and HIV training” were mentioned and in others mosquito nets were noted as strengths.

## **External relationships and support**

External relationships were noted as an important influence on the programme. In several focus groups, lack of support from government was noted as a threat that had negatively impacted on programme activities. For example, in one community: “the irrigation department did not give proper guidance and technical support”. In another community, multiple participants noted that the Divisional Secretary and DDMCU official had intervened to stop the construction of a bridge. On the other hand, in discussing opportunities, in most of the focus groups the relationship with government was discussed. Specifically, the prospect of greater government involvement and assistance was noted by participants in several focus group discussions.

One participant in a focus group explicitly mentioned the relationship with the Red Cross: “the relationship with the RCRC is a strength.”

## **Community engagement and community relationships**

Good community engagement was noted in some communities and was considered a strength. However, in others, lack of community participation was noted as a programme weakness and a threat to the programme. Increased community unity was noted in one focus group, but conflict and poor relationships between different groups within the community was noted as problematic in several focus groups.

## **Programme resources and timing**

Insufficient time and resources were mentioned in some communities and were seen as a threat to the ICBRR programme. How benefits from the programme were distributed within the community was raised by a participant in one community: “The programme should have been implemented so that everyone was able to benefit.”

## **Other**

Increases in knowledge and awareness from the programme appeared to be appreciated, though the comments sometimes did not distinguish who had gained the knowledge – VDMC, CDRT or the community.

## **Thailand**

### **Programme components**

In each of the communities, participants commented on the knowledge gained through the programme and how this made them better able to reduce disaster risk and impact “People know the evacuation route and are calmer during the evacuation.”

However, shortcomings were noted in the matching of assistance to the communities’ needs. Inadequacies in training were one such shortcomings. One

participant saw the training as inappropriate. Others mentioned a need for more training and for this training to be ongoing. One participant also noted that “not all villagers were trained” which suggests broader targeting of training would have been preferred. Barriers to participation in training were also noted: competing demands for employment and livelihoods, scheduling conflict other training activities and bad weather preventing travel to attend training. One participant mentioned that there was strong pressure to attend training: “Forcing us to join training even when we are ill.”

### **Targeting of programme to need**

Unaddressed problems were also mentioned by some communities, specifically, the programme’s failure to target drug problems even though “they are a severe problem in our community”.

### **Programme sustainability**

Continuity and sustainability of the program were highlighted as areas in which programmes were weak. Lack of continuity and ongoing programme activity was seen as a threat.

### **Strengthening of external support and relationships**

In regards to opportunities, issues relating to external relationships and support emerged as a theme. Participants noted opportunities for the programme in regards to government assistance and collaboration with outside organisations. For example, one person mentioned that they understood better who to ask for assistance. Relationships with Red Cross field officers were noted as a positive in Thung Sa Bo.

### **Employment**

In almost all of the communities, opportunities were mentioned in the area of employment. These included learning a new occupation, improved career options and increased job opportunities for the village.

### **Relationships within the community**

The improvement of internal relationships was also noted in strengths and opportunities. One participant mentioned that “People are more united to help each other” and at another FGD another participant similarly noted that “villagers are united.”



## B5 Meta-analysis to identify *key determinants*

<b>Key determinant</b>
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.
<b>Justification</b>
Communities are the main actors in both the implementation and sustainability of CBDRR programmes. Community leaders often become part of, or have direct influence over, the community-based organisations established. Their support and engagement allows the CBDRR programmes to access existing internal and external networks and provides a mechanism for wider community mobilisation and long-term engagement.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>Before the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communities face a high degree of risk</li> <li>• There is an existing culture of risk reduction</li> <li>• Communities have sufficient time to participate</li> <li>• Communities have higher levels of community cohesion or 'unity'</li> <li>• Communities have higher levels of education and literacy</li> <li>• Communities have prior positive experience of the RCRC movement.</li> </ul> <p>Note: Levels of community cohesion, education and the amount of time they have available will vary between urban and rural contexts and between developmental and disaster-recovery situations.</p> <p>Note: These factors are critical in the community selection process and in programme design. If the CBDRR programme is intended to target communities with low levels of community cohesion and education (more vulnerable communities) higher levels of staff, time and funding may be required to make the CBDRR programme a success.</p> <p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standardised community selection criteria are developed and communities are selected in partnership with local government and other stakeholders</li> <li>• Community leaders are identified and their support obtained during the community selection process (Note: It can be beneficial for local government to meet with or write to village leaders and encourage them to participate)</li> <li>• The CBDRR programme is adequately explained to the community (and community leaders). They understand the programme, the value to them in implementing and maintaining it, and have a shared vision of a safe and resilient community.</li> <li>• Community leaders are included in CBDRR activities and long-term planning.</li> <li>• CBDRR activities undertaken are relevant to the needs of the community as identified in the VCA</li> <li>• Appropriate and adequate tools and equipment (e.g. uniforms, loudspeakers, first aid kits) are provided to support the CBOs established</li> </ul>

in responding to emergencies and encourage long-term engagement.

- The mitigation project is of sufficient quality and considers future scenarios so that it has continued usefulness beyond the completion of the project
- Adequate time and funding is allowed to complete the works

#### **Data source: Literature Review**

Culture. Is there an existing culture of protection against hazards or risk avoidance? (UN ISDR, 2004) Does the community have a shared vision of a prepared/resilient community? (Twigg, 2009) Is the media interested in covering CBDRR issues? (IFRC, 2006)

Relevance. Are local leaders/communities interested in the programme? Do they perceive value in implementing it? (IFRC, 2009). Is it relevant to the daily lives of community members? (UN ISDR, 2004).

Community actors. Training of community volunteers to coincide with activities designed to increase community support, such as socialisation of CBDRR for community stakeholders (IFRC, 2009). Potential community leaders should be identified and their buy-in obtained before any community assessments occur (ADPC, 2006; IFRC, 2009). This ensures a full awareness of local circumstances is considered in the assessment processes.

Community selection process. Communities should be targeted for participation in accordance with standard selection criteria (ADPC, 2006; Kafle, 2010). Communities should be interested in the programme as they need to perceive value in implementing it for it to be sustainable (IFRC, 2009).

#### **Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned**

Several authors noted the importance of engaging community leaders as they become part of, or have direct influence over, the community-based organisations established. It was noted that mobilisation of community leaders was easier if the CBDRR programme had the support of local government (SLRCS, 2010:76; Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:4) and recommended that community leaders participate in CBDRR training to 'promote better information sharing and understanding among RCRC and local communities' (Kunaphinun, A., 2008:25).

Authors from all countries highlighted the importance of community selection and that this was most effective when done in partnership with local government and other stakeholders. The external evaluation of the IFRC's programme in Sri Lanka simply states that more methodical selection of districts would have produced better results (SLRCS, 2010).

#### **Data source: Key Informant Interviews**

The level of community motivation was highlighted as a critical factor by a high number of interviewees in all four countries. The relevance of CBDRR to a community's needs was noted as the critical factor in their level of motivation - with higher levels of community motivation noted in areas with frequent natural hazards. Motivating communities to participate in CBDRR programmes in a disaster recovery context was noted as particularly challenging as "...the community are not interested in development when they need food/water"

(Indonesia).

In addition to their motivation to participate it was noted that the level of capacity within the community has significant impact on the success of CBDRR programmes during their implementation. Interviewees noted that a community's capacity to engage in CBDRR programmes was dependent on the level of community cohesion or 'unity', the amount of time community members can commit to CBDRR programmes and their level of education and literacy – and that there can be significant variations between rural and urban communities in all three of these factors.

Although mentioned infrequently, a critical factor which affected the sustainability of CBDRR programmes was the quality and continued usefulness of the mitigation project. In some communities mitigation projects continued to be used (and consequently maintained) by the whole community, while in others mitigation projects had subsequently fallen into disuse because they were no longer meeting the community's needs or were not maintained.

Another critical factor for the sustainability of CBDRR programmes was the provision of appropriate and adequate equipment. This was highlighted in all four countries in comments such as “we don't have the proper tools,” “the loudspeakers do not reach the whole community” or “to provide a first aid service they need caps and jackets.”

The motivation and capacity of community leaders was highlighted as a critical factor in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives. In Indonesia and the Maldives the Head of Village or Island Chief was sometimes the head of the community committee established while in Sri Lanka it was government policy that they fulfilled this role. Interviewees noted that community leaders were motivated to participate if the community faced a high level of risk and/or if they had received a letter from sub-district or district government encouraging them to participate.

Community selection was a key contributing factor to community motivation and this was often completed in partnership with local government. However, the policy of some agencies to run CBDRR programmes in tsunami-affected rather than high risk communities and the relevance of CBDRR programmes focussing on early warning/preparedness activities for communities facing stresses such as droughts and health problems led to lower levels of community motivation.

#### **Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

In all countries, most communities discussed the appropriateness and effectiveness of CBDRR programme components. Infrastructure, assets, training, CBAT formation, committees and livelihood support were appreciated. However, in each country some communities noted shortcomings in areas such as:

- inappropriate training (Thailand and the Maldives)
- poorly constructed infrastructure (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)
- inappropriate selection of activities (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand)
- incomplete works (Thailand, Sri Lanka)
- inadequate funding (all countries)
- inadequate time for the programme (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)

<b>Key determinant</b>
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.
<b>Justification</b>
RCRC staff and volunteers are the main actors in the implementation of CBDRR programmes, the creation of an enabling environment and the long-term support of the community organisations established. Lack of capacity can increase costs and cause delays in programme implementation.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>Before the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staff members and organisations (HNS/PNS) at all levels (NHQ/Branch) have skills and experience in designing and implementing CBDRR (or community-based) programmes</li> <li>• Guidelines, training materials and manuals already exist</li> <li>• Board members and branches are motivated to participate in the implementation of CBDRR programmes and long-term support of CBOs established.</li> </ul> <p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HNS capacity is assessed and all RCRC stakeholders are involved in programme design</li> <li>• RCRC stakeholders are identified, roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, and clear and transparent decision-making, coordination and management structures are established at all levels.</li> <li>• The requirements for working in partnership are understood at the outset and partnership management is adequately resourced.</li> <li>• There are adequate numbers and continuity of staff and volunteers</li> <li>• Staff and volunteers are managed and supported, they are happy with their working environment and have authority to make decisions over their own work</li> <li>• Equitable salaries/remuneration policies are established, and incentives are provided for meeting targets and good service.</li> <li>• Guidelines, training materials and manuals are developed/contextualised</li> <li>• Comprehensive training is provided for branch staff/volunteers including how to train new trainers in the community</li> <li>• There is an induction process for new staff/volunteers</li> <li>• Staff undertake study visits to learn from CBDRR programmes in other locations</li> <li>• Key members of experienced CBDRR teams are seconded into new programmes</li> <li>• Community facilitation teams include people with a range of technical expertise (particularly engineering, sociology and livelihoods in addition to DRR)</li> <li>• Simulations maximise opportunities for coordination with the RCRC branch</li> <li>• The capacity of the HNS in resource mobilisation and fundraising is developed so that they can continue to support communities after completion of the programme</li> </ul>

After the programme:

- RCRC branches have sufficient capacity to support and ongoing relationship with the CBOs established – to assist with advocacy to external actors, provide support in emergencies or provide refresher training as required.
- 

Note: A specialist VCA team at provincial/national level can support branch staff in the completion and analysis of this crucial and complex activity.

#### **Data source: Literature Review**

Branch capacity. Does the branch have the capacity to ensure support for the creation of an enabling environment? (IFRC, 2009)

Branch training. Training for the branch staff/volunteers in advocacy, budget management, project management, the CBDRR approach and activities, and also how to train new trainers in the community (IFRC, 2009).

Pre-community selection, branch staff and volunteers should be familiarised with the concepts of the CBDRR programme (IFRC, 2009).

Training material, curricula and the programme approach should be contextualised for the circumstances in which the programme design will take place (Kafle, 2010).

Roles and responsibilities. Once the key actors have been identified roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined (USIOTWS, 2007; Kafle 2010).

Transparency. Policy decisions should be taken (mindful of contextual *key determinants*) to ensure that decision-making processes are fully transparent (ADPC, 2006).

#### **Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned**

Several authors noted that branch capacity to implement CBDRR programmes was a critical factor in their immediate and long-term impact and that it should be assessed before programme design and implementation (Burton, C & Brett, J, 2009; AmCross Indonesia, 2010; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30).

Steps taken to increase HNS capacity included:

- Increasing staff numbers (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:10)
- Investment in equipment and material resources (Kunaphinun, A, 2008; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010; Sida, L & Pranawisanty, 2010)
- Providing training to increase range and effectiveness of skills (Kunaphinun, A, 2008; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010; Sida, L & Pranawisanty, 2010).
- Using the (H)VCA as a training exercise for branch staff (Wilderspin, I, 2007), and as a knowledge gathering exercise for the branch in another (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010)
- Recommendations to increase HNS capacity in future programmes included:

- Field visits and lateral secondments of key members of an experienced CBDRR team into future CBDRR programmes (CRC Indonesia, 2009:29,31)
- Including specific objectives to build project management capacity of the HNS into future CBDRR programmes (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30)
- Using the ‘well-prepared national society’ (WPNS) checklist as a tool to help the HNS review its strengths and weaknesses (Kunaphinun, A, 2008: 25)
- Creating a CBDRR team within the RCHB (Sida, L, 2010a)

A large number of authors reported that programmes were short-staffed and highlighted that the availability of sufficient numbers of appropriately skilled staff and volunteers was a significant factor affecting programme success and implementation timescales.

Almost every organisation experienced challenges with high volunteer dropout rates and staff turnover (SLRCS, 2010; DRC Indonesia, 2009; Sida, L, 2010a:36; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:25; Wilderspin, I, 2007:17; BRCS Maldives, 2010:34). The Danish Red Cross in Indonesia identified significant costs associated with a high turnover of staff; recruitment of replacement staff incurred financial costs, in addition to the loss of momentum to the project whilst new staff members are trained (2009:26). Activities were delayed (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:9) or projects were scaled back (Sida, L, 2010a:6) as result of insufficient staff in Thailand.

Reasons given for high staff turnover:

- The short-term (commonly one year) contracts under which staff were employed (Wilderspin, I, 2007:17; Sida, L, 2010a:36)
- Staff leaving to take up better paid employment with other organisations (Wilderspin, I, 2007:17; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:25)
- Staff being unhappy with the working environment and level of autonomy they were allowed in their work (Wilderspin, I, 2007:17).

The external evaluation of the IFRC’s programme in Sri Lanka recommended that community facilitation teams should include people with a range of technical expertise - particularly engineering, sociology and livelihoods in addition to DRR (SLRCS, 2010) while ‘selection of people with sufficient capacity to work with communities is compulsory’ (SLRCS, 2010:xv). Beyond just community facilitation, the ability to conduct a HVCA was highlighted as a specialist skill, with one method of overcoming limited capacity in this area being to establish a centralised HVCA unit to support community facilitators at this key stage (Sida, L, 2010b:7).

Where staff did not have the necessary skills, significant training was required, and this was particularly true for new staff members or when implementing a new programme. An induction process (including training about the RCRC and what they do and don’t do) was recommended for new staff and volunteers (Wilderspin, I, 2007; Bhatt, M.R., 2009). While significant ‘project team capacity building through training, provision of project implementation guides, manuals, and IEC materials’ was recommended to familiarise project teams with

new procedures prior to implementation (AmCross Indonesia, 2010). The Thai Red Cross identified the CBDRR programme itself as ‘an incubator for staff to gain valuable project management skills’ (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:25). They also undertook study visits to learn about similar programmes in Bangladesh and Indonesia (ibid:12 & 21).

A successful relationship between the HNS and PNS can be a significant factor in determining the success of a programme. Sida (2010b:43) states that working in partnership needs to be understood from the outset and that partnership management should be adequately resourced.

Sida recommends that ‘all levels of the organisation [should be involved] in project design’ (Sida, L & Pranawisanty, 2010:40) while the external evaluation of the Canadian RC programme in Indonesia goes further in stating that future CBDRR programmes should ‘Start with PMI. End with PMI. Run with PMI’ (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:29) emphasising that (where the HNS has experience of CBDRR programmes) the HNS should lead in completing assessments, designing the programme and setting programme targets, timelines and indicators, with the support of the PNS.

The AmCross final report in Indonesia highlighted that ‘committee and working groups serve as a coordination mechanism at the program policy level and are critical to ensuring all stakeholders have a similar understanding of program implementation’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:23). The DRC final report in Indonesia highlights the importance of workgroup and SATGANA volunteer meetings – particularly at branch level – but describes how these did not materialise in 2008 and 2009 due to communication problems within PMI (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

Several evaluations highlight the importance of a clear management structure and understanding of roles and responsibilities in the programme combined with direct links and a transparent mechanism for coordination and support from the HNS NHQ down to the branches and communities (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; Kunaphinun, A, 2008:24,26; AmCross Indonesia, 2010:22; Sida, L, 2010a:43).

Continued RCRC support to communities after the completion of the project was highlighted as key to the sustainability of the community-based organisations established (Sida, 2010b; Bhatt, M.R., 2009). However, the DRC in Indonesia describe how maintaining the CBDRR programme after its completion will be the ‘biggest challenge’ for PMI ‘due to lack of resources (financial and human) unless supported by the branch/chapter/NHQ as well as the local government authorities’ (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

It was noted that the sustainability of CBDRR programmes could be improved by building the capacity of the HNS in resource mobilisation and fundraising so that they can continue to support communities (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009:6).

Several evaluations recommended that simulations should be included in future programmes for example the Belgian RC noted that they allowed opportunities for coordination with local government and the RCRC branch emergency

response team (Belgian RC Indonesia, 2009).

#### **Data source: Key Informant Interviews**

The level of HNS motivation and capacity was consistently noted across all four countries as key to the success of CBDRR programmes. ‘Capacity’ had many facets and included: the motivation of board members and branches, skills and experience (in both individuals and organisations), availability and continuity of staff and volunteers and the existence of guidelines and manuals.

Having a clear and agreed understanding of the CBDRR approach/concept was highlighted as a critical factor by several interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In both countries the lack of a pre-defined CBDRR approach and the time taken to reach agreement between RCRC actors and develop manuals, guidelines and training programmes caused significant delays.

In addition to the capacity of the HNS and PNS, having clear coordination, decision-making and management structures and procedures within the RCRC was highlighted as a critical factor in Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia. Challenges were experienced with “unnecessary bureaucracy” in the management of CBDRR programmes, confused reporting lines, the lack of a standardised approach to programme management, difficulties in communication between branches/head office and the PNS, delays in designing the programme and transferring funds for implementation.

The skills and capacity of the PNS DRR delegate was highlighted by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Interviewees noted that technical delegates had been a “massive support” but that they carried a lot of responsibility, and sometimes did not have sufficient technical expertise or local experience.

The level of continuing support to the community after the completion of the project was highlighted as a critical factor for the sustainability of CBDRR programmes by interviewees in all four countries. Comments centred on two main themes – firstly an ongoing relationship between the committees/action teams established and their RCRC field officer or branch and secondly the provision of refresher training as an activity which can be provided by the RCRC to support ongoing committee/action team activity.

#### **Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

The relationship with the HNS was also mentioned by communities in each country. In each country support from the HNS and good relationships with their staff were cited as strengths and opportunities. However, in Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka cessation of activity by or support from the HNS was noted as a negative. In Indonesia and Thailand comments were made noting that once CBDRR programmes had finished, knowledge and activity in relation to DRR had declined. In Indonesian focus groups, the absence of HNS support was sometimes associated with CBAT and disaster management committee inactivity.

#### **Key determinant**

The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them



(primarily government, but also NGOs and the private sector)
<b>Justification</b>
Resilience is multi-sectoral and requires a range of actors to be involved. Working in partnership with external actors encourages information sharing, coordination, and provides a solid foundation for the support of DRR activities. Local government have a clear mandate to engage communities and ensure their participation. They control local resources and can provide support to the community in the form of finance, health services and relief items – both during and after the completion of the CBDRR programme. External actors (including local government) can provide specialist skills and technical support in the design and construction of community infrastructure projects.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>Before the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal and regulatory systems (including building regulations and land use policies) support risk reduction activities</li> <li>• There is an established political, administrative and financial environment for CBDRR programmes within national/local government</li> </ul> <p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key actors are identified and local government support is obtained</li> <li>• Mechanisms for coordination and working in partnership are established in the initial stages of the programme, and partnership management is adequately resourced.</li> <li>• Local government staff are encouraged to participate in CBDRR training and simulations with the community.</li> <li>• Capacity building support is provided to local government</li> <li>• A sustainability strategy is developed early in the programme and in partnership with all stakeholders.</li> <li>• The CBOs established are formally recognised by national government and long-term partnerships are established between communities and local government</li> </ul> <p>After the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• External actors have the capacity to provide continued support to the community after the completion of the CBDRR project</li> </ul>
<b>Data source: Literature Review</b>
<p>Partnerships and cooperation. Partnerships can allow information-sharing, coordination of activities and provide a solid foundation of support for DRR activities (Twigg, 2009). Resilience is multi-sectoral, and requires a range of actors to be involved. Mechanisms for cooperation should be established initially, to create a dialogue through which all stakeholders can exchange knowledge and resolve misunderstandings or conflicts as they arise (UN ISDR, 2008).</p> <p>Political will and governance. Will governments approve selected communities for participation? (ADPC, 2006) Are citizens rights recognised? Is there a democratic form of governance? (Twigg, 2009)</p>

Policy and legal framework. Is there an established political, administrative and financial environment for CBDRR programmes within international/national/local governments? (ADPC, 2006) Are legal and regulatory systems supportive of disaster risk reduction? (Twigg, 2009)

Institutional policy. Is CBDRR mainstreamed throughout government, NGO sectors and/or development plans and actions? (ADPC, 2006)

Planning policy. Do building regulations and land use policies support this risk reduction culture? (USIOTWS, 2007)

#### **Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned**

Several authors noted that partnerships between communities and local governments have a key role to play in ensuring sustainability of a CBDRR programme following the withdrawal of the RCRC from a community (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:28; Kunaphinun, A, 2008:23; SLRCS, 2010; Kunaphinun, A, 2008; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39). The DRC final report in Sri Lanka recommended ‘provid[ing] opportunity for local government staff to participate in training together with community members and leaders’ (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33) while the BRCS report from the Maldives noted that capacity building of government can be done through RedR ‘intermediaries’ ‘as a long-term strategy for affecting change without compromising neutrality’ (BRCS Maldives, 2008:40).

Reasons for engaging with local government:

- ‘They have a clear mandate to engage communities and ensure their participation in planning and monitoring’ (SLRCS, 2010:76)
- They control local finances and resources (SLRCS, 2010:xv; Kunaphinun, A, 2008:25)
- They can provide technical support in the design and construction of community infrastructure projects (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33)
- Local government support, and formal recognition of the community based teams/committees, has a significant impact on the sustainability of the organisations established (Sida, 2010b; SLRCS, 2010:74).

In some instances partnerships with other NGOs were used as a sustainability strategy to ensure continued support for a programme after RCRC exit it was recommended that partnerships with other NGOs can provide specialist skills (Burton, C & Brett, J, 2009). The potential of partnering with the private sector is highlighted in two of the reports/evaluations (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010: 33; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30) but specific benefits/activities are not identified other than the potential of commercial mobile phone providers to assist in transmission of early warnings (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30).

The need for the development and dissemination of an exit and sustainability strategy, in partnership with communities, RCRC and external stakeholders, was highlighted in several evaluations to ensure that the community feels supported in the future and hence feel able to continue the programme without the presence of the RCRC in the community (AmCross Indonesia, 2010; SLRCS, 2010).

**Data source: Key Informant Interviews**

The support of the national government for disaster planning or mitigation was highlighted as a critical factor for the success of CBDRR programmes in all four countries. In Sri Lanka, the formation of Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMC) was part of the government “road map”, while in Thailand and Indonesia interviewees noted that the establishment of new government disaster management agencies meant that there were greater opportunities for collaboration.

The motivation, capacity and support of local government was highlighted by interviewees in all four countries as critical to both the short and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes. However, this was challenging due to lack of capacity within local governments and a lack of understanding of the CBDRR approach. Interviewees noted that “more support by government... would have lead to greater sustainability” but that “even the government officers are rotating” and “we are working on developing the capacity of the DMC themselves.”

Despite challenges experienced as a result of low capacity in local government interviewees in all four countries noted the importance of strong connections and coordination with external actors (especially local government) to both the immediate and long-term impact of CBDRR programmes. One interviewee commented that “in disaster management no one can do it alone.”

In Sri Lanka and Indonesia several interviewees specifically highlighted the importance of having formal links between the village committee/action team and government or RCRC in increasing the sustainability of the community organisations established. Several interviewees in Sri Lanka described how once the VDMC is registered as an NGO (in accordance with the government plan) they can open a bank account, collect funds, “implement things” and contract with the government for local infrastructure projects. In Indonesia, where the groups formed by the RCRC are not formally recognised by the government, it was recommended that there should be “a formal link between the CDMC/CBAT and PMI” and that the “CDMC and CBAT should have legal status – particularly in conflict areas.”

While many interviewees discussed factors affecting the sustainability of CBDRR programmes only a few interviewees explicitly highlighted the importance of having an exit and sustainability strategy. It was noted that the exit and sustainability strategy “needs to be designed strategically - it should be tailor made and localised,” developed early in the programme and in partnership with all stakeholders.

**Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

In all four countries, external relationships were frequently mentioned, particularly those with different levels of government and with HNSs. In Indonesia, government assistance in the forms of finance, health services, relief items and construction were seen as strengths or opportunities. Some communities in Indonesia and Thailand mentioned that CBDRR programmes had positively increased their knowledge of who to seek assistance from and how

to advocate for that assistance. However, focus groups in all four countries often noted shortcomings in Government support:

- lack of government awareness (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives)
- inadequate budgets (Indonesia)
- poor coordination (Sri Lanka)
- interference with projects (Sri Lanka, Thailand)

<b>Key determinant</b>
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme.
<b>Justification</b>
The greater ownership a community has of a CBDRR programme, the more successful it will be during implementation and the more sustainable its impacts will be after completion.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing community-based organisations are identified, targeted and included in the CBDRR programme.</li> <li>• There is adequate introduction to, and explanation of the programme, so that community members understand the value of the programme, and it's relevant to their needs.</li> <li>• Community-based organisations (Disaster Management Committees/Disaster Response Teams) are established to provide a mechanism for community participation in the programme, where these do not already exist.</li> <li>• Members of CBOs are carefully selected to ensure that they have sufficient capacity and motivation to implement the CBDRR programme and maintain activities once the RCRC supported CBDRR programme is completed.</li> <li>• Leaders of different sub-villages are included in the CBO established to ensure they are representative of the whole community.</li> <li>• CBO members are provided with training in assessment and the planning, implementation and maintenance of CBDRR programmes/activities.</li> <li>• The VCA is used as an engagement tool, to raise awareness of hazards and risks communities face and pro-actively engage them in managing their risks.</li> <li>• Vulnerable groups are included in the (H)VCA process and their needs and capacities are identified and included.</li> <li>• Simulations are relevant to the risks communities face and can be used as training devices for CBOs and to test community response</li> <li>• Regular meetings are held between the RCRC, the CBOs established, village leaders and the whole community, and key outputs/documents from the CBDRR programme (e.g. VCA, Risk Reduction/Action Plan) are widely circulated, to ensure adequate understanding of the programme by all stakeholders.</li> <li>• Communities develop their own Risk Reduction/Action Plans and they initiate next steps while the RCRC provides assistance.</li> <li>• Communities lead the design and implementation of mitigation projects, to ensure relevant projects are undertaken and maintained after the end of the programme.</li> <li>• The whole community (not just the management committee/action team) update the VCA and Risk Reduction/Action Plan to reflect issues arising out of drills, simulations or real events.</li> <li>• The CBO is provided with a Community Contingency Fund (CCF), members of the CBO receive training in community-based accountancy and the CCF has a mechanism to replenish it.</li> </ul>

- Linkages are made between the CBOs established and other community-based organisations to allow sharing of information and experiences, encourage coordination of activities and increase the sustainability of the organisations established.
- Training of trainers ensures that knowledge can be passed on to other members of the community, after external agency staff have left, in order to sustain skill levels
- Refresher training is provided to support ongoing committee/action team activity
- Handover procedures are established so that when changes in committee/action team members do occur knowledge is transferred and activities are maintained.

Note: Women may make good members of community action teams/management committees. They may have more flexibility in their working hours which enables them to participate in CBDRR activities during the day and they may be less likely to leave communities and take the skills and experiences with them.

Note: Not every community will need or have the capacity to implement a physical mitigation project. If they do occur they should be driven by communities to ensure community participation and relevance to their needs.

#### **Data source: Literature Review**

**Participation.** The more ownership a community has of a CBDRR programme, the more successful and sustainable it will be (Sida, 2010). Communities should be helped to perceive the value of the programme, to make them willing to commit the necessary time and resources to maintain it. Value will be perceived if risk reduction programmes are made relevant to the community circumstances (see also 26. Relevance). This requires activities such as gathering information on local hazards and coping mechanisms by soliciting local knowledge (UN ISDR, 2004; ADPC, 2006).

**Accountability.** Efforts should be made to build accountability, and to encourage community ownership of the programme, and volunteerism (Twigg, 2009).

**VCA.** Vulnerability and capacity assessments offer an opportunity for communities and implementing agencies to explore the risks facing a community as well as the assets and resources the community can use to cope (Twigg, 2009; Kafle, 2010). These exercises serve as a key engagement tool for communities within the programme design and enable the community to develop a risk management plan. The most vulnerable members of the community should be mapped and considered during hazard assessment processes. (BRCS, 2008; Sida, 2010) - see also 'vulnerable groups'

**Risk management.** For example, measures which establish sustainable resource management, and protection of fragile ecosystems, to minimise risk impact (USIOTWS, 2007; Twigg, 2009). Risk reduction measures should be developed with community members as they have a better knowledge of local

circumstances than external partners (ADPC, 2006).

**Disaster response plans.** Preparation of disaster response plans drawn up before review and testing (Twigg, 2009). Any mitigation projects to be implemented should also be incorporated into these plans

**Community disaster plans.** These should now be finalised and widely circulated, to ensure the entire community is aware of them (Twigg, 2009)

**Community review and updates.** The community should be involved in the review of the disaster risk management plan, and open dialogue will promote trust and feedback of ideas (USIOTWS, 2007). These ideas should be used to inform changes made to existing plans. Updates should be made to disaster management plans as a result of any issues which arise during a drill, simulation or real event (Twigg, 2009).

**CBO formation and training.** Self-organising community based organisations should be formed to develop a mechanism for community participation in all stages of disaster risk planning, assessment and activities (Sida, 2010). Where such organisations already exist these should be targeted and trained too (ADPC, 2006). CBO members should be trained to complete assessments, and in planning/management activities. Volunteers should be managed and receive ongoing training to ensure they are supported throughout the programme (BRCS, 2008). CBOs are key to ensuring high levels of community participation (ADPC, 2006) – see also 31. Participation.

**Implementation training.** Relevant training should be provided for those involved. For example, those involved should understand why the project is occurring, how it will mitigate risk, and how it should be maintained (ADPC, 2006)

**Training of trainers.** Volunteers should be identified as potential trainers (IFRC, 2009; Twigg, 2009). Training of trainers ensures that knowledge can be passed on to other members of the community, after external agency staff have left, in order to sustain skill levels.

**Refresher training.** Refresher training should be provided to community organisations, volunteers and staff to continue interest and hone skills in disaster risk reduction (ADPC, 2006; IFRC, 2009).

**Education.** Schools programmes teach future generations the value of risk reduction, and provide a key tool to ensure sustainability of the CBDRR programme (UN ISDR, 2008).

**Drills/simulations.** Used as training devices for community based organisations and to test community response (USIOTWS, 2007).

#### **Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned**

Several authors noted that the level of community participation and ownership had a direct impact upon both the success and sustainability of a CBDRR

programme. It was recommended that communities are consulted in the earliest stages of programme inception to ensure the programme meets their needs and captures their support (Bhatt, M.R., 2009, Burton, C & Brett, J, 2009). It was noted that ‘regular meetings... and inclusion in decision making and monitoring processes are solid prerequisites for the building of ownership, positive rapport and trust between the programme and the wider beneficiaries.’ (DRC Indonesia, 2009:33).

Several authors noted the importance of community participation in the (H)VCA process to ensure that CBDRR programmes meet the needs of communities and are perceived as relevant. However, a number of authors noted that although communities were consulted their input was not used to influence the programme design/activities (Sida, L, 2010a:32; Burton, C & Brett, J, 2009:21) and that the risks identified by the communities may not have been the focus of CBDRR programmes (Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:27)

Sida (2010b) recommends that the focus of CBDRR programmes ‘should be on teaching communities how to plan for disaster’ and that they can ‘move on’ to more complex work [such as mitigation projects] after achieving the basics’ (Sida, L & Pranawisanty, 2010: 40). He states that ‘there should not be a presumption that a community will undertake a mitigation project, and this should be seen as an evolution once the team formation and training has been successfully completed’ (Sida, L, 2010b:44). Where mitigation projects do occur ‘communities should be involved with the design and implementation’ (Sida, L & Jayawardhana, 2010:33; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:29-30) and they ‘should always include a significant community contribution’ (Sida, L, 2010b:44) to ensure relevant projects are undertaken and maintained after the end of the programme (Sida, L, 2010a:17).

Community action teams or management committees are consistently described as significant achievements of CBDRR programmes, and valued by communities as useful additions (BRCS Maldives, 2008:26; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:26). They were considered most effective where linkages were made with other community based organisations to allow sharing of information and experiences and encourage coordination of activities ((BRCS Maldives, 2008, SLRCS, 2010). The selection of appropriate members for the committees or action teams was also critical to the success of the programme (AmCross Indonesia, 2010).

‘In the first phase of AmCross’s programme in Indonesia, CBATs were selected by the CDMC and ‘the process was not transparent’ – leading to a low level of commitment from the CBAT as they were not volunteers. In the second phase, CBAT members were recruited through a transparent process (including an interview) and ‘as a result, the selected CBAT members showed a higher level of engagement in ICBRR project implementation’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:21).

It was noted that the sustainability of CBDRR programmes could be improved by:

- Building the capacity of the HNS in resource mobilisation and fundraising so that they can continue to support communities (Belgian



RC Indonesia, 2009:6)

- Running additional simulations (Sida, L, 2010a:43) and providing refresher training to CBATs (Sida, L & Pranawisanty, 2010:40; Sida, L, 2010a:43; DRC Indonesia, 2009:33)
- Running regular public information campaigns (for example about dengue) to keep the community organisations active (Sida, L & Jayawardhana, 2010:44).
- Providing training to the community organisations established (DMTFs) in basic organisation running and fundraising before the end of the programme and support them to make realistic plans for future sustainability (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39)
- Providing training in financial management so that communities can manage emergency/contingency community effectively where these funds have been established (SLRCS, 2010:74)

#### **Data source: Key Informant Interviews**

Generating a high level of community ownership was highlighted by several interviewees in Sri Lanka as critical to the success of CBDRR programmes – particularly in relation to sustainability. This was noted as being particularly challenging in a post-disaster context as the tsunami had created a “dependancy mentality... so changing [that mindset] was difficult”.

It was noted that the VCA and community action planning are key steps in developing community ownership over the programme and that the way in which the VCA is conducted has a significant impact on community ownership. Several interviewees noted that “it is important that [the VCA] belongs to the village, not to the RCRC” and that “the idea for the steps came from the community, they initiated the next steps and the RCRC provided assistance”.

The motivation and capacity of the community committee/action team members was noted as a specific critical factor in Thailand and Indonesia – with particular relevance to the sustainability of CBDRR programmes. In both countries several comments were made that the community action team “must understand that they have the responsibility to implement after the PMI programme” (Indonesia) and that “committee members need to take these responsibilities seriously” (Thailand).

Many of the key informants interviewed described the challenges associated with retaining knowledge and trained personnel within communities and the importance of having procedures so that knowledge and action teams are sustained. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka many of the people selected for the community-based action teams were in their late teens or early twenties – so that they were physically fit enough to assist others in an emergency and had free time to participate in training. However, several interviewees noted that this had a negative impact on the sustainability of CBDRR programmes as many of the team members had left the community to get married or look for work. Where changes in committee/action team members had occurred, challenges were often experienced in identifying replacement members and in handing over information and documentation to the new representatives.

#### **Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

The importance of community engagement and involvement in CBDRR programmes was consistently noted in focus groups in all four countries. In each country examples were cited of good community engagement but there were also assertions that the community had not been adequately informed of or involved in the programme. In Sri Lanka and the Maldives, comments about problematic community engagement and involvement outnumbered the positive examples cited, whereas this was more balanced in Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, inadequate introduction and explanation of the programme was also mentioned as contributing to poor community engagement.

<b>Key determinant</b>
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors.
<b>Justification</b>
Increased integration with other sectors increases the efficiency and impact of CBDRR programmes during implementation and their long-term sustainability as they become part of everyday activities.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop specialist multi-sectoral teams of RCRC staff/volunteers so that the VCA can be used to holistically identify hazards and risks to the community and develop CBDRR programmes (in any sector) which respond to the community's needs</li> <li>• Maximise opportunities for cross-sectoral impacts of activities and the 'multi-purpose' use of mitigation projects – such as creating livelihoods opportunities in construction.</li> <li>• Coordinate projects geographically, rather than sectorally, with greater authority given to a multi-sectoral manager at branch level to allow greater integration of staff, programmes and activities.</li> <li>• Allow longer timeframes for CBDRR programmes to enable the completion of longer-term developmental projects, tackling the root causes of vulnerability and risk (such as livelihoods or health programmes).</li> <li>• A holistic approach, where the CBOs established tackle day-to-day development issues, as well as larger-scale disasters, is encouraged - to increase the relevance of CBDRR activities and increase the sustainability of the CBOs established.</li> <li>• Community-based and school-based DRR programmes are run in the same villages and links are established between them to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ reinforce DRR messages</li> <li>○ increase dissemination of DRR messages</li> <li>○ support the recruitment of new CBDRR volunteers</li> <li>○ support the sustainability of the CBOs established.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Data source: Literature Review</b>
No data
<b>Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned</b>
<p>Around half of the reports/evaluations discussed the advantages or disadvantages of the integration of community-based DRR with schools-based DRR programmes, or with programmes in other sectors (such as shelter and livelihoods (BRC Maldives and Indonesia) or health (Sida, L &amp; Jayawardhana, 2010:18). However, it was noted that where integration does occur, care should be taken to avoid conflict between core and non-core programme activities (Wilderspin, I, 2007).</p> <p>Several external evaluations recommended greater levels of integration between programmes in future projects (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:23; BRCS Maldives, 2008:27; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30) while the British Red Cross recommended that disaster risk reduction should be part of every programme (BRCS Maldives, 2008:4). The VCA was highlighted as a useful tool in the design and</p>

implementation of integrated programmes (Burton, C & Brett, J, 2009:29). However, it was noted that where integration does occur, care should be taken to avoid conflict between core activities and subsidiary activities (Wilderspin, I, 2007:21).

It was noted that mitigation projects can be integrated with other projects to meet multiple objectives, for example livelihoods projects (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:11), and healthcare projects (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:14). While a number of evaluations noted that a holistic approach to hazards, where the community-based organisations established tackle day to day development issues, as well as larger-scale disasters, increases the sustainability of the organisations established (SLRCS, 2010 & Sida, 2010b).

DRR programmes in schools were run alongside community-based DRR programmes in all countries (apart from the Maldives) and ‘schools represent a huge opportunity, especially...if tied to community work’ (Sida, L & Pranawisanty, 2010:40). In Sri Lanka it was recognised that the schools programme was ‘one of the best ways to disseminate DRR activities’ but that the schools programme should be integrated with the CBDRR programme ‘so that the schools programme will not be isolated’, to create strong links between the Disaster Management Committee, SCH and SHI, and ‘so that disaster related information could be collected by school children’ (SLRCS, 2010:xvi & 74).

#### **Data source: Key Informant Interviews**

Several interviewees in Indonesia and Sri Lanka recommended greater integration of CBDRR programmes with other RCRC programmes – frequently health and livelihoods but also organisational development and schools. Crucially, it was noted that communities view resilience holistically - “from their perspective livelihoods, CBDRR and health are overlapping” - and that greater intervention lead to more successful programmes during implementation and greater sustainability of programme impacts.

#### **Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

No data

<b>Key determinant</b>
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.
<b>Justification</b>
To enable CBDRR programmes to be understood by all stakeholders and implemented quickly and efficiently (allowing them to go to scale) while allowing alteration to activities and timelines to meet the needs of specific communities, ensure a bottom-up approach and support greater community ownership.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>Before the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standardised locally agreed and contextualised methodologies for the implementation of CBDRR programmes (including manuals, guidelines and training programmes) already exist prior to implementation</li> </ul> <p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sufficient flexibility is allowed within the standard methodology to allow appropriate communities to be selected and for the programme to be tailored to meet the needs of specific communities.</li> <li>Timelines allow sufficient flexibility to enable changes to be made.</li> <li>Control over the time schedule is given to those involved in implementing it.</li> </ul>
<b>Data source: Literature Review</b>
No data
<b>Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned</b>
A key challenge identified when implementing CBDRR programmes at scale was the conflict between developing simple, standardised, approaches to enable programmes to be replicated at scale and the need for sufficient flexibility to meet the requirements of individual communities. Sida noted that ‘a structured approach to programme design... allows implementation by organisations and staff with limited experience’ (2010b:7) but that ‘ARC wanted to implement a tight programme on budget and on schedule and this does not facilitate open-ended community development type processes’ (Sida, L, 2010a:43). While several evaluations recommended increased flexibility in programme design to ensure that programmes meet the needs of communities, ensure a ‘bottom-up’ approach and support greater community ownership (Sida, L & Jayawardhana, 2010; SLRCS, 2010, Sida, L, 2010a).
<b>Data source: Key Informant Interviews</b>
Linked to both integration and having sufficient time, several interviewees in Sri Lanka noted the importance of having sufficient flexibility within programme design. Several interviewees in Sri Lanka noted that a lack of flexibility in programme design lead to: inappropriate activities, the distribution of inappropriate equipment, an inability to meet the needs identified by communities and running CBDRR programmes in communities which did not need them.
<b>Data source: Focus Group Discussions</b>
In all countries, most communities discussed the appropriateness and effectiveness of CBDRR programme components. Infrastructure, assets,

training, CBAT formation, committees and livelihood support were appreciated. However, in each country some communities noted shortcomings in areas such as:

- inappropriate training (Thailand and the Maldives)
- inappropriate selection of activities (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand)
- incomplete works (Thailand, Sri Lanka)

<b>Key determinant</b>
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes
<b>Justification</b>
To allow time for the completion of all processes and activities and ensure new roles and activities are understood and performed well.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>Before the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>At least</u> three years are allowed for the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes.</li> </ul> <p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timelines are developed in partnership with both experienced PNS/HNS staff and those responsible for implementing the programme at branch level.</li> <li>• Timelines allow sufficient time to recruit and train new staff and work with local government/external partners prior to implementation.</li> <li>• Programmes accommodate key cultural or religious activities and the daily schedules of communities.</li> <li>• Programmes allow time for <u>two-way</u> communication with communities and this requires adequate staff numbers, with specific technical expertise in community participation.</li> </ul>
<b>Data source: Literature Review</b>
Sufficient time. It is important to allow sufficient time to complete all processes and activities within the programme cycle. For example, training activities should be fully completed, to ensure new roles and activities are understood and performed well.
<b>Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned</b>
<p>A common recommendation made within programme evaluations and reports was that more time was needed to complete a CBDRR programme than originally allocated (Burton, C &amp; Brett, J, 2009:21; Kunaphinun, A, 2008:6). Several evaluations recommended that CBDRR programmes require at least a three year timeframe (Burton, C &amp; Brett, J, 2009:21; Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30; Sida, L &amp; Jayawardhana, 2010:44; Sida, 2010b:7).</p> <p>Programmes must allow significant time for two-way communication with communities and this requires adequate staff numbers, with specific technical expertise in community participation (Burton, C &amp; Brett, J, 2009:29; BRCS Maldives, 2008:40). It is also important that programmes accommodate key religious activities (for example it is sensible to avoid activities during Ramadan) (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:25) and the daily schedules of communities to ensure everyone has the opportunity to participate (BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).</p>
<b>Data source: Key Informant Interviews</b>
Several interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia highlighted the importance of having sufficient time to implement CBDRR programmes and sufficient flexibility within the schedule to be able to make changes to suit the needs, capacities and contexts of specific communities. To allow greater flexibility, interviewees in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka recommended greater control over

the time schedule by those involved in implementing it.

**Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

In all countries, most communities discussed the appropriateness and effectiveness of CBDRR programme components. Infrastructure, assets, training, CBAT formation, committees and livelihood support were appreciated. However, in each country some communities noted shortcomings in areas such as:

- incomplete works (Thailand, Sri Lanka)
- inadequate funding (all countries)
- inadequate time for the programme (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)



<b>Key determinant</b>
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes.
<b>Justification</b>
To ensure all programme activities can be completed and prevent delays in implementation while waiting for funds to be released.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budgets and funding sources/timescales are developed in partnership with PNS/HNS staff at NHQ, chapter and branch levels to minimise the risk of over or under budgeting and so that local teams know what to expect and how to plan.</li> <li>• Efficient systems for transferring funds between the PNS and HNS and between HQ and branches are established.</li> <li>• An agreed accounting system is established.</li> <li>• Training in financial management and reporting is provided.</li> <li>• Financial reporting is integrated into standard reporting and monitoring procedures.</li> </ul>
<b>Data source: Literature Review</b>
<p>Budgets. Sufficient funds should be allocated from the start of a programme to allow completion of all planned activities. The establishment of a community-based contingency fund allows for the provision of financial support to victims of a disaster, as well as a source of financing for risk mitigation projects (USIOTWS, 2007).</p> <p>Project management. Preparation, socialisation and approval of operating plans, budgets, log frames are completed (IFRC, 2009).</p>
<b>Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned</b>
<p>The documents reviewed highlighted fewer lessons with regard to financial management although problems were encountered in transferring funds between the PNS and HNS, and from HQ to branch level (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:25; Sida, L, 2010a:37) with delayed or irregular funding making it hard for programmes to maintain momentum.</p> <p>It was recommended that financial management could be improved by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of programme budgets and funding sources/timescales with both board members and staff at National, Chapter and branch levels to ‘minimise the risks of over or under budgeting’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:22) and ‘so that local teams know what to expect and how to plan’ (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:31).</li> <li>• Establishing an agreed accounting system (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30)</li> <li>• Increased reporting (Wilderspin, I, 2007:28)</li> <li>• Undertaking periodical budget monitoring activities (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:22)</li> <li>• Providing ‘training in financial management and reporting’ (Wilderspin, I, 2007:28)</li> </ul>
<b>Data source: Key Informant Interviews</b>

The adequate and timely provision of financial assistance from RCRC & external partners was a challenge identified by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In Sri Lanka delays in the provision of funding meant that “the village was flooded one more time” or that “the VDMC/community [had to] spend their own money - then the branch reimbursed.” In Indonesia challenges were noted with budgets and programmes being set (and revised) by the PNS or Chapter, with knock-on effects on the implementation of programmes on the ground.

**Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

In all countries, most communities discussed the appropriateness and effectiveness of CBDRR programme components. Infrastructure, assets, training, CBAT formation, committees and livelihood support were appreciated. However, in each country some communities noted shortcomings in areas such as:

- incomplete works (Thailand, Sri Lanka)
- inadequate funding (all countries)
- inadequate time for the programme (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives)

<b>Key determinant</b>
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.
<b>Justification</b>
To collect data which enables strategic decisions to be made during programme design, improve the quality of CBDRR programmes as opportunities for improvement can be identified, discussed and acted upon at more regular intervals and capture lessons learnt and best practices to inform future programmes.
<b>A CBDRR programme is more likely to be successful if:</b>
<p>During the programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adequate assessment of the context (including cultural and religious factors) is carried out at the beginning of the project (this can be a baseline assessment).</li> <li>• Monitoring is integrated throughout the project from the start</li> <li>• Standardised formats for reporting (progress and finance) are developed to make it easier to monitor progress and training is provided to branch staff so that they can successfully complete monitoring activities and use the outputs to better manage their programmes.</li> <li>• Paper-based reporting can be supplemented by field visits by senior HNS/PNS staff</li> <li>• Lessons learnt are documented and disseminated through developing guidelines or supporting knowledge transfer between staff</li> </ul> <p>Note: CBDRR programmes may not be appropriate in low risk contexts of middle income countries. Ongoing or recent conflict can also have significant negative impacts on programme implementation.</p>
<b>Data source: Literature Review</b>
Monitoring and evaluation. This should be an ongoing process, to allow the community to constantly monitor, evaluate and update their disaster plans, ensuring they stay relevant (USIOTWS, 2007; Twigg, 2009). As detailed in the branch programme evaluations, knowledge of lessons learnt and best practices can be highlighted by this process, and used to inform future programmes (Sida, 2009).
<b>Data source: Meta-analysis of lessons learned</b>
<p>Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of adequate assessment of the context, including cultural and religious factors, (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:24; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:10) before beginning the design and implementation of CBDRR programmes and the American Red Cross in Indonesia recommended ‘conducting a baseline survey at the beginning of the project helps the team decide on program strategy and key activities’ (AmCross Indonesia, 2010:21).</p> <p>It was noted that CBDRR programmes may not be appropriate in low risk contexts or middle income countries (BRCS Maldives, 2008) and that ongoing or recent conflict can have significant negative impacts on programme implementation (Kunaphinun, A, 2008:24; Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:31; Wilderspin, I, 2007:13; Danish RC Sri Lanka, 2010:4).</p>

Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of developing adequate reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; Kunaphinun, A, 2008:24). It was noted that ‘monitoring findings had a positive impact on the qualitative nature of activities as these were identified, discussed and amended at more regular intervals.’ (Danish RC Indonesia, 2009:18). Yet in order for monitoring to play a useful role it must be integrated throughout the project from the start, rather than added at the end, as it was in the Maldives (BRCS Maldives, 2008:32). Several reports/evaluations highlighted the importance of documenting and disseminating lessons learned (DRC Sri Lanka, 2010:33; SLRCS, 2010:xvi; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39), specifically through developing guidelines (SLRCS, 2010) or supporting knowledge transfer between staff (Bhatt, M.R., 2009:30; BRCS Maldives, 2008:39).

**Data source: Key Informant Interviews**

The importance of having adequate monitoring and evaluation procedures, to enable progress to be monitored and programme adjustments made, was highlighted by interviewees in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, but “one of our weaknesses is the M&E” and challenges were experienced in both countries with limited time and capacity. Monthly field visits by senior PNS staff had been a successful strategy for one PNS in Indonesia while it was recommended that future CBDRR programmes should have standardised formats for reporting (progress and finance) to make it easier for the Chapter to monitor progress.

**Data source: Focus Group Discussions**

No data

## **B6**      **Performance of the CBDRR programmes with reference to the *key determinants***

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	THAILAND IFRC	THAILAND American Red Cross
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>		
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	Community selection criteria included "willingness of local stakeholders to participate in the intervention" (p.8), and a note was also made that "The readiness and willingness of other local stakeholders and community members are key preliminary factors" (p.24)	Communities were only selected if they wanted a CBDRR and saw the value of it (p.33), however low levels of participation prevented further increases in capacity (p.23)
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	Branches were trained and capacity increased by the programme (p.15-16), which also included increasing institutional systems and developing integrated DM plans. Still greater need for HNS internal coordination (p.23) "Human resources is the major challenge of the programme implementation." more full time staff needed to take responsibility of implementation (p.24)	Thai RC has had a CBDRR programme since pre-2004 tsunami, hence is not implementing it blind, with no previous experience (p.15) ARC and TRC shared management of the project, without any delays being caused to its delivery, although some misunderstandings took time to resolve (p.35) "TRCS could not deploy sufficient numbers of staff to deliver the project at the desired scale in the timeframe" (p.6); staffing matters had a great impact upon the project delivery (p.36)
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	"Coordination and partnerships at national and local levels has been strengthened through programme activities. TRCs built up closer relationship with government and NGOs during programme intervention." (p.23) "Good practice was the agreement of the Local Tambon (sub-district) Administration Office to integrate [the] community disaster risk reduction plan in the CBDRR process into the TAO's annual plan." (p.22)	In the extent that the programme fits within national policy it reflects best practice (p.17-18) When RC withdraws the programme is to be handed over to DDPM and the provincial authorities, under the Governor (p.18); convention that president of TRC provincial chapter is the wife of the Governor
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>		
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	"The sense of ownership needs to be further developed in the communities" (p.23) 12 communities created HCVA maps as part of community disaster risk management process (p.18) 12 communities have a disaster management committee in place, however little elaborated upon in terms of training, sustainability and effectiveness. (p.18)	Process steps of the programme needed further refining to ensure the programme is more participatory (p.43); suggestion that participation results were not fully heard/participation didn't occur to a sufficient degree (p.23). "the programme does things for communities rather than with them" (p.32) Formation of CBATS, all of which seemed to be well organised at time of evaluation (p.22). HVCAs completed but hazard ranking exercise and others made little use of community-identified information (p.32). Apart from maps PRA tools were largely symbolic (p.6)
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors	Integrated with first aid/water sanitation components; recommendation of benefits of further integration (23-25)	
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.	Unknown - Report written at end of 1st phase of programme, projects in several communities were due to be carried over into next phase, however there is no detail on whether any changes have been made to the design of this second phase as a result of the first.	Failure to adapt programme in response to local hazard conditions - did not teach people to respond to hazards other than tsunamis (p.28), however the programme process was refined from 13 steps to 8 (p.65-66), and also the design evolved over time in response to experience (p.6). Suggestion of budget driven planning rather than planning driven by realistic and appropriate assessment results (p.32)
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>		
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes		Project scaled back midway through and no-cost time extension implemented, but "The timeframe too was short, even with an extension and a scaling back of ambition" (p.6)
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes		Programme was delivered slightly under-budget, although it retained the same funds, despite scaling back in scope (p.35)
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.	"Effective reporting and M&E mechanisms are needed to be developed for future implementation." (p.24) Indicating that they were not already in place.	AmCross has advanced M&E systems however focus of monitoring seems to be on expenditure and deadlines, rather than project success and sustainability (p.38)
<b>Reference</b>	<b>Kunaphinun (2008)</b>	<b>Sida (2010a)</b>

<b>MALDIVES</b>	
<b>British Red Cross</b>	
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>	
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	Communities struggled to see value in programme, due to low risk context of the Maldives (p.26). Many people who were trained in DM skills have subsequently left the islands, as they were fairly young individuals, thus taking with them the increased community capacity. (p.26) Where communities were led by older, more authoritative figureheads (over half the communities) they were able to motivate communities and CBDRR programmes were most effective (p.27)
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	"There have been difficulties in getting a coordinated position with other Red Cross partners, particularly so in the case of DRR where AM Cross and BRCS work on the same islands and have on occasions undermined each others programmes." (p.27) BRCS operated a "light" staffing policy which is blamed for leaving community mobilisers undersupervised and unable to effectively communicate (p.3). High delegate staff turnover too (p.34)
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	Desire to maintain neutrality from government (p.29), but reports that government involvement would have been beneficial (p.31) Programme was hugely supported by RedR project managers in the government's Housing and Infrastructure Development Unit (p.30), and "Much effort and work has been put into establishing better DM networks and linkages with authorities...some gains have been made" (p.26). Creation of PRSCs to liaise with governments (p.29-30) More government involvement in demobilisation may have been beneficial (p.31), also feeling that more could have been done to increase public awareness and familiarity with DM, for longer term impacts (p.27) No clear support for programme following RC withdrawal outlined, possibly due to failure to engage with government/local authorities (p. 31)
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>	
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	"Efforts have been made in ensuring that socially inclusive methods of community consultation, communication and monitoring have been used across the programme." (p.3). More direct community communication was needed however. Formation of Disaster Management Task Forces, which were noted as "enthusiastic" (p.5)
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors	CBDRR as subsidiary to livelihoods programme; comment made that is should have been more integrated (p.27) Construction programme integrated DM aspects into home, rainwater harvesting projects cited as very successful (p.26)
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.	Programme was not able to be implemented effectively due to the initial programme design (p.29) however many aspects were reactive in nature, i.e. responding to minimise problems which became evident/were created by initial feasibility and design phases.
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>	
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes	4 year project planned, however report completed before its end. Note that log frame was poorly put together (p.29)
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes	
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.	Monitoring occurred, but was given a very low priority in the DM part of the programme (described as a "last minute add-on") p.32
<b>Reference</b>	? (2008)

	INDONESIA	INDONESIA
	American Red Cross	Belgian Red Cross
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>		
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	Communities were unable to maintain or complete mitigation projects (ibid, p.17)	"communities have some proactive and highly motivated... CBATs and community members." (p.5)
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	Comment that field staff had "limited knowledge" (p.28) Capacity building of PMI disaster response was considered very successful (p.6), although impacts were hard to measure (p.6) PMI has good strategy for maintaining readiness of its branches, training of SATGANAs members is increasing, however overall PMI branch capacity, and hence support for communities will likely decline over time. (p.34)	"PMI and communities have some proactive and highly motivated PMI board members [and] volunteers." (p.5) "Strong linkages were developed between PMI chapter, branches and the communities." (p.5) Whilst volunteers motivated and sustained committees and teams they were heavily dependent on direction from branch (p.4) Following the programme there has been a change in mind-set of PMI which provides a solid foundation for DRR (p.1)
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	Lack of national framework to support schools programme (p.6) At time of report writing, government was "putting in place a new national response structure that will eventually reach down to the community level." (p.6). Attempt to build relationship with Tsunami Disaster Monitoring and Research Centre of Syiah Kuala University, however there have been delays in this partnership due to the TDMRC being a young organisation (p.19-20).	Government recognises, and hence supports, PMI as first responder in case of disaster (p.9) PMI has established advocacy channels with provincial governments, which should ensure sustainability of programmes in the future (p.9).
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>		
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	Due to reduced timeframe/limited knowledge of staff the role of the HVCA was reduced (p.28) Failure to place the HVCA at the heart of the programme decreased level of community participation and ownership (p.28). CBATs created, but comments that to ensure their sustainability they should be linked to PMI formally, and PMI should do refresher training sessions for them which is not done now (p.7). Despite establishment of CBATs there was significant variation in operational capability when evaluated (p.15) Need to build "better institutional linkages to the CBAT" (p. 20 & 34)	VCA completed with community participation, results were presented back to the community as educative activity on hazards, vulnerability etc (p.4) "Community participants are extensively involved in the planning and implementation stages of the programme. Starting from conducting the baseline surveys to VCA the communities were fully involved in this process. This participatory approach puts the community as the backbone of the programme." (p.3) CBATs and family focus groups were created and training took place (p.2).
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors	Despite being described as integrated, there is little evidence of this - integrated aspects removed to simplify the programme (p.27-28)	No other RCRC programmes in Belgian RC CBDRR communities
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.	Comments that "project design needs to be simplified" to allow implementation elsewhere (p.6). Design did not work in practice, so original implementation process steps were redefined (p. 26-27)	There have been no shifts, by time of report writing, from the original project document (p.3)
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>		
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes	A final push to complete programme activities "may have affected the depth of understanding and commitment in some villages. A longer time frame may have guaranteed greater sustainability." (p.6)	
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes	Funds available were adequate, however their timely distribution was limited by the PMI's limited capacity to handle the funds (p.35)	
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.	PMI did not have the capacity to manage the financial reporting systems, and the monitoring regime failed to pick up on delays/was not useful for PM staff as a way of measuring success (p.36)	
<b>Reference</b>	Sida & Pranawisanty (2010)	Belgian Red Cross (2009)



	INDONESIA	
	British Red Cross	Canadian Red Cross
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>		
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	Communities selected from those in which TRP was already providing livelihoods/housing support (p.21), feeling that there was minimal buy-in for CBDRR in communities (p.21)	
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	Capacity building of the HNS was attempted but not successful (p.25) Partnerships formed between BRCS and IFRC/other PNS (p.27) Frequent staff turnover and lack of technical skills, in phase 1 in particular (p.24) Poor or underdeveloped systems.	"Efforts in disaster management have focussed on building PMI capacity to reduce community risk of future disasters." (p.4) However not all aspects were addressed, and focus was upon HR, project management and relations with government and NGOs (p.14) CRC and PMI completed some aspects of programme design together, however the final design was set by CRC, and was too ambitious for PMI to implement - better communication could have avoided this, and should be developed (p.21). Staff frequently left to take up better paid roles elsewhere (p.25)
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	Government early warning system/DRR structures exist however they are not clear (p.21) Significant efforts made to engage with actors inside and outside the RC (p.27), some partnerships formed with INGOS led to longer-term relationships whilst others struggled in achieving desired results (p.27) Agreements made with Auscare to complete work started by the BRCS in one district (p.21), however once Auscare withdraws sustainability of projects is at risk.	Establishing relations with key government agencies is cited as one element of PMI capacity building undertaken but little further detail on this (p.15) Need for greater linkage of systems and communications with national systems and local authorities and stakeholders (p.7) "A project exit strategy is currently under development." but no clear form exists yet. Mention of need to establish partnerships to ensure sustainability. (p.17) Report written at mid-phase. Doubts were raised over the sustainability of the programme following RC withdrawal. Unsure who would do what. (p.18)
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>		
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	Due to time constraints "The TRP shifted from a focus on community participation in decision-making and implementation, ... to one of BRCS-led implementation" (p.25) Reports also that communities did not always spend grants on what they were intended for (p.v) but increased community awareness was noted (p.vii). HVCA completed but results were not used effectively (p.21) CBATs were created and trained, however travel restrictions often prevented CBAT members reaching training sessions. CBATs also reported that many of their suggested mitigation projects had not been approved (p.20-21)	Note that community consultation should have occurred earlier in the programme. (p.11) CBATs were created, although rather late in the project (p.26). These were cited as "one of the most significant achievements" of the programme (p.7). Need for further training however was highlighted (p.8), and suggestions for how better to allow CBAT engagement (p.24) Increase in awareness and change in behaviour of community members; CBATs have used skills learnt in training to respond in later disaster events. However impact has been greatest for those who are members of the CBATs (p.7) Caution that CBATs may not last, due to insufficient training (p.7-8)
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors	Integrated in communities where British Red Cross was providing housing and/or LLH support (p.iv)	CBDRR implemented in communities where Canadian Red Cross has built houses (p.11) Mitigation projects (culvert construction (p.7), and also some which addressed livelihood issues (p.11), cited as particularly successful).
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.	PMI decided to remain focussed on overall strategic plan rather than to integrate further with other BRCS projects (p.25), and a focus on meeting assigned deadlines rather than having a greater impact (p.26)	Programme was not scaled back or redesigned to reflect the capacities of PMI, having been created by the Canadian RC (p.14)
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>		
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes	Timeframe was too short and should have been at least 3 years; "programme duration has been too short to build sustainable disaster preparedness capacity within fragmented, traumatised communities" (p.21)	Report based on data collected mid-term of programme (p.4) however recognition is made of the need for a minimum of 3 years of time to implement a programme effectively (p.30). Time estimates for several activities were "off mark significantly" and activities were rushed as a result (p.24)
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes	Implementation faced major challenges due to lack of resources (p.21)	Transfer of funds from CRC to PMI was delayed, meaning that "PMI finds it hard to maintain momentum when resource flows are not predictable." (p.25)
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.		
<b>Reference</b>	<b>Burton &amp; Brett (2009)</b>	<b>Bhatt (2009)</b>

	INDONESIA	SRI LANKA
	Danish Red Cross	IFRC
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>		
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	Communities selected as "belonging to the areas worst hit by the 2004 tsunami", also selected as places where accompanying RC programmes were also in operation (p.9). "The programme gave high priority to building capacities in communities." (p.10), and capacity to respond to disasters was felt to have been enhanced by the programme (p.28)	"Communities were not consulted in selection process"; however there is a recommendation made that selection should be finalised by a stakeholder workshop (p.70&73) SLRCS not necessarily trusted by communities due to previous activities in conflict (its intentions were doubted) (p.60) "Community's capacity to cope with disasters increased rapidly due to CBDRM project activities" and "CBDRM project has lead to progressive improvements in safety and community resilience" (p. 44 & 66)
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	"Programme supported the development of a national fundraising strategy for PMI" (p.10) "PMI's capacity to provide timely assistance to disaster victims has been strengthened" (p.29). Capacity has been developed by provision of equipment and material resources, as well as organisational capacity building of staff. High drop-out/turn-over rates of volunteers (p.32)	Branch capacity development ranked excellent (p.67-68) Recognition of importance of link between branch and NHQ, but notes some actions taken by staff on the ground were not in interest of project objectives. (p.67). Poor dissemination of information between NHQ and branch level. Close relationship was NOT established between branch and NHQ. (p.68) Importance of staff training is highlighted, under "Areas needing to be improved" (p.71)
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	Socialisation and information sharing with local governments helped "increase the rapport between the programme, its intentions and the joint obligations of the [local] Government Unit and ICBRR in addressing community risk reduction measures and community development issues." (p.16) The "programme supported... advocacy for government support for ICBRR." (p.10) Local governments looked to to sustain the programme following RC withdrawal. "The increase in communicational ties between PMI and the local government, will be paramount in sustaining risk reduction initiatives at community level." (p.30)	National Disaster Management Act no. 13 established in 2005; CBDRM is supported as a thematic area by roadmap of Sri Lankan Disaster Management (and the SLRCS), produced 2006 by Ministry of Disaster Management & Human Rights (p.4) Little support from local government mentioned, except the comment that there is a need to increase involvement of local authorities (p.76)
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>		
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	Participatory approach was adopted throughout (p.10); and was considered important for PMI staff and volunteers AND community. PRA/VCA was a core programme activity, and used as a foundation for social analysis (p.11). They were used as "self-learn" exercises for communities before undertaking risk mapping. (p.14) Established CBATs, regular leader meetings, training (p.12-15) (also refresher training discussed, p.19-20)	"Community participation at project implementation stage was commendable. Community contribution was reflected by the stakeholders' appreciation of most of the mitigation and preparedness projects." (p.xi) VCA credited as "one of the best participatory methods of project implementation and creating awareness at the same time." (p.17) Creation of VDMC, and VATs(p.10). VDMCs found to be operating effectively in evaluation (p.70) Emergency funds started by most VDMCs, cited as good initiative (p.71)
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors	Programme followed on from Primary Production Support Programme (p.8), and communities selected already had psychosocial and livelihoods programmes running there (p.9)	
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.	Following initial baseline surveys, and KAP exercises/VCA, community identified needs and proposed actions informed the revised programme that was implemented the following year (p.4)	"Project objectives [were] formulated at the national level, those objectives did not meet the ground conditions" (p.70). This caused implementation problems due to the relative inflexibility of the programme design (p.70)
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>		
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes	Objectives were achieved within the project timescale (p.4)	
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes	Budget appears to have been managed and monitored carefully and responsively (p.23)	High levels of awareness of need to ensure funds for communities, and efforts made to secure this (p.46).
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.	After a brief period of irregular monitoring, formal monitoring resumed, and "had a positive impact on the qualitative nature of activities as these were identified, discussed and amended at more regular intervals." (p.18)	
<b>Reference</b>	<b>Danish Red Cross (2009)</b>	<b>SLRCS (2010)</b>

	SRI LANKA	
	American Red Cross	Danish Red Cross
<b>STAKEHOLDERS</b>		
The motivation and capacity of the community and community leaders.	Communities took a lot of convincing to see the value of the programme, and this was only sustained when they were driving the programme agenda, i.e. Within the mitigation projects. (p.30) Community responses in evaluation suggested a variation in success/capacity to respond of the communities (throughout)	Programme was implemented in an area that was "not a disaster prone district" (p.4), which suggests communities may not have instantly seen the value of the programme
The motivation and capacity of the RCRC stakeholders and the strength of partnerships between them.	Team environment plagued by sentiments of suspicion (ARC controlling and scrutinising budgets), clashes over who to hire etc. (p.38). IFRC did not take opportunity to mentor the HNS, and the HQ was less committed than the branches (p.39) 170 SLRCS staff were recruited for the programme, which was a significant upscale in human resources. The energy and commitment of SLRCS staff were highly commended, and responsible for many of the successes of the programme (p.39) Efforts made to enhance response capacity of branches at early stage of programme (p.18), and programme has had a positive impact upon SLRCS branches, in part due to upscaling of human resources, and also via increased support from the RC (p.27)	Branch had limited experience, before the programme, due to "non-presence of severe disaster threat". However after the programme more of this experience was felt to have been obtained, and the capacity of the branch significantly improved (p.26) Establishment and maintenance of dialogue channels between DRC and SLRCS HQ and branch levels. This was noted as crucial for clear understanding of roles/responsibilities in activities and budgeting (p.31) Staffing systems were being re-engineered at the time of the report's writing. Concern expressed that "no programme staff have been retained to continue with programme activities." (p.29) and that this could contribute to future programme failure (p.35).
The capacity of external actors and the strength of partnerships with them (government, NGOs, private sector)	Following the tsunami, government policy was changed to recommend "that committees were formed at village level to respond to disasters." (p.14). DP programme "falls firmly within a policy framework both for community based disaster preparedness and response" (p.30). Schools programmes implemented within supportive government framework policy (p.24), which in turn the programme fed back into (p.30) District level government played important role in supporting the programme (p.30) and even participating in training and mitigation projects. Excellent in terms of relationships developed with government, particularly at district level (p.30). Linkages developed with Disaster District Management Units to support VDMCs after programme completion (p.35) An innovative partnership was also developed with the National Building Research	Lack of national level policies, procedures, tools and frameworks related to the project implementation (p.8) Local government had limited understanding/capacities in terms of CBDRM (p.8), however 100% approval and acceptance was granted from respective local governments (p.17) Maintained good coordination and collaboration with disaster management partners (p.9) and linked CBDRM programme activities with the government and other partners with similar activities in the same communities.
<b>PROGRAMME DESIGN</b>		
The level of community participation and ownership of the CBDRR programme	HVCAs completed but little of the gathered data was used to full potential (p.32) VDMCs established, however by evaluation responsiveness and effectiveness of these VDMCs were hugely varied (p.15) Measures have been taken to ensure continuity of interest in the programme and work of VDMCs (p.35), roughly half communities established contingency funds (p.15). Mitigation projects relied heavily on community contribution, but communities rarely drove the agenda in mitigation activities (p.43) and some were stalled/unstarted due to lack of this contribution (p.15).	Full participation of community members in assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring (p.8). Also acknowledged as good practice: "Creating ownership of the programme by the beneficiaries. Giving them a clear understanding that the programme output benefit is for them alone" (p.9) Community Disaster Response Teams created and trained (p.28) although little further detail of how effectively they have performed. VCAs conducted in communities and as part of schools programmes. Used with PRA tools to increase branch knowledge and capacity as well as that of communities (p.26)
The level of integration of CBDRR programmes with other sectors	Combined mitigation projects with those implemented by other ARC programmes (wat/san for example) (p.31)	Schools based disaster management programme (inc. Mitigation activities) (p.15), early warning system implemented and further community projects such as well-digging (p.29)
Having an appropriate balance between standardisation and flexibility in the programme design.	Programme had sufficient flexibility to allow innovation to emerge (p.31), but many hazard kits were not relevant to the most pressing hazards of the communities who received them (p.33)	Log-frame had to be revised to re-align activities with actual/present implementation (p.6) The "Achievements of programme outputs compared to plans" suggests that there was some degree of revision made, where activities or objectives were found to be irrelevant to the situation. (p.10-20)
<b>PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b>		
Having sufficient time to complete CBDRR programmes	Programme was scaled back in 2008/9, feedback on programme suggested it was too short and should have run for at least 3 years (p.30)	
Having sufficient funding for and financial management of CBDRR programmes	Funding was a contentious issue on the project; varied amounts distributed in different areas (p.32). ARC also controlled the budget and used its own management system for this which delayed provision by the SLRCS (p.38)	One significant constraint, contributing to future programme failure, is identified as "Lack of financial support to implement the disaster management programme particularly at the branch level." (p.34)
Having adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation procedures.	ARC used its own monitoring systems, in finance for example, which prevented adoption of a single, shared system. This caused confusion and delays (p.38). Monitoring was commonly based on numerical targets which were not updated to keep them relevant as the programme progressed (p.40)	Systems for reporting and monitoring did exist but some were so complex (i.e. The finance system of the SLRCS) that they delayed activities. (p.32). SLRCS and DRC had separate systems which also consumed more time.
<b>Reference</b>	Sida & Jayawardhana (2010)	Danish Red Cross (2010)

# The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

**Humanity** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

**Impartiality** It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

**Neutrality** In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

**Independence** The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

**Voluntary service** It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

**Unity** There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

**Universality** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.

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